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1.1 Problem statement: Water governance as everyday politics 
 
“What would you do... sell your land to get benefits from the mine? Or keep your land to 
leave to your children as their inheritance?”, 
“What to do... we want water but also jobs” ...,“and if we believe the [miners]...do you think 
they will keep their promises?” 
These are statements by farmers in rural communities in Peru’s Cajamarca and 
Apurímac regions in the Andes about their experiences living with large-scale mining 
companies. They reflect the dilemmas and ambivalences they face when the subsoil 
under their territories has been given as concessions to large-scale mining companies. 
Many community members welcome the new opportunities for jobs and earning 
incomes that mining companies may offer. They are also glad about how mining 
companies re-invest part of their profits in their area of operations: schools, hospitals, 
roads, etc. get constructed thanks to their contributions. Yet, they are often much less 
positive about the significant losses of access and rights to land and water that mining 
operations produce, as well as of their reduced autonomy to make decisions about 
these resources. Living with a mining company as a new neighbour is challenging: the 
presence of mines alters waterscapes and territories in ways that are both unexpected 
and difficult to resist or influence, as mining companies have much more economic 
and legal power than communities. In this thesis, communities are considered as 
groups of rural or small-scale farmer families sharing particular socio, economic, 
cultural and territorial commonalities, and being similarly affected and influenced by 
the presence of mining companies. Yet, communities are also marked by differences 
in power, race, class, gender and beliefs, while community members may also react 
differently to the changes provoked by mining activities – depending on positions, 
interests, and affiliations and royalties. Some communities importantly differ between 
each other depending on their political-legal status: where some are recognized by the 
state as “comunidades campesinas”, others are not or are only starting legal recognition 
processes. 
  Chapter 1 
11 
 
This thesis presents an in-depth portrayal and analysis of how communities and 
mining companies navigate these challenges, focusing in particular on those related to 
water. It documents community members’ efforts to continue to access, manage and 
control the water that they need for their livelihoods, the same water that mining 
companies need and claim for their operations. Yet, while thus competing for water 
with the mining company, communities members also often want to get ‘the best from 
the bad’ and pro-actively approach companies for employment opportunities or with 
requests to invest in development projects for their localities. This double bind – of 
wanting to benefit from and thus becoming dependent on, while at the same time 
being threatened by mining companies - is what fundamentally characterizes 
community-mine relations. Community members may combine efforts to resist the 
company’s appropriation of water resources with strategies to befriend the mining 
company in order to obtain jobs or other benefits, or choose one of the two strategies. 
For many of them, living with mines consists of sometimes paradoxical combinations 
of resistance, struggle, negotiations or the forging of alliances, with community 
members as well as mining company representatives tactically shifting positions 
depending on the context as well as on how long and well they know each other.  
In Peru, the state has pro-actively promoted and welcomed mining investments, 
particularly since the 1990s. In many instances, community-mine interactions have 
resulted in conflicts. In some cases these have led to the abandoning of mining plans 
altogether, some examples are the Mount Quilish and Conga in Cajamarca. Also in 
Tambogrande, Piura, the outcome of a local referendum was that communities should 
be allowed to continue farming in the area, thereby stopping large-scale mining 
interventions in the region (Muradian et al. 2003, McGee 2009). Many other 
community-mine interactions instead ended in sometimes long-winded negotiations, 
occasionally through round-tables specifically designed for the purpose. Espinar, 
Cusco (see de Echave et al. 2009a, Dominguez 2010) is an example here. Round-table 
negotiations have helped channel complaints, and facilitated the design of solutions 
that allowed farmers to continue practicing small-scale agriculture in spite of the 
presence of mining operations. 
Introduction 
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Most accounts of community-mining interactions are done against a desired outcome. 
Hence, those identifying with social or environmental justice movements tend to 
describe them in terms of the relative success of resistance to mining operations, and 
consider attempts to reconcile conflicts between companies and communities as 
necessarily suspect, signifying co-optation of the communities by the mines and the 
state. Those identifying with a government perspective instead consider conflict and 
resistance as signs of unwanted trouble; a hindrance to the supposed progress that 
mining development generates. Rather than as expressions of discontent, state officials 
may interpret community opposition to mining operations as ways to blackmail 
companies for (more) benefits: “People do not want water, they want money”, and “when 
communities impacted by mining negotiate with companies, they think they are rubbing 
Aladdin’s lamp”. Third parties such as NGOs may describe conflicts in view of 
identifying possible ways to technically or legally resolve them, or to propose 
processes of mediation or re-conciliation.  
In this thesis, I make an explicit attempt to portray the interactions between mining 
companies and communities in a less teleological manner. My starting point is an 
explicit acknowledgment of the fact that these interactions are characterized by messy 
politics: they consist of struggles, negotiations and compromises that are always 
provisional. They reflect the paradoxes that emerge when parties try living together in 
a mutually dependent but very unequal relationship. By shaking off the temptation to 
romanticize indigenous communities as environmental protectors, and by remaining 
sceptical about providential techno-fixes as solutions to the socio-environmental 
problems caused by mining development, this thesis thus analyzes community-mine 
interactions as embedded in forced relations between very unequally positioned 
partners.  
By embracing the messiness of situational processes and relations, my ambition is to 
not only describe the social and environmental changes provoked by mining 
operations, but also to shed light on how everyday water politics play out in 
contentious mining contexts. By doing this, I aim to contribute to a newly emerging 
field of practice-based water governance studies and theorizations.  
  Chapter 1 
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1.2 Research design  
1.2.1 Research objective and research questions 
This thesis sets out to understand what happens with water in contexts of mineral 
extraction, by looking at how and by whom water is accessed, controlled and 
governed. By focusing on their inherently situated, complex and power-laden 
character, I describe the messy processes of water politics in mining contexts to shed 
light on how mining reconfigures water governance arrangements. This, in turn, 
allows me to contribute to practice-based theorizations of water governance. 
The research develops around the following research question: 
How does water governance evolve in contexts of large mining operations in the 
Peruvian Andes?  
I have approached this question as consisting of two broad and interconnected themes. 
The first is about control over resources: the (legal and less legal) ways of accessing water 
and making decisions about it. The second is about representation: ways of knowing 
and speaking for water, linked to relations of accountability. In mining contexts, both 
are inherently contested, yet some mechanisms of control and some forms of 
representation are (considered) more legitimate than others or carry greater weight.  
1.2.2 Navigating roles and positions: Research sites and methods 
Research sites. For this thesis, two regions of Peru were selected as fieldwork sites for 
case studies: Cajamarca and Apurímac (see Figure 1). To “follow the mines”, I selected 
those areas because they have high records of discontent associated with mining 
investments. My consideration was that conflicts over water would provide a useful 
entry point for beginning to trace and identify opinions, actors, interests and positions 
and thus for starting to unravel how water and its access and control is arranged and 
contested.  
Cajamarca and Apurímac are the two regions with the highest number of socio-
environmental conflicts in Peru over the last five years. It is no coincidence that these 
are also among the regions with the highest concentration of large mining investments 
(Apurímac, Arequipa and Cajamarca). Apurímac and Cajamarca have been the main 
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destinations for mining investment during the last fifteen years. Cajamarca is a region 
with a long history of struggles, disagreements and conflicts between the Yanacocha 
gold mine and the urban and rural areas surrounding its operations. In Apurímac, 
even though levels of contention appear lower than in Cajamarca, many frictions did 
emerge when mining concessions had just been granted and the project was still in the 
exploration phase (Gouley 2005, de Echave et al. 2009a, de Echave 2014). These 
simmering dissatisfactions provided for a fertile ground for protest to erupt as soon as 
operations began in the Las Bambas mine in Apurímac.  
Chronologically, I started this research by visiting Cajamarca, looking at a mining 
company that had been operating for over fifteen years in the area. In comparison with 
Apurímac, what is interesting is that Cajamarca’s mining history dates from before 
colonial times (O' Phelan Godoy 1993, Pérez Mundaca 2010) 
 
Figure 1. Location of the main research sites in Peru. Source: adapted by C. Cerdán. 
Doing research on contentious issues. Doing research in such conflict-ridden areas on 
precisely the theme that is the topic of contention comes with challenges and 
difficulties. The collection of information is inevitably coloured by the strong emotions 
and opinions that characterize the conflict. Particularly at the start of the research, 
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communities’ attitudes – while being mostly open, warm, and friendly – towards non-
local researchers (even if Peruvian) can easily turn into distrust. This is testimony of 
the research topic’s extreme political sensitivity: the topic lies at the heart of strongly 
polarized opinions among and even within families as well as between community 
members and others about the transformations that mining provokes.  
This influenced my research in at least three ways. For one, I became deeply aware 
about how ways of knowing and understanding water and its governance are always 
deeply entangled with normative and political ideas about how it should be governed 
and managed. To some extent I learned to unravel such entanglements, and also came 
to understand the importance of making my own position and opinions explicit. I also 
became aware of how it is impossible to study community-mining interactions without 
somehow getting involved and (being seen as) taking a position. Being trained as a 
biologist – ecologist, this was new to me. I had learnt to subtract myself from the 
subject being studied, as a way to remain as objective and neutral as possible. Now, I 
came to understand how a researcher is always part of and therefore influences the 
world she studies (Burawoy 1998, Billo and Hiemstra 2013).  
Yet, and this is the second implication of doing research in a politically charged 
environment, I had to express my opinions with caution if I wanted to be able to talk 
to all involved actors. It was impossible not to feel and experience the tension that 
marked the overall atmosphere in my research areas. I was for instance regularly 
confronted with company security guards who blocked public roads to check for IDs 
and credentials. During field work, I was constantly ‘accompanied’ by someone – 
supposedly a security guard from the mining company - who followed and observed 
me from a distance. Sometimes, farmer fieldwork collaborators preferred to send me 
alone to walk along some parts of the irrigation canals, because these were located in 
contested areas. On one occasion, angry farmers in Cajamarca with axes in their hands 
kicked out an official state monitoring group that I was following, saying “I don’t bother 
you in your offices, so don’t bother me here at my house”. I could give many more examples 
of how I became mixed up in the game of watching and being watched that is an 
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important element of how mining companies and communities interact with each 
other (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Researcher during fieldwork. Front page of local newspaper reporting the mobilization of 
farmers from Combayo. Source: El Mercurio, Cajamarca, December 2010. 
Very similar to how communities and mining companies navigated their sometimes 
contradictory positions and interests, I also was forced to learn how to navigate my 
alliances and position. While I clearly had greatest sympathy for those who stood to 
lose or were losing their access to and control over water – members of the 
communities -, I needed to express this sympathy with caution so as not to lose the 
possibility to also meet with and learn from the ideas and perspectives of the mining 
company and state representatives. I sometimes also had to give up on research plans. 
This for instance happened with the water-quality sampling that I had wanted to do, 
to understand the influence of mining on the quality of the water in creeks and rivers 
that communities use. Besides technical challenges of preserving the samples until 
their delivery to the lab, it proved challenging to get the necessary permissions. Not 
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only were the permissions from the mining company needed to enter the different sites 
almost impossible to get, but also the communities themselves were not so keen for 
studies to happen in their areas. Both mistrusted this activity and were suspicious 
about what would happen with the findings. This is why, early on in the field work, I 
decided not to sample water quality. I did help conduct water-quantity assessments 
for the Chonta Water Users’ Association in Cajamarca (JURCH), to determine water 
availability in the hydraulic networks and in the watershed (CEDEPAS 2009). 
In a similar way, it proved challenging to conduct questionnaires. When I tried doing 
it, many community members whom I had had friendly conversations with earlier 
became reluctant to participate. One of them, “for more security”, sent me first to the 
governor of the town. The governor explained to me that people in the area are 
suspicious about what can happen when they help with forms or questionnaires, 
because questionnaires and forms were also used by mining companies prior to 
exploration and extraction. The company used these to get permission from the 
farmers to start their operations, often without the latter realizing this. By sending me 
to the governor, farmers hoped to receive some assurance about the purpose of my 
activities in the area, proving in particular that I did not have anything to do with the 
mining companies. 
The third implication of studying a conflictive issue is that it required time and energy 
to establish the trust needed to have meaningful conversations and interviews. I 
needed to continuously re-establish my own trustworthiness, against suspicions and 
allegations that I was a spy. Once, in Tambobamba, Apurímac, close to the area of the 
Las Bambas mine, I attended an event organized by CooperAccion, a national NGO 
working on topics of mining, natural resources and local development1. Some consider 
this an anti-mine organization. The event was about natural resources and mining in 
Las Bambas and gathered different actors from the area, including farmer leaders, local 
authorities, NGOs, and representatives of the mining company Xstrata. At some point 
during the meeting, a leader from Fuerabamba (a community that was working closely 
with the mining managers), asked the organizers: Why are you sending students to spy 
                                                     
1 See http://cooperaccion.org.pe/main/index.php 
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on the communities, saying that they are from foreign universities when they are actually 
working for anti-mine organizations? The organizers replied ... “I think this question is for 
you, Milagros, come to the front and give an answer”. Incidences like this happened several 
times. Similarly, I was often questioned about my roles and affiliations with public 
organizations in Cajamarca, with farmers trying to establish my trustworthiness and 
wanting to know if I was there to somehow support them and the communities in their 
struggle against the mining company or just another one of those visitors who do 
nothing for people’s struggles, meaning state officials.  
Methods. Within the two regions, snowball methods (Ranjit 2011) were used to select 
particular incidences or manifestations of socio-environmental conflict. In Cajamarca, 
I selected one ongoing water dispute as well as a past socio-environmental conflicts as 
entry-points for my investigation. I traced the main features of the disputes, the 
strategies used and actions displayed by various actors, focusing on laying bare how 
water governance arrangements evolved, were negotiated or contested (see Chapters 
3, 4 and 5). In Apurímac, interactions between communities and the ongoing Las 
Bambas mining project were taken as events to analyse how water-governance 
arrangements are negotiated or contested when mining is not yet operating and how, 
at that stage, mining influences local water institutions (see Chapter 2). 
The actual fieldwork consisted of repeated visits to several Andean communities in 
Cajamarca and Apurímac, during a period of two years (from 2009 to 2011). I 
complemented this with interviews with state officials in Lima during 2012 and 2015 
with a follow-up in 2016. In total, I visited about twenty communities. In Cajamarca, I 
had dual residence, as do many farmers in the area: I had a place to stay in the city of 
Cajamarca and at the same time I rented a room in the rural town of Combayo. This 
allowed me to visit and interview government officials during work-days in 
Cajamarca, whereas I often stayed in Combayo during the weekends (from Friday to 
early Monday) to visit and interact with farmers, or interview them during the Sunday 
farmer’s market. I also often met with leaders when they visited state offices such as 
the Defensoría del Pueblo and ALA Cajamarca.  
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In Apurímac, I chose to rent a room in the district of Challhuahuacho, and access 
communities from there. In this case, I relied on the help of Daniel Luna as a field 
assistant and translator (from Quechua to Spanish). Farmers were mostly visited at 
their homes and in their fields, but also at the open-air market, carnival festivities and 
during meetings such as community assemblies, forums or presentations. 
A main method for gathering information was semi-structured informal interviews. 
About 126 interviews were conducted, with some key actors who were interviewed on 
more than one occasion (see List of Interviews in Appendix 1). My interviewees 
included farmers, government officials at local, regional and national level, 
representatives of local NGOs and civil-society groups, researchers, and mining-sector 
representatives. Interviewees’ names have been omitted in the chapters; only when 
they are explicitly mentioned are the names of persons, organizations and places real. 
Research activities were expanded after the fieldwork, following developments at 
research sites via information from email communications with key informants, as 
well as by gathering news from regional, national and international media. In addition 
to interviews, I also made use of questionnaires and group discussions, methods that 
I combined while using case-studies of particular conflicts. Case-studies make it 
possible to examine a phenomenon within defined perimeters of place and time (Ranjit 
2011, Gartner 2014). They allow to extract the general from the unique and to move 
from the “micro” to the “macro” (Burawoy 1998). While going deeper into the case 
studies, I used oral histories to unravel how particular water governance arrangements 
had evolved, according to the different perceptions and experiences of people 
involved in them, or to reconstruct events as seen through the eyes of different actors.  
In addition to these methods, I engaged in participant observation and action-types of 
research. By staying in rural communities and living with community members, I 
became a participant observer (Crang and Cook 1995, Burawoy 1998), allowing me to 
form an understanding of interests, relations, and interactions between communities, 
mining company representatives, state officials and other actors interacting within and 
beyond communities’ borders. I alternated between a role as an observer, a 
photographer and sometimes a secretary, taking notes for community-assemblies’ 
Introduction 
20 
 
minutes. I took walks along canals, or wandered into the few remaining areas not yet 
owned by the mining company, accompanying farmers during their rondas and mingas. 
I also attended cattle markets and community assemblies, and participated in public 
demonstrations. Here, the fact that I was born in the Andes (Huancayo) helped in 
creating rapport with farmer families. Sharing the same Andean identity made it easier 
to connect and engage in conversations, and establish trust. In this way, I became a 
friendly companion of several farmers, supporting them in their daily activities and 
struggles. I also accompanied some of them during judicial hearings. Just before one 
final trial, I received a message on my phone: “We fear the worst, could you maybe talk to 
your acquaintances – lawyers – and see if they can help us?” I of course went, even though 
I felt powerless and unable to help. Yet, I hoped – as they were – for good news and 
not punishments of 30 years in prison. Fortunately, in this case the farmers were 
absolved by the jury.  
Also in other ways, I sometimes became more deeply involved as an action-researcher. 
For instance, to start my field work and gain entry into the communities, I used 
contacts from the WALIR Water Law and Indigenous Rights course2 to approach 
CEDEPAS, a local NGO working with agriculture, irrigation and farmer production in 
Cajamarca. They asked me to help with the water-management plan that they were 
developing for the water-user association of the Chonta River in Cajamarca. This work 
got me out in the field, and I became familiar with the communities of the high, middle 
and low areas of the Chonta watershed, all within the Yanacocha gold mine’s area of 
influence. 
Once I had settled in Cajamarca, I approached Grufides, a local NGO working in the 
area that gives legal advice to rural communities and helps them improve their 
farming activities.3 The Yanacocha mining company considers this NGO as anti-mine, 
because it has been critical of the company’s actions and behaviours since mining 
operations began in the area. I decided to visit the NGO and tried to make 
                                                     
2 WALIR was an international alliance coordinated by the Water Resources Management group at 
Wageningen University and the United Nations (2001 – 2008). It is now followed up by the Justicia 
Hídrica - Water Justice Alliance.  
3 Grupo de Formación e Intervención para el Desarrollo Sostenible, see: http://grufides.org  
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appointments with its staff. They asked me for some official credentials and gave me 
access to their library and some email addresses to make appointments. Little by little, 
I got to know more people from this organization and got the opportunity to interview 
them. Months after my first arrival, in subsequent fieldwork visits, I offered myself as 
a volunteer, working together with some of their staff and receiving useful feedback 
on my findings. Yet, it took time to get to this situation, because – as I found out some 
years later – at the beginning some of their staff assumed I was a spy, thinking that my 
research was paid for by the mining company. I can understand their suspicion or 
mistrust, particularly considering that the NGO’s staff had received, some years ago, 
death threats and been subjected to surveillance by the Yanacocha mine’s security 
company.4 
As a further way to gain entrance into the communities and obtain insights into 
contested water issues, I did some volunteer work for the Ombudsman’s office of 
Cajamarca. This is why some farmers saw and approached me as a lawyer, I conveyed 
the questions and concerns from communities to the Ombudsman Office and, together 
with the responsible lawyers, provided the communities with advice on how to engage 
with the mining company and the government authorities. This role was much 
appreciated, and community leaders also started approaching me to accompany them 
when visiting for example the Local Water Authority and talking with the directors. 
My presence, they felt, would lend legitimacy and authority to their complaints and 
requests. 
For the fieldwork in Apurímac, I received support from the Bartolomé de Las Casas 
Andean Studies Centre (CBC). Going to visit the communities with CBC’s 
representatives helped to get the research started, but the reputation of CBC and 
CooperAccion as anti-mine proved difficult later on in the study. Once, a school 
teacher for instance stopped me from entering a meeting already arranged with a 
community. He shouted: “you are not a student but a spy and you have nothing to discuss 
                                                     
4 These were documented by Boyd (2010). 
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here”. It was only some days later that I got a chance to meet with the leaders with 
whom I had made the first appointment.  
To get access to the mining companies, the fact that I was studying abroad and the 
affiliation with a foreign university was particularly useful. Company representatives 
were always highlighting the fact that researchers should remain neutral. Even though 
I made no secret of the fact that I did not approve of their actions and behaviours, 
conversations and discussions were still possible. In Apurímac, and perhaps because 
of my association with organisations that were seen as anti-mine, I was identified as a 
threat to mining, bringing anti-mine message to the community. Eventually a letter 
sent from Wageningen University to the mine manager’s office was needed, asking for 
permission to conduct research work in the area. The letter allowed me to do some 
interviews, but the mining company remained reluctant to share detailed information. 
They said that this was because they were in the process of preparing its 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). According to the mine managers, “by law we 
are not authorized to share information before studies are finished.” On other occasions, 
company representatives blocked my access to informants or meetings by saying that 
it was for my own security. They also did not allow me to accompany a water-
monitoring team into the mining areas, even though it was participatory monitoring.  
1.3 Theorizing water governance: Politics, practices and people  
In the chapters that follow this introduction, I present several cases of negotiations, 
struggles and conflicts between communities and mining companies, which I discuss 
in the context of more general questions of (the organization of) water control and the 
representation of water. Chapters 2 through 5 thus already include their own 
theoretical or conceptual frameworks, which I do not repeat here. When combined, 
these chapters provide a detailed account of the politics of water in contentious mining 
contexts. In this way, they provide an interesting and revealing backdrop against 
which to discuss more general water governance conceptualizations and theories. 
Here, I provide some of the theoretical sources of inspiration that I mobilize to do this. 
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Stating that water connects sectors, territories, levels and peoples, the OECD (2015) 
developed principles, based on effectiveness, efficiency, trust and engagement, to 
guide countries in governing water. While recognizing that governance is highly 
context-dependent, the OECD aligns with the Global Water Partnership in defining 
water governance as ”the range of political, social, economic and administrative 
systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of 
water services, at different levels of society” (Global Water Partnership 2002 cited by 
Rogers and Hall 2003: 7). Both organizations approach water governance as a set of 
strategic tools to help resolve water challenges and improve water policies, proposing 
frameworks to enable or support those tasked with water responsibilities to manage 
and distribute “sufficient water of good quality while maintaining or improving the 
ecological integrity of water bodies.” (OECD 2015:3).  
In this thesis, rather than as a prescriptive toolkit, I define water governance in a more 
descriptive-analytical sense to refer to political processes around water, entailing 
debate and asymmetrical interactions between often rival actors (Castro 2007, 2008). 
Water governance, as Woodhouse and Muller (20016) explain, is “a scene of 
contestation” in setting priorities, needs and goals (see also Eagleton-Pierce 2014). 
With Zwarteveen, I thus define water governance as “the practices of coordination and 
decision making between different actors around contested water distributions” 
(Zwarteveen 2015: 19). Such practices are thick with politics and culture; they are 
linked to creative processes of imagining and producing collective water futures, and 
combine political problems of scale (spatial, ecological, administrative, temporal), with 
problems of coherence (the durable alignment of different people and different waters 
despite problems of commensurability and political tensions) (cf. Bridge and Perreault 
2009). This definition emphasizes that governance is not just about the managerial 
aspects of governing or using nature, but also about the politics involved. It also 
usefully allows opening up for questioning the extent to which actual governance is 
an "intentional process", consisting of purposive actions and interventions to decide 
on and influence particular outcomes.  
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I link this definition of governance to broader discussions of governance that use the 
term to indicate that processes of coordination and decision making happen largely 
outside of formal government domains or by non-government actors (Rhodes 1996, 
Buizer et al. 2011, Colebatch 2014). 
Instead governing practices are based on negotiations involving a broad range of non-
state entities (Colebatch 2009). The implication is that studies of governance need to 
make the question of who governs, an explicit part of the investigation. Rather than 
taking for granted what governance is and who is involved, the questions "governance 
of what, by whom and to what end" (Bridge and Perreault 2009: 477) become 
important. These are precisely the questions that I engage with in the thesis. I want to 
use my descriptive analyses to reflect on how access to and control over water are 
organized, by and for whom, and for what purposes? Such a broad and open-ended 
definition of governance rests on the recognition of how different political 
communities –state or non-state entities– employ a suite of “mundane techniques of 
governance” (Jaffe 2013: 736, Meissner 2014).  
I firmly anchor these reflections on water governance in the everyday negotiations, 
bargaining and conflicts that happen when water becomes even more contested than 
it normally is because of the presence of a powerful new competitor: a mining 
company. Extraction, particularly large open-pit mining, profoundly modifies water 
flows in terms of quantity and quality, while also changing the ways in which it is 
controlled, coordinated and talked about or known. These modifications all start with 
the mining company getting access to the subsoil, leading to reconfigurations of 
activities, spaces, and uses needed for the extraction of ore (Bebbington and Bury 2013, 
Preciado Jerónimo et al. 2015). At its most fundamental level, these modifications can 
be interpreted as pitting member of local communities, livelihoods and the long-term 
conservation of water and water-based ecosystems against mining companies, profits 
and shorter-term development goals (Bebbington et al. 2010, Bebbington and Bury 
2013, Li 2015). Analyses drawing on insights from political ecology thus effectively 
expose the profoundly unequal power relationships that characterize these 
interactions (Swyngedouw 2004, Perreault 2013, Budds 2014, Himley 2014, Perreault 
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2014a, 2014b, Boelens 2015), laying bare the military and economic resources used by 
mining companies to silence or buy local people (Tanaka et al. 2007, Arana Zegarra 
2009, Gil 2009, de Echave et al. 2009b). 
While being profoundly inspired by these analyses, this thesis takes a somewhat 
different approach by focusing more attention on how community-mining company 
relations evolve. Rather than fixing either communities or mining companies in pre-
determined positions (e.g. as victims, benefactors, beneficiaries, exploiters), I instead 
make room for a more emphatic description and analysis of their motivations and 
aspirations, with explicit recognition of their agency. Here, I take inspiration from an 
emerging body of ethnographic work on conflicts and community-mine relations and 
contradictions (see e.g. Horowitz 2012, Babidge 2013, Carrasco Moraga 2014, 
Dougherty and Olsen 2014, Martínez Silva 2015, Rasch and Köhne 2016), work that 
uses terms like micro-politics, focuses on everyday practices (Long 2001) and everyday 
politics (Kerkvliet 2009) and that emphasizes how different local people actively 
influence and shape how resources are used, produced and allocated (Hogenboom 
2012). These analyses thus attempt to recognize that although nobody is entirely free 
to do as she or he wants, people are also not entirely constrained. There should be a 
middle-ground somewhere, as Gaasbeek (2010) says, that enables them –to a certain 
degree – to shape their realities. Hence, I attempt to understand people’s capacity to 
respond not only as resistance, but also as their capacity for action (Mahmood 2001) 
and reaction in contexts of historical and economic marginalization. Here the thesis 
coincides with Meissner (2014) in not dismissing the agency and influence of elites, 
state entities, individuals or communities, but rather to analyse their interactions and 
the changes in water governance that such interactions might generate. 
In recognizing the resilience and creativity of local communities without 
romanticizing these, I have also greatly benefitted from the studies and discussions 
done in the contexts of the Justicia Hídrica network and the Concertacion research project 
– both Wageningen University initiatives (see e.g. Dominguez 2010, Panfichi and 
Coronel 2010, Guardia Nogales 2011, Preciado Jerónimo 2011, Sosa and Zwarteveen 
2011, Urteaga 2011, Sosa Landeo 2012, Vos and Boelens 2014, Perreault 2014a, Yacoub 
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López 2015, Stoltenborg and Boelens 2016). All that scholarly work, as well as this 
thesis, undertakes to unravel scenarios of (un)just water management, identifying and 
analysing the multiple actors and sectors involved, often using conflicts as an entry 
point to lay bare the power and politics of governing water (see Boelens et al. 2011, 
Isch et al. 2012, Yacoub et al. 2015). A particular insight of this body of work is the 
analysis of actual patterns of water use and rights as part of local, contextualized 
dynamics, highlighting the embeddedness of water in history and culture (see Trawick 
2001, Urteaga and Boelens 2006, Boelens 2008, Lynch 2012, Paerregaard 2013, Boelens 
2015) 
1.4 Background of the thesis and the research sites 
I use this section to provide some background and context to the thesis. I first give a 
broad-brush overview of mining in Peru, focusing on how mining operations often 
create conflicts over water. I then zoom in on my two research sites, Cajamarca and 
Apurímac, providing the context against which the more detailed analyses in the 
following chapters need to be seen and interpreted. 
1.4.1 Peru: Mining, water and conflicts 
“Peru is, without any doubt, one of the richest countries in mineral [resources], and it 
is truly amazing to see these materials’ abundance and variety, disseminated in every 
region of the Republic”. 
(Raimondi 1878 cited inVillacorta Ostolaza 2007: 374) 
Peru has been considered a país minero (mining country) already for a long time. 
Towards the end of the 19th century, the prominent natural scientist Antonio Raimondi 
produced “Minerales del Perú”, an exhaustive catalogue of Peru’s minerals. The 
catalogue was presented at the Paris Universal Exposition in 1878. In representing 652 
mineral samples from different regions of Peru, the catalogue showed off the country’s 
mineral wealth, clearly marking the country as a rich mineral country in the eyes of 
the rest of the world (Villacorta Ostolaza 2007).  
During the last decades, the idea of Perú país minero was actively revived by 
consecutive governments as one of the ways to attract more external investments to 
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the country. Among others through attractive policy packages (including tax and legal 
stability contracts (Morón 2007).5 Peru has become one of the foremost destinations in 
the entire Latin American region for international and national investors in mining 
businesses. From covering nearly 2 million hectares in 1991, mining developments 
covered more than 27 million hectares in 2013 (see Figure 3) (de Echave 2014). About 
15% of the national territory is devoted to mining, with some departments with far 
over 50% of their territory under concession. Worldwide, Peru is the third-largest 
producer of silver, copper and zinc; in Latin America, it is the largest in gold 
production. Investments in the mining sector between 2011 and 2015 were about US 
42,076 billion dollars, compared to 11,458 billion dollars in 2006-2010 (SNMPE 2016). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mining concessions in Peru (1991 - 2013). Source: de Echave (2014) 
 
The active government support to mining development is based on the idea that 
mining brings prosperity and development. While mining certainly brings money into 
the country, mining operations also come with many challenges and problems since 
the concessions are granted by the state. Problems have to do with how the rights to 
subsoil minerals are allocated, mineral reserves officially are state property and are 
                                                     
5 During the 1990s, about 18 legal-stability contracts had been given to several operations from different 
companies such as Yanacocha, Quellaveco S.A., BHP Billiton Tintaya S.A., Antamina, and Southern 
Peru Copper Corporation. For example, Yanacocha got 3 tax stability contracts for its mining operations 
at Maqui Maqui, Carachugo Sur and at Cerro Yanacocha (Morón 2007: 9,10).  
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given in concessions for exploration or exploitation to mining companies.6 Those who 
own or live on or off the land below where the minerals are located, are not always 
aware of the concession. The problem is exacerbated when companies also need 
associated rights – including those that are the focus of this thesis: rights to water. 
Mainly because of the building of mining camps; the excavation, dismantling, and 
construction of tailing and leaching platforms; mining developments –often in 
irrevocable ways– alter the quality and nature of water flows, severely damaging the 
ecosystems and livelihoods that depend on these (Perreault 2014a). Although there are 
efforts to plan, mitigate or compensate for such impacts through EIAs, there remain 
many worries and complaints. Some of these stem from community members’ 
difficulty to understand the technical language used, or the fundamental differences 
in understanding and appreciating what is at stake (García 2012, Preciado Jerónimo 
2012). 
In general, many agree that existing organizational and institutional arrangements for 
governing water in Peru are poorly suited to tackle the governance challenges that 
arise in mining contexts.7 What is particularly problematic is that the main principle 
on which water governance in Peru is based is that of efficiency. Hence, the general 
rule is that water should be given under concession to those who most efficiently use 
it. This a priori dismisses other principles of governance , such as those of equity or 
sustainability (Boelens and Vos 2012), or those embedded in existing water 
management systems (Urteaga 2010, Varillas 2010, Hoogesteger et al. 2013). Mining 
companies can obtain water rights for industrial and domestic uses. These rights 
comprise permissions to extract groundwater; drain water; make alterations to water 
quality; and discharge treated water to the environment for agricultural uses; affecting 
communities and ecosystems.8 There are also many problems in monitoring and 
controlling the administration of mines’ water uses and rights because of limitations 
                                                     
6 This is a task of the Mining Geological and Metallurgic Institute (INGEMMET) 
7 For critical studies regarding Peru’s water legal instruments see Del Castillo (2009), Morales (2009), 
Oré et al. (2009), (Urteaga 2010) and a report commissioned by the UNDP on water governance in Peru 
(Indij and Hantke Domas 2013). 
8 For hydrologic studies of mining impacts see Cerdán (2015), Kuijk (2015), Vela-Almeida et al. (2016). 
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of water agencies and the powerful influence of companies (Preciado Jerónimo and 
Álvarez Gutierrez 2016).  
It is because of the many socio-environmental problems that mining creates that it is 
very controversial, and the cause of a large number of conflicts. Peru’s Defensoría del 
Pueblo (Ombudsman office) reports that, in 2016, most socio-environmental conflicts 
in Peru happened around extractive industries. The report counts more than 900 socio-
environmental conflicts from 2004 to 2014 with a peak in 2009 during Alan García’s 
second government.9 In terms of regional distribution, 19.85% of new mining 
investments happened in Apurímac, followed by Cajamarca (17.95%), Moquegua 
(13.11%), Ancash (6.14%) and Cusco (5.78%). These were also precisely the regions that 
featured most protests and conflicts in the last five years. According to Preciado 
Jerónimo and Álvarez Gutierrez (2016), during 2011 and 2014, about 153 cases of large 
socio-environmental conflicts involved water, most (67%) because of mining activities, 
followed by hydrocarbons (14%). The most frequent causes for conflict are pollution 
and competition for natural resources (access and use); non-consultation with affected 
communities and poor distribution of benefits, (Franks et al. 2014: 7577). Conflicts may 
take the form of strikes, road blocks, street protests, or damage to private property and 
regularly lead to fatal injuries (Panfichi and Coronel 2010, Franks et al. 2014).  
The Peruvian government uses a combination of repression and dialogue to deal with 
these conflicts, and alleviate tension. (Melendez and León 2010). Violent repression 
and declarations of the state of emergency were the normal government response 
during García’s and Humala’s regimes. In recent decades, mesas de diálogo or 
negotiation and dialogue meetings have become more popular (Rees et al. 2012, Flohr 
2014). One of the most prominent government offices intervening in socio-
environmental conflicts is the Defensoría del Pueblo, which works at the national level 
but also operates in situ via its regional offices. It mostly assumes a mediating role and 
it is often considered by all parties involved in conflicts as a legitimate authority to 
provide advice. Other government bodies entering into conflict scenarios are the Prime 
                                                     
9 Government period 2006 – 2011. Garcia’s position on socio-environmental protests was repression and 
dismissal of communities’ complaints, to ‘have a firm hand’ for conflicts (La República 2006). 
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Minister’s Office (PCM), and representatives of different ministries.10 During the 
1990s, the Coordinadora Nacional de Comunidades Afectadas por la Minería (CONACAMI 
National Coordinating Committee of Communities Affected by Mining) emerged as a 
prominent actor representing community interests and demanding vindication for 
communities’ struggles (Palacín Quispe 2008). However, in the cases revisited for this 
thesis, this organization did not play an active role. Instead, at the communal level, 
affected communities and rural towns united their forces in so-called frentes de defensa 
ambiental or environmental defence fronts. These are mainly temporary civil 
associations with little capacity to create effective alliances with similar groups or 
demands (Melendez and León 2010).  
1.4.2 Research sites and companies: Apurímac - Las Bambas and Cajamarca - 
Yanacocha 
Apurímac and the Las Bambas copper mine 
The Apurímac region is located in the southern Andes and comprises 7 provinces, 80 
districts and 377 rural communities. Apurímac has a rugged topography categorized 
by Antonio Raimondi as crumpled paper (“papel arrugado”), combining high 
mountains with deep canyons. Mostly its population is rural and Quechua-speaking. 
Apurímac is one of the country’s poorest regions: according to the 2012- 2016 
Institutional Strategic Plan for Apurímac, the poorest provinces in the region are 
Cotabambas and Grau (Gobierno Regional de Apurímac 2012). These provinces are 
precisely the ones that host the Las Bambas mining company. Provincial government 
assessments report low agricultural productivity, and poorly developed roadway 
infrastructure, irrigation systems, and health-care services as compared to other areas 
in the region. Although reports also mention that the case study province of 
Cotabambas is rich in natural resources, such as water and land, growing problems of 
pollution and over-extraction have generated a wave of resource-related conflicts in 
the Province. 
                                                     
10 For example: mining and energy (MEM), agriculture (MINAG or MINAGRI), environment (MINAM), 
etc. 
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The region’s main economic activities are livestock raising, particularly sheep and 
cattle, and subsistence agriculture. Practices such as barter (‘trueque’) are widespread: 
the exchanging of products between communities from different ecological zones. 
Agricultural and livestock activities rely on seasonal water, taken by farmers from 
rivers and creeks. There have been few public investments in irrigation infrastructure 
and domestic public water networks. The study area’s main water sources are the 
rivers of Challhuahuacho, Fuerabamba, Pumamarca and Pamputa and several small 
creeks. Land use here is organized either communally or individually. It is often based 
on groupings of smallholdings known as laymes –land access and usage rights- 
assigned to every family by communities. In legal terms, many communities are not 
being formally recognized as comunidades campesinas by the Public Register Office. This 
implies that community titles of ownership are not formally endorsed, but exist only 
in community inventories (IAG n.d.). Apurímac is one of the country’s regions with 
most mining concessions, with about 65% of its territory concessioned for mining 
activities (see Figure 4). The field sites for this thesis are communities located in the 
district of Challhuahuacho11 in the Cotabambas province, neighboring the Las Bambas 
mining company. 
 
                                                     
11 See Appendix 2 for mining concessions in the district of Challhuahuacho. 
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Figure 4. Mining concessions in Apurímac. Modified from (OCM 2013) by C. Cerdán and the author. 
 
The opportunity to mine copper in the Las Bambas zone was discovered in 1911 by the 
Ferrobamba Limited Company, which nevertheless abandoned the site and concession 
after some years. In 2003, the state put the exploration of copper in the region out for 
tender. In 2004, the concession was awarded to the Xstrata Company, which later 
became Xstrata Copper, the world’s fourth-largest copper producer. The Las Bambas 
concession’s ore deposits are Chalcobamba, Ferrobamba, Sulfobamba and Charcas, 
located at 4000 meters above sea level –masl (ProInversión 2005). Xstrata began 
exploration in 2005, completing its pre-feasibility study in 2008 and the environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) in 2010 (IAG n.d.). In 2014 Las Bambas was acquired by the 
Chinese joint venture MMG Limited (62.5%), Guoxin International Investment (22.5) 
and CITIC Metal (15%) which finished the construction phase and started operations 
in 2016 (MMG 2014). Explorations are due to finish in 2034 (mining closure phase from 
2034 to 2038) (CooperAccion 2015). 
About 49 communities are located around the Las Bambas project. After modifications 
to the EIA in 2013, the direct-influence lease area involves territories of 18 communities 
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located downstream from mining. The mining operations also include the relocation 
of one community, Fuerabamba, because it was located on one of the deposits to be 
mined (SNC-Lavalin Perú 2014).  
The concession area is about 35,000 hectares (ha), the mineral reserve contains an 
estimated 7.2 million tons (MT) of copper, the company invested more than US 5 
billion dollars to develop the mine. The company estimated that it would be able to 
produce 2 MT of copper in the first five years of its operations. About 140,000 daily 
tons of mineral (or 51.1 MT per year) can be processed at the mine facilities (Las 
Bambas 2015). In its original plans, operations were also to include a 200km pipeline 
to connect the Las Bambas mineral production with mining processing plants and 
developments in the region of Cusco (de Echave 2014). After the EIA’s modifications, 
the pipeline plan was dismissed, now production is done in situ affecting communities 
with huge traffic transporting the minerals to the coast for export.  
Regarding water, the Las Bambas mine holds water use rights since 2004. The activities 
of the Las Bambas develop in the Challhuahuacho sub-watershed and compromise 
main rivers such as Fuerabamba, Ferrobamba, Pumamarca and Challhuahuacho, part 
of the Santo Tomás watershed in the Apurímac region. From the abovementioned 
water sources, the most compromised is the Fuerabamba river, formed by 15 small 
tributaries -820 L/s- and 120 seasonal and permanent springs -90L/s- that risk to be 
drained because overlapping with the open pit (CooperAccion n.d.). The company also 
enjoys permits to pump and store water in its reservoirs located upstream its 
processing plants to supply water for mining operations during drought periods in the 
area. Several communities in the vicinity of the water flows used by the mining 
company noticed a decline in water availability, which they felt was due to the 
company’s exploration and operation work. However, due to high precipitation 
intensity in the region (average 1290 mm), the water authorities assume enough water 
availability for different users.  
Cajamarca and the Yanacocha gold mine  
The department of Cajamarca is located in the lowest area of the northern Andes. 
Cajamarca lies between two different eco-regions: the sierra, with its inter-Andean 
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valleys and mountains -up to 3590 masl- and the selva, or rainforest area -400 masl- 
(Gobierno Regional de Cajamarca 2011). Hydrologically, the rivers of the region 
belong to two main watersheds: the Marañón, -tributary of the Amazon River- and 
rivers that drain to the Pacific ocean (Kuijk 2015). Politically, it is divided into 13 
provinces and 126 districts. Cajamarca is mainly a rural region (approximately 70%), 
with a prominent presence of smallholders practicing small-scale agriculture and 
livestock production (Alcántara Sánchez and Franco Muñoz 2010).12 In terms of 
production, since the colonial period and particularly since 1940 with the haciendas,13 
Cajamarca has been one of the country’s most important regions producing and 
supplying milk and dairy products. Two main companies collect and process milk in 
the region, INCALAC-Nestle working since 1947 in the area and CARNILAC-Gloria, 
since 1998 (Escurra 2001). 
Currently Cajamarca is also one of the highest contributors to the country’s revenues 
because of mining extraction activities in the region. In 2013, according to 
INGEMMET, the Cajamarca region had 2819 mining concessions (Chávez Ortiz 2014), 
covering about 41% of its entire territory (see Figure 5).14 
                                                     
12Agricultural units smaller than 10ha.  
13 Hacienda system control production and labour in the region under the command of the landowner 
or hacendado (Deere 1990). The Agrarian reform in 1969 marks the end of the hacienda system.  
14 Mining concessions concentrated in the provinces of San Pablo, Hualgayoc and Cajamarca, see 
Appendix N 3.  
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Figure 5. Mining concessions in Cajamarca. Modified from Chávez Ortiz (2014) by C. Cerdán and the 
author. 
 
The city of Cajamarca is the department’s capital, and is historically well-known 
because it was here that the Spanish conquerors captured the Incan Emperor, 
Atahualpa. This is a history that is already clearly linked to the availability of gold and 
silver in the area: according to the chronicles, the conquerors demanded one room full 
of gold and two of silver as a ransom to free Atahualpa. The conquerors “did not wait 
for the rooms to be filled and had the gold and silver melted down, obtaining about 
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4,510 kg of gold and 128,399 kg of silver” (Sarmiento Gutiérrez and Ravinez Sánchez 
2009: 72). Rather than respecting the agreement, the conquerors killed the Emperor as 
soon as they had received their ransom. The memory of this brutal plunder is often 
revived by those in and around Cajamarca who are critical of mining operations; they 
draw parallels between the contemporary behaviour of mining companies and that of 
Spanish conquerors, seeing the region’s history one of continuous plunder (Elizalde et 
al. 2009). The field sites illustrated in this thesis are located in the surroundings of the 
city of Cajamarca, mainly in rural communities and the areas occupied by the 
Yanacocha gold mine. 
Yanacocha gold mine is a complex of 5 open pits located 15km north of Cajamarca city, 
at the headwater areas of the region’s four main watersheds (Palacios-Berrios 2006, 
Yacoub 2013). The mine has been operational since 1992, producing its first gold bar 
in 1993. It is a joint venture of the American Newmont Mining Corporation (51.35%) –
owners of the world’s first open-pit gold mine15- the Peruvian Buenaventura mining 
company (43.65%), and the World Bank financial sector (5%). 
Yanacocha owns 267 mining concessions, making it the largest holder of mining 
concessions in the Cajamarca region, among 30 other holders (Bury 2007, Chávez Ortiz 
2014). In a nutshell, mining operations began by extracting soil or material by using 
drilling and blasting. The extracted ore is transported to the heap leach platforms to 
be irrigated with a cyanide solution (50mg cyanide per litre of water) and extract the 
metals. The rest (waste) is deposited in backfills and tailing ponds. Rainfall that might 
affect the open-pit development is controlled by constructing drainage canal systems 
to convey water to the sedimentation or settling pond. The process also considers 
water treatment plants before water is released to the environment (Yanacocha 2007).16 
Yanacocha as a site was given in concessions several times before the joint venture’s 
request. The concession was always returned to the state because no value was found 
during exploration work to pursue operations with the technology available at that 
                                                     
15 The first gold bar was poured by Newmont Mining Corporation at its Carlin Gold Mining subsidiary 
in Nevada on May 4, 1965 – 4000 tons of soil were needed for that first bar of gold (Morris 2010) 
16 See the production of gold at the mine site in the Appendix N 4. 
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time – before the 1990s.17 Only the chemical technique applied by the Newmont 
corporation, mining by leaching, was suitable to mine this site.  
“...The gold was invisible, even with a microscope... [t]he metal was so finely dispersed 
through the rock that it could be detected only by a fire or chemical assay... It took three 
tons of ore to produce just one ounce of gold... Finely ground ore was mixed with 
cyanide-laced water in an extraction process developed in Scotland in 1887... [the ‘rich’ 
solution] was filtered, mixed with zinc dust to precipitate the gold into a concentrate, 
and finally smelted into bars of gold bullion” (Morris 2010: xi). 
Applying this technique made Yanacocha –compared with other productions sites– 
the Corporation’s most profitable enterprise. The final phases of the mining cycle entail 
closure and post-closure, needed to restore the areas to the way they were before 
mining disturbance. 
Regarding water, large open pits such as in the Yanacocha complex rely on a constant 
supply of water. Yanacocha’s water managers portray the water use in the mining site 
to be a closed cycle, showing that any water input is controlled once it reaches the 
leaching platforms and ponds, treated in their acid water treatment plants –AWTP– 
facilities to then be released to the environment. The company argues that its water 
consumption is minimal (about 2 million cubic meters MCM per year), as compared 
to consumption by other water users such as farmers or the city of Cajamarca. Yet, and 
as commented on in Chapter 3, in addition to its need for continual, secure water 
supply for its operations, Yanacocha also extracts water during its work in the open 
pits. This process is called “dewatering”, and consists of draining groundwater –and 
surface water– into settlement ponds (ICMM 2012). This process lowers groundwater 
levels, alters water flows of rivers and creeks, and even makes entire springs 
disappear, impacting other water users downstream from the mining site (Younger et 
al. 2004). As Morris says about large open pits: “[t]he sheer size of operations creates 
inevitable tension wherever gold is mined” (Morris 2010: xiii). In terms of pollution, 
water quality studies carried out by Yacoub (2013) identified the type of pollutants 
                                                     
17 MEM officer, Personal communication Dec. 2012 – Lima  
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compromising the four watersheds where Yanacocha mining operations take place. 
The most dangerous, harmful heavy metals found in the Yanacocha mining site’s 
surroundings are Cadmium, Arsenic, Lead, and Mercury. Implications of Yanacocha’s 
operations for water quantities are described and discussed in Chapters 3 – 5 of this 
thesis.  
In terms of interactions with local communities, Elizalde et al. (2009) observed that the 
lack of communication and compliance with local agreements at the earlier stages of 
Yanacocha’s operations, marked consecutive tense community-company interactions. 
Adding to that, the arrogance and pejorative treatment from the mine’s employees 
towards communities, plus the operations’ environmental impacts, made the company 
very unpopular.18 The illegal surveillance campaign by the Yanacocha security 
company against environmental activists such as leader Marco Arana and the local 
NGO Grufides in Cajamarca (Boyd 2010), linked to the deaths of several 
environmental activists and farmer protesters, such as Isidro Llanos in Combayo – a 
case described in this thesis – further added to Yanacocha’s bad reputation. It’s overall 
negative image explains why Yanacocha is surrounded by conflicts and protests, the 
expansion projects at the Mount Quilish in 2004 and Conga in 2011, are famous 
examples.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is organized into 6 chapters. With the exception of this introduction and the 
conclusions, all of the chapters of this thesis were published as independent, peer-
reviewed papers. I only made some minimal modifications when making them part of 
this thesis. After this introduction in the first chapter, chapter 2 illustrates how the Las 
Bambas mine reconfigures local rural water arrangements in Apurímac, mainly 
through the formalization of water rights. Chapter 3 focuses on the politics of water 
grabbing, illustrating actions by the Yanacocha gold mine in Cajamarca to get access 
to and control over water resources that used to be controlled by rural communities. 
Chapter 4 critiques the effectiveness of planned conflict-resolution strategies in water 
                                                     
18 The mercury spill-over in 2000 from one of its contractor companies that affected the towns of 
Choropampa, San Juan and Magdalena, is one infamous example. 
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disputes between rural communities and mining companies, observing how the 
supposedly neutral instruments of law and science are invoked to reduce tensions. 
Chapter 5 explores the institutional regulation of water-resource sustainability in 
mining contexts, highlighting the importance of accountability and plurality. Chapter 
6 presents the conclusions which include major findings, implications of the research 
for policies and methodologies, as well as for re-thinking water governance, and 
further ideas for research. 
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Chapter 2. The Influence of Large Mining: Restructuring Water Rights 
among Rural Communities in Apurímac, Peru 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Challhuahuacho district, Apurímac. Photo: M. Sosa. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Since the 1990s, sizable foreign investment in the mining sector has transformed Peru’s 
economy, with rising world-market ore prices turning large-scale mining into one of 
the country’s main economic activities (Torres 2007, Hogenboom 2012). According to 
the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM), the portfolio of mining exploration and 
expansion counts forty-nine large projects, representing an investment of $58.346 
billion. The three regions that host the highest percentage of this investment are 
Apurímac (33%), Arequipa (16.4%), and Cajamarca (16.2%) (MEM 2016). 
Even though mining is a main driver of the national economy, there are major 
controversies regarding this industry’s social and environmental impacts (see also 
Bebbington and Williams 2008, Bebbington et al. 2010). The most tangible impacts that 
communities near mining operations experience relate to the degeneration and 
dispossession of water and land – the most crucial resources for community 
livelihoods (Perreault 2013, 2014a). Large-scale mining, because of the construction of 
open pits, requires the moving of huge amounts of soil, while also depending on 
permanent water flows for its operations (Budds 2010). Open-pit mining is typically 
located in watershed headwater areas (Bebbington and Williams 2008), which explains 
why mining interventions alter hydrological flows in terms of quantity and quality (Li 
2016, Vela-Almeida et al. 2016). In addition to these profound material modifications 
of water sources and watercourses, large-scale mining operations also alter water 
control and governance arrangements, with mining companies often becoming the de 
facto water managers in Andean highland zones (Sosa and Zwarteveen 2012, 
Zwarteveen 2015). Changes in how water is governed are anchored in the 
formalization of water rights, a process that precedes or accompanies mining 
operations.  
This chapter presents a contextualized analysis of the process and implications of 
formalizing water rights and uses19 in communities near the Las Bambas mining 
project and operations, in the Province of Cotabambas, Apurímac, Peru. It explains the 
                                                     
19 “Formalization of water rights” is considered as the act and process of legally recognizing customary 
(“vernacular” or “local,” peasant and indigenous) water rights by the state water authority (Benda-
Beckmann et al. 1998, Boelens and Seemann 2014, Roth et al. 2015, Seemann 2016).  
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reconfiguration of socio material arrangements to use and manage water provoked by 
mining developments. The chapter shows how earlier modes of sharing water are 
altered through new water management rationalities introduced with the entrance of 
mining operations. Resulting new institutional arrangements empower and privilege 
those communities and families who align themselves with the mining company, often 
at the expense of existing water governance and sharing arrangements. The chapter 
demonstrates the contradictions of such reconfigurations and illustrates how their net 
effect is a dangerous de facto concentration of water management powers in the hands 
of strong economic and political actors, like mining companies.  
2.2 Methodology 
The analysis is based on field work conducted in Apurímac during 2010 and 2011, with 
ongoing follow-up in subsequent years (2012-2016).20 Communities were visited in the 
Las Bambas mining company’s influence area (Fuerabamba, Pamputa, Huancuire, 
Choquecca, and Pumamarca) as well as in neighboring zones (Chila and Choaquere). 
In addition to reviewing literature; archives; and local, national, and international 
news, the fieldwork consisted of participatory observation, semi-structured and open 
interviews, participation in community assemblies, and regional forums. Fifty-two 
interviews were conducted: twenty-four with farmers and communities leaders; 
thirteen with government officials in Cusco and Apurímac (municipality and regional 
government, local water authority, and user boards); five with the mining company’s 
representatives; and ten with researchers, advisors, and NGO representatives.21 The 
support of the Bartolomé de Las Casas Andean Studies Centre (CBC), a research 
partner working in the region for several years, was crucial for the research. Going to 
the field together with CBC’s representatives helped us approach communities and 
start the research. Even so, conducting field research in the harsh, remote, and deeply 
marginalized highland region of Apurímac about the interventions of a multi-million 
dollar enterprise is inevitably influenced by the strong emotions and opinions that 
these interventions provoke. Particularly at the start of the research, communities’ 
                                                     
20 See Appendix 5 for a research guideline developed to approach water issues during fieldwork in Las 
Bambas. 
21 The names of the interviewees have been omitted to protect their identities. 
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attitudes – while being mostly open, warm, and friendly – towards non-local 
researchers (even if Peruvian) could easily turn into distrust, for example, when a 
newly appointed community teacher stopped us from entering the school for a 
meeting that was planned with community leaders. Accusations of being anti-mine 
spies, or to the contrary of being secret mining agents, as well as questions about the 
funding sources of the investigation, influenced the atmosphere and contents of the 
research process. These suspicions and attitudes of distrust underscore the political 
sensitivity of the research topic. Water and livelihood questions lie at the heart of the 
strong polarization among and even within families over the rapid social, territorial, 
and livelihood transformations generated by one of the largest mining projects in the 
country, with experiences of loss and degradation mingling in complex ways with 
promises and high expectations of better futures (Tanaka et al. 2007). Conscious of the 
stressful ambience, informal meetings at, for example, the Sunday’s market in 
Challhuahuacho were particularly important for approaching farmers and community 
leaders. Also, assisting the farmers when reading the formal documents given to them 
and collectively trying to understand environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and 
legalities concerning natural resource management and the mining operations of Las 
Bambas importantly helped to build confidence. My Andean background fostered an 
empathic link with the communities, while at the same time, her affiliation with a 
foreign university facilitated interactions with interviewees (farmers, state, and 
company’s representatives); it triggered their curiosity about the research and made 
them eager to share their experiences. 
In the next section, the chapter presents the conceptualization of water governance and 
water rights in smallholder farmer water management, highlighting the 
understanding of the legal dimensions of water governance processes in Peru. The 
fourth section presents some basic characteristics of the Apurímac region and the Las 
Bambas mining company. The fifth section documents the water sharing and 
management arrangements that existed before the arrival of the mining company; also 
discusses the process and impacts of formalization, including the tensions it generates. 
The chapter concludes that the recent formalization of water uses and rights in rural 
communities near mining operations imposes a new normative hierarchy that 
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privileges the rights of those aligned with the mining company over those opposing 
it. This provokes frictions and conflicts among and within communities while also 
irreversibly disrupting existing sharing and management arrangements. Water 
formalization policies interact with historically and politically grounded notions and 
practices of water use to produce impacts that are not always easy to predict. In the 
context of large social, economic, and political inequalities, there is nevertheless a clear 
risk that formalization will erode existing water logics and governance arrangements. 
In conclusion, we argue that understanding and considering the important role of local 
water arrangements can lead to more respectful policies towards rural communities 
and so may help to reduce tensions and conflicts among different water users in 
contexts of mineral extraction.  
2.3 Examining water governance and the formalization of rights 
2.3.1 Water governance and rights in contexts of local management 
“Outside” interventions such as those provoked by mining operations entail re-
allocations of water as well as reconfigurations of water sharing and management 
arrangements. Documented experiences of how this unfolds in the Andes of Peru 
show that making waters accessible to new outside actors often happens through the 
incorporation of these waters into state water governance institutions. This in general 
occurs with little regard for existing water management practices and arrangements 
(Trawick 2001, Lynch 2012), in spite of official policy discourses about the importance 
of recognizing communities’ rights. Indeed, the cultural diversity and epistemological 
complexity that characterizes existing water governance arrangements in the Andean 
highlands are inevitably eroded when inserted into one uniform, national framework 
explicitly aimed at the commensuration of different waters to make their comparison 
and exchange possible (Roth et al. 2005, Zwarteveen et al. 2005). In actual practice, 
“recognition” of existing usos (uses) and costumbres (customs) entails aligning these 
with national-level norms, rules, and laws based on distinct imaginaries of private 
property (Urteaga 2010). The cultural and political logic of existing arrangements and 
the history, culture, and sense of place of particular water actors and their multiple 
values are not considered by national laws (Ingram 2011); recognition happens in the 
The influence of large mining on water 
46 
 
terms and logics of the recognizer, for example, the state (Gelles 2000, 2010, Guevara-
Gil 2010, Guevara-Gil and Boelens 2010).  
As we do not share the a priori belief in the desirability of the commensuration of 
water values and norms across places, our analysis of water governance and rights in 
the Peruvian Andes starts with the recognition that ways of dealing with, caring for, 
and sharing water are always an intimate part of history and territory. Our perspective 
is anchored in the realization that everyday water use, sharing, and management 
practices are always local: “Water is tied up with specific place-based ecologies 
involving community, culture, and identity and can be a symbol for security and self-
determination” (Ingram 2011: 245). Instead of conceiving water rights as legally 
ordained state norms, we define them as living social, cultural, economic, and political 
normative arrangements that are embedded in wider histories and ways of living and 
being (Zwarteveen et al. 2005, Vos et al. 2006, Lynch 2012, Paerregaard 2013). It follows 
that we understand water rights as historically evolved logics of using, sharing, and 
caring for water that are embedded in more encompassing cultures of being and 
relating and part of wider social dynamics and power structures. This does not mean 
that we see “local” water rights arrangements as autonomous or isolated institutions: 
they dynamically interact with other normative and (state) legal frameworks to form 
plural and often hybrid rules, rights, and organizational forms (Boelens 2015).  
Water uses, distributions, and the interpretation and implementation of rights 
inherently imply negotiations and sometimes contestations and conflicts, as different 
water user groups and sectors have divergent and sometimes opposing needs and 
interests. Negotiations and conflicts happen over the distribution of the resource but 
also over the values on which this distribution is or should be based (Ingram 2011, 
Zwarteveen 2015). The entrance of new claimants always entails a renegotiation of 
locally specific contents and definitions of “water rights,” or the existing mechanisms 
to access, distribute, and use water resources and decide about resource management 
(Guevara-Gil and Boelens 2010). This often results in redefining rules of access and 
inclusion (Schlager and Ostrom 1992, Roth et al. 2005, 2015). In contexts of large 
economic, social, and political inequalities, such changes will often benefit those actors 
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who are already better placed politically and economically. Existing imbalances 
among competing uses or perspectives may, as a result, worsen (Ingram 2011).  
2.3.2 Water management and formalization of rights in Peru 
In Peru, the Water Resources Law 29338 that was enacted in 2009 affirms that water is 
publicly owned and cannot be traded. Legal water access and use is regulated through 
permits, authorizations, and licenses. The National Water Authority (ANA) is in 
charge of managing the country’s water resources. At the regional and local levels, 
Administrative Water Authorities (AAA) and Local Water Authorities (ALA) are the 
agencies responsible for granting and administering water rights in their respective 
jurisdictions.  
In the case of the Las Bambas mining project, the Local Water Authority in Cusco, ALA 
Cusco, used to be the agency responsible for granting water and usage rights in the 
Province of Cotabambas, in the neighboring region of Apurímac. After 2011, this zone 
came under the jurisdiction of the Pampas Apurímac AAA, more particularly the ALA 
Medio Apurímac-Pachachaca. In addition to domestic and irrigation uses, this 
authority also grants permits for mining and industrial uses of water, among others. 
Permits, like other concessions, are specific for certain sources and uses. Before 
granting permits, the ALA/AAA is obliged to verify that sources are not in dispute 
and that granting rights will not deprive other users of water.  
An important and noteworthy feature of the 23389 law is its explicit mention of respect 
for rural or indigenous communities’ customary water management uses and rights. 
The law thus recognizes communities’ rights to use water running through their land 
and water originating in the watersheds where their territories are located. This 
recognition happens through the formal incorporation of existing uses in national 
registers. The Water Resources Law establishes administrative obligations for 
formalizing these water uses, a process which starts with an application addressed to 
the Local Water Administrator. This application has to include land titles, cadastral 
and location maps, a register of the users, and a description of the villages where water 
is going to be used. In addition, the application needs to include a technical water 
study, which consists of a hydrological justification, planning and design, volumetric 
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flow measurements, water demand assessments, and project components (e.g., 
reservoirs, distribution network), as well as a budget for the costs of field inspections 
and administrative resolutions. The study has to be signed by a certified engineer, as 
rural communities are not considered sufficiently capable to carry it out by themselves. 
The formalization of water rights, which is actively promoted through the National 
Program for Formalizing Water Use Rights (PROFODUA) (MINAG 2009), is part of a 
larger attempt to modernize the Peruvian water sector. The government received 
sizable funding from the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank 
(Lynch 2012) to support the process, with the objective of standardizing water rights 
and “promoting a modern water culture among the people.” Through PROFODUA, 
as Boelens and Seemann (2014) show, the Peruvian government and the banks adopted 
an approach to water rights following supposedly universal economic, legal, and 
scientific rules (MINAG 2009, World Bank 2012). The idea behind this is that the 
formalization of local communities’ water rights will increase water security. Beyond 
just protecting customary rights systems, formalization will theoretically also provide 
the poor with the means to become richer: by making exchange and transfer of waters 
and water rights possible, formalization allows the poor to capitalize on their water 
assets. The work of the United Nations Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the 
Poor (CLEP) was a major source of inspiration for this line of thinking.22 Established 
in 2005 as the “first global initiative to focus on the link between exclusion, poverty, 
and the Law,” it explicitly aimed for, as its working title expresses, “making the Law 
work for everyone” (UNDP 2008). In the Commission’s view, formalizing local and 
customary rights “transforms security and opportunity from the privilege of the few 
to the reality of all”(UNDP 2008: 22). In CLEP’s reasoning, formalizing tenure security 
is a prerequisite for the fight against poverty. In addition to increasing investments 
and the incentives to protect resources, formalizing property rights also provides 
clarity over intangible local, extralegal rights, which in turn will lead to a reduction in 
resource conflicts among farmers (de Soto 2000, 2002). “[F]ormal property is more than 
a system for titling, recording, and mapping assets – it is an instrument of thought, 
                                                     
22 The Commission, hosted by the UNDP, was co-chaired by Hernando De Soto, Peruvian economist 
and World Bank consultant. 
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representing assets in such a way that people’s minds can work on them to generate 
surplus value. That is why formal property must be universally accessible: to bring 
everyone into one social contract where they can cooperate to raise society’s 
productivity”(de Soto 2002: 355).  
These ideas that inspired the Peruvian water policy reforms are rooted in liberal 
individualism (Roa-García 2014) and guided by notions of rational choice. They are 
anchored in the possibility and desirability of uniform rules and rights in the sovereign 
authority of the State (Roth et al. 2005, Achterhuis et al. 2010, Roth et al. 2015). Viewed 
through the lens of a liberal uniform rights’ system, existing communal use and 
allocation practices, authorities, and management modes (Boelens and Seemann 2014, 
Seemann 2016) come to appear as remnants of a non-desirable, heterogeneous and 
backward past; a situation to be remedied.  
2.4 The context: Las Bambas in Apurímac 
2.4.1 The Apurímac region 
The Apurímac region, which hosts the Las Bambas mining company, is located in 
Peru’s southern Andes and comprises seven provinces, eighty districts, and 377 rural 
communities. Apurímac has a rugged topography, combining high mountains with 
deep canyons. Two-thirds of its population is rural and Quechua-speaking. Apurímac 
is one of the country’s poorest regions: according to the 2012-2016 Institutional 
Strategic Plan for Apurímac, the poorest provinces in the region are Cotabambas and 
Grau – precisely where the mining company is located (Gobierno Regional de 
Apurímac 2012). For 2010, the per capita income in Challhuahuacho – the district 
hosting the company – was about US 62 dollars monthly, 30% of the national minimum 
monthly wage, estimated at US 203 dollars. According to Portilla (2005), Apurímac’s 
structural poverty is due to its geographical isolation and lack of effective economic 
programs and public policies.  
The main economic activities in the region are livestock, particularly sheep and cattle,23 
and small-scale subsistence agriculture. Practices such as trueque (barter) are 
                                                     
23 Livestock activities in the region were also related to violent events of cattle rustling (Valderrama 
The influence of large mining on water 
50 
 
widespread (Argumedo and Pimbert 2010), consisting of the exchange of products 
between communities from different ecological zones. Potatoes from high altitude are, 
for instance, exchanged for corn from medium altitudes. Agricultural and livestock 
activities rely on seasonal water taken by the farmers from rivers and creeks. There 
have been few public investments in irrigation infrastructure and domestic public 
water networks. The study area’s main water sources are the rivers of 
Challhuahuacho, Fuerabamba, Pumamarca, and Pamputa. Rivers also partially 
filtrateand feed existing springs from where people take water as well.24  
In legal terms, many communities located in the region are not recognized as 
comunidades campesinas (communities). Some are in the process of being formally 
recognized by the Public Register Office. The implication is that community titles of 
ownership are not formally endorsed but only exist in community registers or 
inventories (IAG n.d.) Land use here can be either organized communally or 
individually. It is often based on groupings of smallholdings known as laymes,25 with 
communities allocating land access and usage rights to families. After the land has 
been thus allocated, it may be inherited or rented out. Although not common, land 
sales do also happen but only if the full community assembly approves.  
Provincial government assessments report low agricultural productivity and 
insufficient and deficient roadways, irrigation systems, and health-care services as 
compared to other areas of the region. While the province of Cotabambas is rich in 
natural resources such as water and land, growing problems of pollution and over-
exploitation generate a wave of resource-related conflicts in the Province. In our case 
study area, in 2007, 31 percent (13600 km2) of the district of Challhuahuacho (43996 
km2) was granted to mining concessions.26 During 2015 and 2016, there were several 
socioenvironmental conflicts provoked by the presence and operations of the Las 
                                                     
Fernández and Escalante Gutiérrez 1992) 
24 The degree of infiltration varies depending on the characteristics of the aquifer in the area: limestone 
and permeable rock (SNC-Lavalin Perú 2014).  
25 Group of plots are assigned to every family for agriculture and livestock purposes (Xstrata Copper 
n.d.) 
26 About 72.6 percent of the territory of Apurímac has been granted to mining (Alegría Galarreta and 
Estrada Zúñiga 2010). 
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Bambas mining company; some farmers from different communities were even killed 
by the police during protests. In September 2015, as a way to suppress social 
mobilization and execute control by military forces, the central government declared 
a month-long state of emergency for the region (La República 2015).  
2.4.2 The Las Bambas mining project 
Copper in the Las Bambas zone was discovered in 1911 by the Ferrobamba Limited 
Company, which abandoned the site and concession after some years. Over the 
following sixty years, there were several other initiatives to explore the concession, on 
behalf of both the government and private companies (Montes 2008). In 2003, as part 
of the Peruvian Government’s privatization policy, the Investment Promotion Agency 
(Proinversión) put the exploration of copper in the region out for tender. In 2004, the 
concession was awarded to the Swiss Xstrata Company, which later became Xstrata 
Copper, the world’s fourth largest copper producer. In 2013, Xstrata Copper merged 
with the international Glencore Group (Xstrata Copper 2013), which sold Las Bambas 
to the Chinese MMG Limited in 2014. The ore deposits of the Las Bambas concession 
are Chalcobamba, Ferrobamba, Sulfobamba, and Charcas, located at 4,000 masl., in the 
provinces of Grau and Cotabambas (ProInversión 2005). Xstrata began its explorations 
in 2005, completing its pre-feasibility study in 2008 and the environmental impact 
assessment in 2010 (IAG n.d.). In 2015, the construction phase was finished, and 
operations started in 2016 (MMG 2014). 
The concession area measures 35000 ha, with an investment of approximately US 5 
million dollars (Xstrata n.d.) It is a mineral reserve that contains an estimated 7.2 
million tons of copper and a total of 12.6 million tons of mineral resources. The 
company estimated that it would be able to produce 2 MT of copper in the first five 
years of operations (Las Bambas 2015). As a social contribution, US 45.5 million dollars 
of the US 121 million dollars of Xstrata’s offer for the exploration concession was 
allocated to the Las Bambas Social Fund. 
About forty-nine communities are located around the Las Bambas project, six of which 
sit directly in the perimeter of the mining concession: Fuerabamba, Huancuire, 
Pamputa, Chicñahui, Pumamarca, and Cconccacca (Gouley 2005). Because of its 
The influence of large mining on water 
52 
 
location on one of the deposits to be mined (SNC-Lavalin Perú 2014), the community 
of Fuerabamba needed to be relocated. Fuerabamba consists of approximately 500 
families and occupies an area of 8,660 ha in the district of Challhuahuacho. Xstrata 
negotiated with community members to establish the conditions for the resettlement 
and the other benefits that the community would receive in return for agreeing to 
make place for the mining company.27 We focus our analysis on how these 
developments affected water in both the resettlement area, as well as in the 
communities of Choaquere and Chila which would host the relocated Fuerabambinos. 
We first briefly explain how the company obtained its water permits.  
The mining project received permits to use water in 2006. These permits were granted 
by the ALA Cusco and approved by the Cusco Water Users Board (a federated 
organization that represents all water users). Permits were granted for (1) industrial 
uses, to control dust emissions and maintain access roads to the project zones, and (2) 
mining uses, to mix water with additive lubricants for drillings. Water sources to meet 
both uses were springs, creeks, and part of the Fuerabamba River. These sources are 
located in the communities of Pamputa, Huancuire, and Fuerabamba. For industrial 
uses, some 47.331 m3/year were granted, while 120.418 m3/year were allocated for 
mining use. The total water use permit for the company was 167.749 m3/year. In 
addition to these productive use permits, the company also obtained rights to use 
water for domestic purposes – approximately 21.800 m3/year – intended for its 
personnel during the exploration stage. These volumes granted by the ALA are 
different from those forecasted by the detailed EIA for Las Bambas, prepared by 
Golder Associates (2010). The numbers in the EIA seem to more accurately reflect 
actual requirements of the project: it assesses total water needed for drilling to be 
3467.5 m3/year for each drilling rig, with a total of 166 drilling platforms, and estimates 
water needs for emission control to be 49.640 m3/ year (which is higher than the 
volume granted). For domestic uses, the EIA estimates that nearly 9.490 m3/year will 
be needed.  
                                                     
27 For more information about the conditions of the agreement, see Sosa Landeo (2012). 
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According to the company’s general manager, water would not become an issue 
during mining operations because the region is rich in water resources, and the 
company would only impact one of the region’s six rivers, the Fuerabamba River. 
Contradicting this optimism are the company reports that indicate that in 2012 it used 
a water volume of 160.976 m3 from different rivers: Fuerabamba 113.395 m3, 
Challhuahuacho 14.994 m3, and Pumamarca 25.884 m3, as well as 2.204 m3 from the 
Patumayo creek (Xstrata Copper 2013). The farmers of Pamputa indeed noticed a 
decline in their water availability and also found that the color of the water changed. 
The water authority that granted the water permits to the company in 2009 shares the 
optimism of the general manager in its assessment that livestock production in the area 
will not be affected by the company’s water use. They see no grounds for conflicts over 
water emerging between the company and local farmers. Yet, the same authority does 
admit that conflicts can arise when extraction activities begin.  
To prepare the area and sources for operations, the company received additional 
permits28 to use water and develop works along the Ferrobamba and Challhuahuacho 
rivers, as well as along some creeks located in nearby communities (Pamputa, 
Huancuire, Pumamarca, Choquecca-Antio, Quehuira, and Chila). In addition to these 
official water permits, the company also negotiated permission to pump water out of 
the Challhuahuacho River to be stored and used for its extractive operations during 
drought periods. The pumping zones are located in communities downstream from 
the project, in the district of Challhuahuacho. The negotiations involved purchasing 
some 30 ha of land from a community for US 2,200 dollars per hectare.  
2.5 Water arrangements, formalization of rights and tensions within 
communities  
2.5.1 Water and rural communities neighboring the Las Bambas project 
In the area, water access and use have always been subject to negotiation and struggle. 
The history of the Choaquere Puquio [a spring], in the highlands of the community 
Choaquere, provides a telling example. In 1939, farmers from three communities – 
                                                     
28 Among others are Res. N. 070, 080, 081-2012, and 0028, 0029-2013 ANA-ALA-Medio Apurímac. 
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Choaquere, Challhuahuacho, and Chila – fought for access to the water from this 
spring against farmers from the neighboring district of Haquira. After two days of 
clashes and strategic use of political networks, Choaquere and its allies succeeded in 
retaining their access to the spring. The Haquireños had to relinquish their aspirations 
to also access its waters (Alarcón n.d.). Years later in 1989, a new round of 
confrontations occurred in the zone around the springs. To strengthen their claims to 
the spring’s water, the leaders from Choaquere and the other communities 
emphasized that the waters had belonged to them since the 17th century. The 
importance of safeguarding, protecting, and caring for the Choaquere Puquio and 
other springs are thus well ingrained in the culture and memory of the communities. 
Like other communities in the area, Choaquere allocates its various sources of water 
according to the specific uses and needs of its members. It also shares water flows with 
other neighboring communities, like Chila, and with the district of Challhuahuacho. 
For example, one of the springs located in the highlands of Choaquere – of about 11 
L/s – is specifically designated for domestic purposes in Challhuahuacho, something 
that is recorded in an agreement signed between the municipality of the district and 
the community. Likewise, the Ccaccatuni Puquio was given by Choaquere to Chila, 
which is also shared voluntarily via a local agreement. In exchange, Choaquere 
farmers can take gravel from Chila for construction works in their community. 
Another spring was earmarked for sprinkler irrigation for Choaquere, Chila, and 
Minascucho, working together under a project developed by the municipality of 
Challhuahuacho. From the same source, the Choaquere community promised to divert 
water for a Domestic Sanitation Board (JASS) project to benefit about fifty-three 
families.  
According to the project representatives, so far there is sufficient water in the territories 
of Choaquere. The problem is the infrastructure to access and convey it to lands and 
people. Some families, for instance, access their water from the Ramon Puquio source 
by using buckets. Others take water from a acequia (creek) that originates from the 
Illahuatana spring, for their consumption and for their animals. During the dry months 
of the year, even the permanent sources may run dry, forcing people to look for water 
beyond the communities’ areas. Some take their horses and see where they can get 
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water, collecting it in buckets and transporting it to their homes (Alegría Galarreta and 
Estrada Zúñiga 2010). In these drier periods, they need to ration water and use it 
carefully for some days until another source is found. Via the water projects to be 
implemented in the area, farmers expect to bring water closer to their homes. Hence, 
the plan is for every family to have their own faucet with safe drinking water and for 
about 35 ha of pastures and vegetables to be irrigated.  
Communities register their water sources, including small lagoons, in their 
community books; they know exactly how many sources are available and for what 
purposes. The Choaquereños thus know that most of their sources are already allocated 
to different purposes or shared with other users. Yet, and as we show in more detail 
below, the formal status of these records, plans, and sharing practices are disputed, 
while they are also poorly captured in the baseline inventories of water sources 
performed by the mining company. Community members are also less sure about the 
quality of their water sources, a problem that may become more urgent when water 
qualities are increasingly influenced by mining operations. “There were engineers 
doing some studies, but we did not receive that information on the spot... they know 
it, but didn’t tell us,” some farmers remarked, referring to the EIA a consultancy 
company was performing for the mining company. “Then, the engineers left books 
here, we don’t know if the information is there…. There is a lot of information, too 
much, but nothing that we can understand… we don’t know how to even start.”  
2.5.2 Communities’ water rights and the formalization process  
As noted, a community’s resources and sharing arrangements – including cropland, 
natural pastures, non-agricultural land, barren land, springs, creeks, and rivers – are 
often duly written down in community books (or statutes). Yet, it is only if they are 
also registered with the government office of public records in main cities such as 
Cusco or Abancay that a community’s rights to their resources are formally recognized 
or that the resources themselves formally exist. The importance of this becomes very 
clear when an outside claimant, like the mining company, wants access to these 
resources. The lack of formal registration, for instance, caused a mismatch between the 
mining company’s inventory of Pamputa community’s springs (it counted thirty) and 
The influence of large mining on water 
56 
 
Pamputa’s own records, which list many more: three lakes, forty-nine springs, creeks, 
and wetland zones.29 Also, the lack of formal acknowledgment of Pamputa’s existing 
uses and rights allowed the ALA to grant the mining company permits to use some of 
its water flows – for instance the 4 liters per second from the Huasijasa creek – without 
the community’s knowledge or consent. In such cases, of which there are many, the 
sources the mine wants to use appear in formal records as unused sources, even when 
communities have been using them for a long time or when they are already 
committed to future uses.  
According to the Water Resource Law, water sources must be registered with the Water 
Authority; it is not enough when waters are only registered with the community’s 
books. In practice, until 2010, communities as well as local authorities deemed it 
sufficient to register their uses and sources of land and water with public registers. 
Formalizing rights was not common practice; “No one does it,” explained the major of 
Challhuahuacho at that time. Even for drinking water projects, formalization only 
happened after projects began. This lack of formal registration was not a problem as 
long as water governance remained within locally recognized boundaries and as long 
as claims and rights were recognized and respected within these boundaries. It only 
became a problem when the mining company wanted a share of the waters and with 
the active promotion of the new water law. This is when representatives of the 
government started becoming more critical of customary water sharing practices and 
community registration. One water authority officer observed, 
 “Granting water rights is the exclusive task of the ALA; nobody can have property over 
sources because water belongs to the state…the water law only recognizes the 
communities’ usos and costumbres, but that doesn’t make them the owners of water….”  
Communities are nevertheless hesitant to formalize their rights because it is both 
cumbersome as well as expensive. As some of the farmers explained, “Formalization 
is very costly, about US 4000 dollars, before it was even more expensive, around 
$7000.” When considering the high poverty rates in the region, it is clear that 
                                                     
29 Community registers. 2010.  
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formalizing rights is something almost no community is able to afford on their own, 
without external sources of support. For example, as noted, the mining company 
proposed to pump water out of the Challhuahuacho River and store it for use in their 
operations during droughts. Pumping zones are located in communities downstream 
from the project and from the district of Challhuahuacho. The company held land 
negotiations with one community and agreed to have access to land and to the 
pumping zone. As a result, the community that engaged in negotiations has its water 
sources recognized and endorsed by the authorities, but those sources were shared 
with another community that was not aware of the negotiations or formalization 
process. The members of the second community did not even know whether they and 
their uses had been considered in the recognition process. What they found, as one 
farmer told us, is that the community with formalized rights “closes the pipe and keeps 
water from entering the canal.” Since there is no water anymore in the canal, they now 
have to look for other sources. The members of this community were not consulted 
about those negotiations and are now affected because they depended on those shared 
waters for their and their animals’ consumption. 
The formal registration of rights also involves complicated procedures (described 
above). In addition, many communities did not see why they would need to formalize 
water rights: after all, they were managing their irrigation and domestic water 
resources on their own, and had been doing so for a long time, without ever receiving 
any state support. As water resources are located in their communal territories, 
communities considered them a part of their collective property. In this sense, 
Escalante (2010) is right in concluding that water never really became a public good in 
the Peruvian Andes: the “degree of control executed by the state was minimal or 
absent” (Escalante 2010: 251).  
Early in 2011, however, this changed, and state-supported processes of formalization 
were started in communities neighboring Las Bambas: Choaquere, Chila, and a few 
others. They began registering their water uses and rights with the ALA Cusco and 
later with the ALA Apurímac. Community leader testimonies reveal that their 
agreement to this process was importantly prompted by their desire to protect their 
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water sources from the mining company, as two leaders from communities located 
within the area influenced by Las Bambas mining operations expressed: “Now with 
the mining company [in the area], we don’t know what might happen.” So, they felt it 
would be necessary “to get the springs recognized because over time, the mine may 
dry them up, or others may take the water if it is not recognized. When the mine comes, 
with this document, we will defend our water.”  
Communities’ desire to more formally secure their future access to water sources was 
thus a response to a perceived (future) competition over their waters with Xstrata, 
which started mining operations in Las Bambas after the approval of their 
Environmental Impact Assessment. It is no coincidence that especially those 
communities which entered into direct negotiations with Xstrata engaged in the 
process of formalizing their rights. In part, these negotiations with the company 
earned them some income, which allowed them to pay for the costs of formalization. 
Hence, the communities of Chila and Choaquere obtained the money to start the 
formalization process through their land negotiations with Xstrata. Like other 
communities,30 they felt the need to have some kind of legal protection to secure their 
current and future rights to water. The community of Choaquere took an active charge 
of the formalization process: “Now we are getting the ALA Cusco to register our water. 
This is under way. The engineers are collecting information on the sources and 
preparing blueprints, so water will be perfectly well recognized.”  
Our conclusion is that the protection and respect of customary rights that the law 
promises is a rather empty one. In practice, the legal security is only for those who 
hold a difficult to obtain and expensive state water license or permit. When 
communities have not gone through the formalization process, their water resources 
are available to be given in concession to others (Alegría Galarreta and Estrada Zúñiga 
2010).  
                                                     
30 Communities from Cusco after getting the state water rights issued by the ALA, also registered them 
with the public registers “to be more powerful while facing interventions of third parties” or users 
(Escalante 2010:245). 
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2.5.3 Contestation and disempowerment of customary water rights arrangements 
The resettlement process of Fuerabamba provides an interesting case to further shed 
light on the controversies and contradictions of water formalization rights. When we 
asked how the water was going to be distributed or shared with the new settlers, 
nobody in the area had precise information. The community of Fuerabamba fully 
relied on the mining company to get the water they needed in their new resettlement 
area. As some Fuerabambinos revealed, they were confident that if problems with 
water would arise, “the company will buy water for us.” The president of the 
community referred to their good relations with the mining company to justify this 
confidence. It was based on the several years of negotiations that Fuerabamba and 
Xstrata had already engaged in, negotiations about the resettlement process and the 
facilities that the company would provide to the community in the new area. In 2010, 
Fuerabamba signed the agreement to relocate Fuerabamba’s 500 families to the 
community territories of Chila and Choaquere. The mining company bought about 
250 ha of land in total from these communities and would construct a new town: 
“Nueva Fuerabamba.” To arrange these purchases, Chila and Choaquere held a series 
of meetings with the company to clarify communal land borders, establish the exact 
area of the land, and agree on prices. Representatives of both communities reported 
that water was not discussed in those meetings: the question of how Fuerabamba 
would be provided with water was not part of the discussions. In contrast, the General 
Manager of the company, by referring to the new area for the resettled families as “a 
‘New York’ in Challhuahuacho” suggested that the new plan included all facilities. He 
said that although not discussed in the meetings, they had taken care of water and 
would get it to Nueva Fuerabamba.31 In discussions with leaders of Choaquere, they 
pointed out that this water would have to be taken from elsewhere since their sources 
were already allocated.  
The confidence of Fuerabamba in the company’s willingness and powers to look after 
them seemed justified when the process of getting water rights was set in motion. In 
December 2011, the president of Fuerabamba requested authorization to carry out 
                                                     
31 Personal communication 2011. 
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water studies in the area. This was the beginning of a process that would eventually 
result in Nueva Fuerabamba obtaining its water rights license for drinking purposes. 
The process was supported by the engineering and construction company GMI, part 
of the Graña and Montero Group, one of the biggest companies in the construction 
sector in Peru. This same company was responsible for the construction of the mining 
site of Las Bambas. Paid and commanded by the mining company, it was agreed that 
the engineering company would carry out the legally requested water and feasibility 
studies in support of Fuerabamba’s water rights’ application.32 After submitting the 
formal request, the law allows a period of seven months to finish all the studies needed 
to get the license. Yet, already one month after the application in January 2012, no 
doubt because of the engineering company’s fast work, Fuerabamba delivered the 
water studies to the water authority and asked for its water rights to be approved. The 
process, however, did not go unchallenged.33  
 As noted, many of the water sources are located in the territory of the community of 
Choaquere. Choaquere opposed the allocation of water rights to Fuerabamba. The 
farmers of Choaquere feared there would not be sufficient water for all and were 
reluctant to agree to interventions that would compromise their water sources without 
previous consultation. The respective water sources were already under pressure, as 
they were shared with two other communities and the district of Challhuahuacho,34 
with additional pressures arising from several future water projects that were already 
planned for irrigation, livestock, and domestic purposes. Choaquere argued that in not 
considering all present and future uses, the consultancy company’s water studies 
overestimated availability. The community’s doubts were backed up by the 
municipality of Challhuahuacho. The municipality suggested that Fuerabamba meet 
its water needs with water from sources different than the ones used by Choaquere.  
Choaquere issued an official appeal against the studies and the proposed allocation of 
water rights to Nueva Fuerabamba, partly on account of the fact that it was not 
                                                     
32 RA 271-2012 and RA 0344-2013-ANA-ALA-Medio Apurímac- Pachachaca. 
33 For a summary of the conflict, see Defensoría del Pueblo (2012). 
34 Because of the Las Bambas mining developments in the district, the population grew with its commercial 
activities having new water demands from restaurants, hotels, and shops. 
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involved or consulted. They asked for the intervention of the ombudsman office to 
verify whether the process of establishing the study and the proposal was correct. 
Choaquere also questioned whether it was legally possible to grant water to a non-
existing entity. Nueva Fuerabamba, after all, had not yet been allocated any legal 
status, neither as a community nor as a residence. The water authority transferred the 
issue to Fuerabamba for them to respond to these complaints. Backed up by the studies 
of the engineering company, Fuerabamba responded that there would be enough 
water for everybody to share. In the meantime, officials also started questioning the 
legal status of the disputed sources. Choaquere presented a request for getting state-
endorsed water rights over its springs in 2011. However, this request was rejected by 
the authority because it did not include the respective “proper water studies.” The 
implication was that Choaquere did not hold any official water rights.  
Because of the dispute and opposition to allocate water rights to Fuerabamba, the 
water authority organized a number of visits to Choaquere to inform them about the 
allocation and the full extent of the potential water rights for Fuerabamba. Meetings 
were also held between the mining company and the communities, including 
Choaquere, where, besides water issues, the company was reminded about the 
promises it had made to help developing projects in the area. The representatives of 
the company, although emphasizing that those communities were not part of the 
company’s impacted area and therefore were not entitled to compensation or projects, 
promised that they would consider the communities’ demands.  
Choaquere continued its opposition against the allocation of rights to Fuerabamba, 
even intensifying it when it became clear that Fuerabamba not only wanted the water 
that was flowing from the springs but also claimed rights over the springs themselves. 
Farmers from Choaquere were considering protesting and blocking the road that 
connected Challhuahuacho and the mining operations with other regions like Cusco 
if these plans were to materialize.  
The case illustrates how the promise of formal rights, together with the protection and 
support it received from the mining company, gave Fuerabamba a clear advantage 
over other users. As a local legal advisor commented, “In daily practice, the customary 
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rights of a community – Choaquere – cannot be paired with the water rights given by 
the state to a second community – Fuerabamba, particularly since the latter constitutes 
a strategic actor for the mining company. This actor will get all the attention, advice, 
and logistic support needed to materialize formal water rights, even if that means 
affecting other communities’ rights.” As noted, it is crucial for the company to deal 
with Fuerabamba’s needs and the consequent resettlement process because the 
development of the mining site depends on this. The process of formalizing Nueva 
Fuerabamba’s water rights lasted for more than a year, with several changes in the 
communities’ board of representatives. There were several meetings between the 
water authority, the communities, and the company to discuss the water intake for 
Fuerabamba and development projects for the farmers. During these discussions, 
tensions were alleviated, and Choaquere agreed to share its water flows, which led the 
water authority to conclude that the “problems were solved.” There were no further 
details given about any agreements regarding water sharing with Fuerabamba or 
others. The representatives of the mining company simply reported that there was “no 
more opposition in the area” and agreed to support several development projects in 
the communities, including Choaquere. At least for the moment, Choaquere was yet 
another community that seemed to be “convinced” by the economic support and 
development opportunities offered by the company – in any case, it did not have the 
force to continue its protests.  
The water authority approved the water studies presented by Nueva Fuerabamba, 
certifying that 371 L/s would be available for diverse community purposes. This 
cleared the way for Nueva Fuerabamba to enter into the administrative process of 
getting its formal water rights.  
2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter presents a contextualized analysis of the influence of large-scale mining 
on the reconfiguration of water governance arrangements through the formalization 
of water rights. Focusing on the implementation of the mega mining project Las 
Bambas in the region of Apurímac, Peru, we illustrate the complexities, intricacies, and 
contradictions of the formalization of water rights in the communities neighboring 
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mining operations. While some communities and families strategically resort to 
formalization as a legal protection for their security of tenure against present and 
potential future demands of competing stakeholders, there are many who decide 
against it because it is a very costly and cumbersome process. Our examples in fact 
suggest that the mining company is often the source of the funding, and technical 
advice communities need to be able to actually start the formalization process. This is 
ironic, as the mining company itself has clear interests and stakes in the resulting re-
definition and re-distribution of waters and lands, as it needs these resources for 
conducting its operations.  
The arrival of the mining company, through the formalization of water rights, thus 
reconfigures existing water governance arrangements among communities and 
between communities and the state. Existing arrangements evolved over years: they 
are based on experiential assessments of availabilities and of needs and are anchored 
in wider relations of co-dependency and mutual help between and within 
communities, like the voluntary agreements for sharing water flows and springs. 
While not without their own problems and conflicts, these logics of sharing are now 
being superseded by new ones in which the ability to pay for technically determined 
assessments of quantities becomes the basis of rights to water. As noted, the water 
sources that the community of Choaquere had in their territories and used for different 
purposes were not respected because the community could not meet the technical 
requirements to officially formalize them.  
Confronted with the combined legal, economic, and political force of the mining 
company and the state, communities have relatively few powers to protect and hold 
on to their own rights’ systems. This becomes particularly evident when they are 
confronted with company-supported neighboring communities which claim their 
waters: communities with state-endorsed rights are in a much better position to defend 
their claims. The example of the Fuerabamba resettlement’s incursion into the 
territories of Chila and Choaquere is a clear illustration of this. It shows how 
formalization may lead to the gradual decontextualization of water rights from 
histories, places, and cultural dynamics. Instead of protection, formalization erodes 
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the existing rights of rural communities if a competing claim enjoys the support of a 
mining company and the formal legal system. The formalization of one community’s 
rights often entails the exclusion of other communities from previously shared 
territories and water sources (see also Boelens and Seemann 2014), with the 
simultaneous existence of different distributional logics increasingly leading to 
conflicts, both about who has or should have access to the resource and about the 
normative grounds on which access should be based.  
We conclude that the recent formalization of water uses and rights in rural 
communities near mining operations imposes a new normative hierarchy that 
privileges the rights of those aligned with the mining company over those that oppose 
it. The formalization of customary water rights is a process full of contradictions, 
especially when triggered by the demands of an economically powerful extractive 
industry; formalization undeniably entails profound redistributions of water and land 
and reconfigurations of existing logics of sharing and managing water. It may imply 
the irreversible erasure not just of existing rights’ systems and associated usos and 
costumbres but also of shared community histories and vernacular knowledges. The 
processes and impacts of water rights formalization need to be seen as part of ongoing 
and new dynamic interactions and struggles between communities, and between 
communities and mining companies, over access to and control over water and land. 
The state is never a neutral legislator in these interactions but actively favors some 
users and uses over others as part of an overall strategy of development and economic 
growth. Beyond the discourse of “customary rights protected by law,” there is 
therefore a need to look at the actual results of formalization in terms of how it 
transforms or erodes existing customary rules, rights, and organizational 
arrangements. Which actors and interests are behind processes of the formalization of 
water rights, who benefits from such processes, who loses? 
While in earlier days, communities established their own water governance principles, 
rights, and mutual responsibilities, now with the rearrangements in the area of Las 
Bambas, not just the rights but also the ontological and epistemological existence of 
communities’ waters stem from and are articulated in the terms of state-endorsed and 
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technically-produced documents. How this matters is very much an empirical 
question. What is clear, however, is that with the loss of customary rights systems, also 
a wealth of knowledge about how to best care for water and equitably share risks 
disappearing. This is precisely the knowledge that may prove instrumental to 
countervail and resist the accumulation of water and its control in the hands of those 
who can pay for it or to develop and support more democratic and environmentally 
respectful ways of governing water.  
This research stresses the need to understand and consider the already existing local 
water rights arrangements among rural communities, which determine the actual 
practices of water usage and governance at intra- and inter-communal levels. Mining 
and other extractive interventions usually take place in rural areas where formalized 
state rules and rights have low legitimacy, application, or even seem to be absent. It is 
fundamentally important that these interventions realize that they do not come to 
operate in “legally and institutionally empty spaces” but rather in contexts that are full 
of local arrangements, histories, institutions, and dynamics. Understanding and 
respecting the importance of these normative systems, recognizing the meaning and 
values of water beyond its material quantity and quality conditions, and avoiding the 
decontextualized imposition of state formalization processes can contribute to 
reducing tensions and conflicts among different water users.
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Chapter 3. Exploring the politics of water grabbing: the case of large 
mining operations in the Peruvian Andes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Children and an irrigation canal, Cajamarca. Photo: M. Sosa.
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3.1 Introduction 
"El Perú es un país minero" (Peru is a mining country). With this statement, pronounced 
during the opening ceremony of a water reservoir constructed by the large gold mine 
Yanacocha in Cajamarca in 2008, the then president of Peru Alan García underscored 
the government’s fondness of the mining industry. From the 1990s onwards, the 
different Peruvian governments have actively promoted mining as one of the 
cornerstones of the country’s development through state measures to attract and 
secure private and often foreign investments in mining (de Echave et al. 2009a). 
Helped by the worldwide increase of mineral prices, these measures resulted in a 
mining boom that was particularly remarkable from 1999 to 2009 (IPE 2011). 
According to (2007) from 1990 to 2005, the sector sparked the development of the 
national economy, with global GDP rising only by 80% as compared to that of mining 
increasing rising by 221%. 
Yanacocha, in the northern Peruvian Andes, was the first large mining investment that 
benefited from the new favourable legal and policy climate. Since its establishment, 
Yanacocha’s production has significantly contributed to making Peru one of the most 
important mineral producing countries in Latin America and worldwide (Torres 2007). 
Although undeniably positive for the national trade balance, there is much 
controversy and debate about the impacts of large mining industries on the areas 
where they operate, as they provoke significant social, economic and environmental 
changes (Bury 2004, 2005, Bebbington 2007, Bebbington et al. 2008) which are not 
necessarily positive. This is why Bebbington et al. (2008) characterize the relationship 
between large mining and development as "contentious and ambiguous", as "mining 
has often delivered adverse social, environmental and economic effects for the many, 
but significant gains only for the few" and "because of the abiding sense, among local 
populations as much as development professionals, that just maybe mining could 
contribute much more" (Bebbington et al. 2008: 887). Analysing mining as a form of 
capitalist expansion that deeply transforms the development of those rural territories 
where it operates, Bebbington (2007) argues that a development model based on 
(foreign) mining companies has its price. "It transforms livelihoods strategies, social 
relations of production and forms of environmental governance in those territories" 
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(Bebbington 2007: 35). These changes and transformations do not go uncontested, but 
provoke sometimes violent resistance and reactions from civil society groups at 
different scales (local, national, international). 
The best documented impacts of mining operations on local communities are about 
how mines appropriate resources (in particular land and water) compromising 
livelihoods and environments. The focus of this chapter is on water, a resource that is 
of crucial importance for mining operations. Gold mines, for instance, require a large 
amount of water to 'wash' the soil containing gold minerals (Budds 2011). In addition, 
mining sites are often located in the catchment areas of water sources and rivers 
(Bebbington and Williams 2008), which means that mining operations affect, and often 
alter, hydrological regimes and the quantity and quality of downstream water flows. 
Mines also contaminate water through leaching (infiltration of acids and heavy metals 
used for ore separation) and dumping of tailings (finely ground rock from which ore 
had been extracted). Mining operations, in sum, entail profound material 
modifications in water flows. 
The chapter uses the case of the Yanacocha mine to show that alongside producing 
such material effects, large mining operations in rural areas are also accompanied with 
profound and often irreversible changes in how water is controlled and managed. It 
argues that these reconfigurations of waterscapes provoked by mining operations can 
be understood as a form of water grabbing. This argument is made on the basis of a 
detailed description of what we call the politics of water grabbing, presenting two 
cases that show the mining company’s strategies to acquire control over water. It 
shows how the appropriation of water by the mining company happens through long-
winding and often somewhat shady processes of negotiation and struggle between the 
company, the surrounding communities and different government agencies. The 
descriptions illustrate that both the mining company and the communities a) skilfully 
make use of the institutional and legal fuzziness and plurality that characterize water 
tenure relations in the Peruvian Andes, especially after the new water framework took 
effect in 2009 (Del Castillo 2009, Budds and Hinojosa 2012) and b) also, often, resort to 
extrajudicial means for defending their claims. 
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These negotiations and struggles occur in one of the poorest regions of Peru. In 2011, 
the Ministry of Finances and Economy (MEF 2012) reported that Cajamarca presented 
the highest number of poor districts in Peru. It is a region consisting largely of rural 
areas and inhabited by small livestock farming communities. As we show, the political 
agency of the people in these communities is remarkable and many also display a deep 
awareness and pride of their territory and natural environment. Yet, and even though 
they are assisted by environmental NGOs, their bargaining power is very limited as 
they hardly have any fall-back position, making it difficult for them to say no to the 
financial compensations and favours that the mining company offers them in return 
for water. In terms of money, these compensations are enormous as compared to their 
normal earnings. 
The empirical material for the chapter comes from 18 months of research in the region 
conducted between 2009 and 2011. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
key informants from rural communities, the Yanacocha Company, local NGOs, water 
authorities at the local and national level, and local government offices (we 
anonymised their names). 
In what follows, we first briefly explain our theoretical points of departure. Before 
moving on to the description of the two cases (La Ramada canal and the San José 
reservoir), we provide a background of Yanacocha mine and water use in Cajamarca. 
In the last section, we draw three major conclusions about how mines alter 
waterscapes. Our cases illustrate that mining operations not only change how and who 
uses water but also reconfigure water governance, with the mining company obtaining 
control over water and assuming major responsibilities for water allocation. The 
longer-term impacts of these changes on livelihoods and environments remain poorly 
understood, although it is clear that the 'de-territorialisation' of water management 
that it entails is irreversible. 
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3.2 Water grabbing and mines: Some theoretical points of departure 
In analogy with the definition proposed by Borras Jr and Franco (2012) for land 
grabbing, we define 'water grabbing' as involving both changes in water use, and 
(perhaps more importantly) also involving (irreversible) changes in water tenure 
relations. As with land grabbing, this process involves the enclosure of commons by 
multinational companies and government agencies, dispossessing peasants and 
indigenous people and altering the environment. Our understanding of water 
grabbing rests on the concept of waterscapes. The term allows recognising how the 
natural and the social environments always co-constitute each other, and is therefore 
useful "to explore the ways in which flows of water, power and capital converge to 
produce uneven socio-ecological arrangements over space and time" (Budds and 
Hinojosa 2012: 124). 
We associate changing waterscapes through water grabbing with the so-called 'neo-
liberal turn' and the neo-liberalisation of environmental arenas of governance, as well 
as with the privatisation and commoditisation of nature (Bakker 2002, Fairhead et al. 
2012), a stream of theoretical literature which focuses on the inevitable environmental 
dimensions of neo-liberalism, trying to understand how capitalism emerges through 
a restructuring of nature-society relationships. In particular, we use these insights for 
conceptualising water governance as a form of state re-regulation to secure capital 
accumulation, through both material and discursive means, which produce particular 
forms of authority and social order (Budds and Hinojosa 2012). These ideas are 
inspired by discussions on water becoming a commodity (Prudham 2009), and a 
necessary lubricant for capital accumulation (Budds 2011). Our analysis thus suggests 
that the entrance of mines in waterscapes entails the introduction of market dynamics 
or market-oriented processes in water management, allocation and supply, leading to 
the commercialisation or privatisation of water management (Bakker 2002). 
3.3 Cajamarca, water and Yanacocha 
Cajamarca is located in the northern Peruvian Andes, and therefore is a region 
characterized by mountains, high grassy plains and valleys. The capital of the 
department is the city of Cajamarca, located at 2700 masl., in an inter-Andean valley 
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and surrounded by mountains of about 4000 masl. Since hacienda times, Cajamarca 
has been one of the most important regions for livestock and dairy production in Peru 
(Armijos 2005). The livelihood activities of rural households consist of grazing cattle, 
milking schedules, milk delivery and milk-related production. Small-scale agriculture 
is also part of the activities of the region, which depends on irrigation. Irrigation is 
mainly done with water from streams and sources located in the high mountains 
which are channelled to the agricultural fields through a network of rudimentary 
canals. To manage these irrigation canals – e.g. distributing the available water supply, 
establishing the delivery turns and organising maintenance work – the farmers 
organise themselves in water user associations. These associations take decisions 
collectively or in consultation with the community general assembly. They are also 
responsible for formally registering their association’s members and the water sources 
that they use. Rights to water – permits, licences or authorisations – are registered in the 
names of these associations, and it is also the responsibility of the associations to renew 
such water rights. When water is also used for other purposes next to irrigation, the 
rights specify this. Not all associations have their records, rights and registrations in 
order. 
In the mid-1990s Cajamarca gained importance as a significant contributor to the 
national economy, due to the operation of a large gold mine, Yanacocha (established 
in 1993). According to the Ministry of Energy and Mining, Cajamarca is the second 
most important region – of the 12 Peruvian Andean regions – in terms of mining 
concessions, particularly for gold, silver and copper production. In 2008, about 40.88% 
of Cajamarca’s territory was given out for mining concessions (Grufides n.d.). For the 
last 10 years, in the Cajamarca region, at least 10 transnational mining projects have 
been implemented and developed by transnational and national investors. Yanacocha 
is very prominent among these. It is the largest gold producer in Latin America and 
one of the most profitable mining enterprises in the world (Bury 2005). The operations 
are established from 3500 to 4100 masl.; 48 km north of the city of Cajamarca and 800 
km north of the capital city (Golder Associates 2008). It is a surface or open pit mine 
consisting of four heap leaching platforms and three gold recovering plants (Elizalde 
et al. 2009). The company is a joint venture owned by Newmont Mining Corporation 
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(USA), the Buenaventura mining company (Peru), and the financial sector of the World 
Bank (Kuramoto 1999, Bury 2005, de Echave et al. 2009a). Since its establishment, the 
production of Yanacocha has exceeded 26 million ounces (Newmont 2008). In 2008 and 
2009, Yanacocha produced 1,8 and 2,0 million ounces, respectively, making profits of 
about US 1.6 billion dollars and 2.1 billion dollars, respectively (Yanacocha 2010). The 
mine constitutes the first large-scale heap leaching mine in Peru and is "the largest 
heap-leaching operation in the world" (Newmont 2002 in Bury 2005: 10). 
As Yanacocha itself states: "[t]he development of our activities requires water. [We] 
accumulate water from rainfall, surface and groundwater [extraction] and drainage, to 
use them in our operations" (Yanacocha 2009: 23). The process of obtaining gold 
consists of the removal of large amounts of soil deposited in the pads or platforms. 
This soil is then constantly irrigated by a cyanide solution (50 mg per litre of water) 
which dissolves the gold, and through pipe systems this gold-containing liquid is 
pumped to the processing plants where the gold is recovered. Hence, for producing 
gold, Yanacocha requires a permanent supply of water (Yanacocha 2009). According 
to its annual report of 2009, the total amount that entered into its productive process 
in that year was about 33 MCM, most of which reportedly came from groundwater 
sources (Yanacocha 2010). All the water used by Yanacocha’s operations is (in 
principle) stored in a reservoir constructed for this purpose, where the water is treated 
before it is released to the surrounding communities. 
The mine, however, does not just require water for its operations but also alters water 
flows because its site is located in the headwaters of five of the main rivers of the 
Cajamarca region (Yanacocha 2008), hence also at the place where many sources and 
streams feeding irrigation channels are located. According to the reports of the mining 
company, there are about 9,330 farmers´ families living in the area influenced by the 
mining company (Yanacocha 2007a). During the operations on the open pits, 
groundwater sources are removed in a process called 'dewatering'. According to one 
of the mine’s managers, this water is not necessary or useful, it is a burden35 and 
hampers operations, which is why it needs to be pumped or removed. This dewatering 
                                                     
35 "El agua ahí es mas un estorbo". Personal communication, Mining manager 1, 2010. 
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process has enormous implications for the downstream waterscape: lowering 
groundwater levels, altering the flows of rivers and creeks and even making entire 
upstream lakes disappear. There are also repercussions for the operation of existing 
downstream hydraulic networks, for instance, irrigation systems (Younger et al. 2004). 
Besides dewatering, the extraction of water is accompanied by capturing and draining 
of surface water, from small lakes and water springs. This is done to secure operations 
on the pit and to prevent acid mine drainage. This is the result of a chemical reaction 
that can occur when removed metal sulphides exposed during the soil removal enter 
into contact with surface water (e.g. from rainfall of surface sources) and air (oxygen). 
According to Yanacocha, most of the water that it uses is treated and recycled. In one 
of its sustainability reports, the mine states that its water use for 2009 amounted to 
125,100 MCM. The report claims that 98% of this amount was reused and recycled, and 
that therefore only 2% was actually consumed in mining operations. According to the 
mine, therefore, its actual consumption of water: 2 MCM is negligible compared to the 
amount used by agriculture – in the 5 catchment areas – which is estimated to be about 
68 MCM (Yanacocha 2009). 
Indeed, Yanacocha uses such figures to boast of its environmental awareness. 
Yanacocha’s focus on net consumption, however, is misleading as it obscures the 
impacts of Yanacocha’s operations on the quality and quantity of downstream water 
flows. In an attempt to arrive at more accurate figures that do take these impacts into 
account, Preciado Jerónimo (2011) analysed Yanacocha’s water use in the framework 
of a river basin. The author arrived at an estimate of Yanacocha’s yearly use of around 
34 MCM instead of only 2 MCM, this quantity was calculated considering the water 
consumed by mining operations (2 MCM) and the extracted groundwater (32 MCM). 
In her analysis, Preciado Jerónimo (2011) highlights that there are extra amounts of 
water that are involved in the mining operations, but they are not quantified such as 
drainage water from surface water sources and the amounts of water that, in the long 
term, are taken from the watershed because of mining operations in the area. 
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Yanacocha covers an area of about 10,000 ha in three main districts of Cajamarca: La 
Encañada, Baños del Inca and Cajamarca. This large mining site is adjacent to around 
100 rural communities. The national land titling and registration programme (PETT36) 
initiated in 1992 by the Peruvian government, largely in line with the ideas of de Soto 
(2000), greatly facilitated Yanacocha’s acquisition of land; once land titles were 
registered through the PETT process, they could also be transferred and sold (to the 
mining company). Evidencing its interests in the matter, Yanacocha even actively 
supported parts of the PETT process, by helping the clarification of the land status and 
legal ownership through rapid land-titling initiatives in communities (Bury 2005). 
Yanacocha acquired most of its land by direct purchase, and some through 
negotiations. The direct purchases or plot negotiations were done between Yanacocha 
representatives and the landowners. With hindsight, many involved feel that 
Yanacocha obtained land at very low prices (for example US 25 dollars/ha) (Deza 
2008). Land transactions were the cause of several socio-environmental conflicts 
between Yanacocha and the inhabitants of neighboring communities. In case a 
landowner refused to sell or did not want to negotiate, the mine would take actions to 
have the plot expropriated by force and registered as property acquired under 
resistance (SCG 2004). 
Through its acquisition of large portions of land, Yanacocha de facto appropriated the 
means of subsistence and production of many people in the area. According to many 
of them, this comes with responsibilities: they feel that Yanacocha should be creating 
employment and provide assistance to those deprived of their land. The families’ 
perception was that the work replaces the land. Thus for them it was not a gift, but 
their right, so it must be considered as permanent and inherited (SCG 2004). 
In what follows, we provide detailed descriptions of two specific sets of encounters 
between the mining company and the surrounding communities about water. 
                                                     
36 Programa Especial de Titulación de Tierras (PETT), which was created and implemented to promote 
the formalisation of property rights in rural areas. This is to provide land titles to farmers and in that 
way to support their private landownership.  
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3.3.1 Case 1: La Ramada Canal 
In this first case, we illustrate the strategies of the mine to gain access to, and control 
of, water from a particular set of sources (in the Cerro Negro mountain) which used to 
feed the La Ramada canal, a canal used by farmers to irrigate their fields, about 247 ha 
of agricultural crops like potatoes, barley, wheat, among others. The beneficiaries of 
this canal were two communities from the rural town La Ramada: La Ramada and 
Manzanas, located in the sub-catchment area from the Porcón and Maschón rivers. 
The canal La Ramada was constructed in the 1980s, under the enthusiastic leadership 
of Don Eusebio. He organised the farmers to collectively work on its construction, a 
tremendous effort which took a long time, from 1982 to 1986. It was a tiresome and 
difficult process, because of the roughness of the terrain and the remoteness of the 
water sources. Many comuneros still vividly recall the hardships they faced when 
building their canal: "[w]e walked for hours very early in the morning to reach the 
sources and worked the entire day".37 Once the canal was built, Don Eusebio also took 
the lead in officially registering it, so as to formally establish the water rights of the 
involved comuneros. In 1989, the Cerro Negro – La Ramada canal of 17 km of length was 
officially registered and got state water rights licences. These were issued by the 
General Water Directory of the Ministry of Agriculture to the water users of the La 
Ramada and Manzanas communities.38 These water rights authorised the members of 
these communities to use the water from a group of natural springs located in the 
Cerro Negro area.39 Some of these springs are located in the Cajamarca watersheds, 
while others are in the Jequetepeque watersheds. The water flows given were about 13 
L/s to irrigate 247 ha of agricultural land. Logically, Don Eusebio also became the first 
president of the water user association of the La Ramada canal. 
These Cerro Negro water sources which feed the canal are located on the land that was 
later purchased by Yanacocha, soon after it started its operations in the area in 1993. 
                                                     
37 Farmer 1. Personal communication. 9 April 2009. 
38 Resolución. N. 065-89-AG-DGA. Ministerio de Agricultura. 1989. (Res. stands for ‘Resolución’ in the 
remainder of the chapter). 
39 The water sources and the respective flows were: Rumi Rumi (or Rume Rume) 3L/s, Cuyoc 3L/s, 
both sources located at the Jequetepeque river basin and Perga Perga 7L/s located at the Cajamarca 
river basin.  
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Yanacocha bought this land from the Granja Porcón, which is an evangelical farming 
cooperative that was established (and had received its land) as a result of the Land 
Reform of 1969 (Granja Porcón n.d.). This cooperative owns about 11,000 ha in 
Cajamarca and its relationship with Yanacocha is one of friendly comradeship. 
Yanacocha also wanted to be able to use the riparian (adjacent) waters, including those 
from Cerro Negro, as a source of drinking water for one of its mining camp sites, La 
Pajuela. In 2003, Yanacocha applied and got the official water rights40 to use 8.5 L/s 
from the Cerro Negro water sources. These rights were issued by the water authority 
of Jequetepeque -Administración técnica del distrito de riego del Jequetepeque ATDRJ. As 
part of the requirement to apply for water rights and to reinforce its application, 
Yanacocha presented its land titles to prove that the water sources were located within 
its private property. 
The members of the Canal Ramada water user association were not aware of the fact 
that their rights to water had been transferred. In 2002, a group of some ten comuneros 
got together and travelled to the catchment area to clean parts of the canal. To do this, 
they had to enter the area that now belonged to the mine. Yanacocha discovered this, 
and accused the farmers of trespassing and denounced them to the Crime prevention 
office of the Cajamarca court.41 To the farmers’ surprise, Yanacocha also stated that the 
farmers’ use of the Cerro Negro water sources and the canal was illegal, since 
(according to the mine) their rights to these waters had been officially revoked. The 
court decided not to take any actions against the farmers, because there had not been 
any violence, nor had any private property been damaged. 
It was through this incident that the farmers found out that there was something 
wrong, and they started inquiring about the status of their water rights and their canal. 
They soon found out that Don Eusebio, their charismatic leader, had arranged for the 
cancellation of their rights. In 2001, he had (together with another leader of la Ramada) 
presented a petition to the water authority of Cajamarca -Administración Técnica del 
                                                     
40 The given water flows were: Rumi Rumi 1: 1 L/s, Rumi Rumi 2: 0.20 L/s, Rumi Rumi 3: 2 L/s, Cuyoc 
1: 1 L/s, Cuyoc 2: 1.50 L/s, Cuyoc 3: 1 L/s, Quebrada Cuyoc: 2 L/s, Pampa Cuyoc 1: 0.15 L/s and Pampa 
Cuyoc 2: 3 L/s. Res. N. 036-2003MA-ATDRJ.  
41 Distrito Judicial Cajamarca Res. N. 005-2002-MP-FDS-DJ-Cajamarca. 
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Distrito de Riego de Cajamarca ATDRC- to cancel the communities’ water rights. The 
reasons he gave for this request were that the water flows and the canal were no longer 
in use, and that the canal was damaged because of leakages. In addition, he mentioned 
the fact that in La Ramada, Yanacocha is already executing programs of provision and 
improvement of drinking water systems, supposedly indicating that the Ramada and 
Manzanas communities would, in the future, access water through these systems. Don 
Eusebio had undertaken this action entirely on his own account, and without 
informing the other members of the La Ramada water user association. In response to 
Don Eusebio’s request, the ATDRC – based on the water law42 17752– revoked the 
water rights for irrigation given to the La Ramada and Manzanas water users. Their 
main arguments to do this were: the lack of maintenance and cleaning of the canal for 
about 4 years; the fact that the users’ register was not updated; and the failure of the 
users to pay water fees.43  
Why had Don Eusebio initiated this process? His relatives –and in particular his 
grandsons- speculate that he was approached by Yanacocha. They think the mine may 
have offered him money to help pay for his medicines, in return for which he had to 
make sure the canal was abandoned to allow for the rights attached to it to be 
cancelled. Another water user likewise thinks that "the mine paid him little by little to 
stop organising users for the canal maintenance work".44 The water users all state that 
Don Eusebio had been acting entirely on his own account, and not as the president of 
the canal. They emphasised that they had not been aware of the cancellation. Of course, 
the official cancellation of the rights of the La Ramada and Manzanas users was indeed 
convenient to the mine, as it allowed the company to formally acquire these rights, 
which happened in 2003. 
Although there are no precise measurements, it is clear that the loss of the La Ramada 
canal did significantly reduce farmers’ access to water. People interviewed agreed that 
there was less water, and that this was becoming an ever more serious problem with 
                                                     
42 Article 116, section about cancellation of water rights (República del Perú 1969)  
43 Res. N. 118-2001-CTAR-CAJ/DRA-ATDRC.  
44 Farmer 2, personal communication May 2009. 
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the population of the communities increasing.45 As one farmer observed: "before we 
could irrigate for about 12 hours every 45 days but, after the water decreased, we 
irrigate less than 3 hours and using only water from [surrounding] canals".46 Some 
users indicated that they had changed their cropping pattern because of the reduced 
availability of water, and were now only irrigating pastures to at least be able keep 
their livestock production. 
The story, however, does not end with Don Eusebio’s action. Some of the affected 
farmers got together and (in 2004) filed an official complaint with the Regional 
Agrarian Office from the Ministry of Agriculture. Their story was treated seriously, 
and the Office enacted a resolution in support of the farmers’ claims. The resolution 
recognised the existence and legitimacy of the La Ramada canal and the assigned water 
rights given to the farmers in 1989. Before arriving at this conclusion, the Office had 
carefully analysed how the cancelation of the water rights could have happened. Their 
conclusion was that the process of cancellation was not legally valid, because the canal 
leader had not acted on behalf of the water users, and had not properly notified or 
informed them. 
Yanacocha’s reaction to the resolution was clear: they dismissed it by questioning the 
authority of the Regional Agrarian Office to deal with water rights. According to the 
mine, water should be dealt with by water authorities, the ATDRs. The mine’s view of 
the matter was that the canal and its water rights were cancelled because they had not 
been used since 1997. To further lend support to its own position, Yanacocha did 
everything it could to question the very existence of the canal La Ramada. The mining 
company for instance produced maps which showed that the canal was seriously 
damaged and interrupted at several places, and therefore could not have conducted 
water (see Figure 6). In the words of one of the mine’s managers “the canal was no 
more than a large hole”.47 Also, to disqualify the canal and its users, in its documents 
the mine referred to the "auto-nominated users of the supposed canal La Ramada".48  
                                                     
45 There is water only in the mornings from 8 to 11. 
46 Farmer 2, personal communication May 2009. 
47 “El canal no es más que un hueco largo”. Mining manager 1, personal communication October 2010. 
48 Mining engineer, field inspection, December 2010. 
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Figure 6. The La Ramada canal – Yanacocha’s version.Note: Map elaborated by Yanacocha. Emphasis 
–ellipses- added by the author to indicate deficiencies expressed by Yanacocha: “broken bridge, 
disused canal and canal in bad condition”. 
In the reasoning of Yanacocha representatives, the farmers "do not really want water 
or do not really struggle for that, instead, what they want is money" or "to have an 
excuse to engage in negotiation with the mine, because of the economic benefits they 
might get".49  
Between 2003 and 2004 and convinced of its own rightness, Yanacocha also actively 
destroyed a stretch of almost 5 km of canal. When they learned about this from the 
                                                     
49 Mining manager 2, personal communication April 2009. 
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farmers, the Regional Agrarian Office declared that the mine had acted against the 
water law, which states that nobody can obstruct or impede a right of way because 
they belong to the state. Any alterations or modifications therefore require the prior 
approval of the state. After having inspected the damage in 2004, the Office ordered 
Yanacocha to rehabilitate and fix the damaged stretch of canal. 
This trouble with the Regional Office may have prompted the mine to change its 
strategy. Rather than continuing to attempt to gain control over the Cerro Negro 
waters through legal means, the company instead decided to enter into a process of 
negotiations with the water users. In October 2004, the mine succeeded in gathering a 
group of about 150 people from the La Ramada and Manzanas communities agreeing 
to negotiate. This group not only consisted of members of the La Ramada water user 
association, but also included users from a neighboring canal and even counted some 
people who were not registered as water users. The mining company, in an attempt to 
once and for all end the troubles and disputes about the Cerro Negro waters, offered 
some money to the community members; this money was to compensate them for the 
work done on the construction of the 17 km of the canal stretching from the Cerro Negro 
area to the community of La Ramada. The amount each farmer would receive was 
substantial: 7000 PEN (Peruvian Nuevos Soles), equalling approximately US 2000 
dollars. The company even gave payments to those who had never used the water, 
supposedly (and as stated in the written agreement50) because they had contributed to 
the maintenance of the canal. The amounts of money are huge for the inhabitants of 
the two communities; representing four times the average income of US 509 
dollars/year – that a farmer could get in 1995 (INEI 1997) or more than an entire annual 
income of someone working in the town of Cajamarca in 2008 and 2009 for a minimum 
wage. For many of them, therefore, the offer of the mine was difficult to resist. 
Yet, by accepting Yanacocha’s money, people also explicitly agreed that the mine had 
adequately compensated them for any damage or loss they might experience as a 
result of the closure of the canal or as a result of the transfer of water rights to 
Yanacocha. Upon receiving the money, people also formally recognised the validity of 
                                                     
50 Extra-legal agreement (Transacción extrajudicial, Cajamarca 19 October 2004). 
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the mine’s water rights (and thus agreed that their own rights were no longer valid), 
and accepted the closure of La Ramada canal. The agreement signed upon the handing 
over of the money also stipulated that those who had received money would renounce 
from any action which would negatively affect the rights given to Yanacocha. The 
agreement allowed Yanacocha to empathically assert that the farmers did no longer 
have legitimate claim to water or to water rights51.  
The agreement also worked to divide the community members, with those who had 
accepted the money (and in particular those among them who had never been users 
of water) now taking the side of, and defending, the mine and its actions, for instance 
by supporting the mine’s claim that the canal had never conducted water or, the mine 
never blocked the canal. According to La Ramada inhabitants, these people were paid 
by the mine to do this, as "the intention of the mine was to delete any trace of the 
canal".52 The people siding with the mine also forcefully prevented others from 
entering the area where the canal is situated. They even stopped representatives of the 
water authority when they passed by to inspect the canal condition. An aggressive 
farmer explained: "that he does not bother the authorities at their offices, why they 
then have to bother him in his property"53. 
There are also many people who maintain that water can and should never be 
exchanged for money. They therefore argue that if people accepted cash, this just 
represents compensation for work done on the canal or for damages suffered. But: "it 
was not selling our water" nor the rights to water or to the infrastructure.54 Some of La 
Ramada leaders also question the legal validity of the agreement, because it was co-
signed by people who had never been water users and who had no relation whatsoever 
with the canal. According to the grandsons of Don Eusebio, and leaders in La Ramada 
– this agreement represented nothing else than buying users and thus buying water: 
"this was more than a payment for labour devoted to the canal. It was a transaction to 
                                                     
51 Certified letter from Yanacocha, Cajamarca 17 October 2007.  
52 Farmer Personal communication, January 2009. 
53 Fieldwork inspection, December 2010. 
54 Farmers 2, personal communication April 2009. 
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force us to give up our water sources, the canal and the water flows".55 Yet differing in 
many accounts, but determined to defend their territory and livelihoods, leaders of La 
Ramada approached the water authorities of Cajamarca and Jequetepeque with the 
request to cancel the water rights given to Yanacocha. Their argument was that the 
mine was using the water for mining purposes rather than for the intended drinking 
water purposes, thus violating the priorities for water use as established in the water 
law. Their request was dismissed by the authorities, on account of the fact that 
Yanacocha used the assigned water for drinking water of its camp site.56  
Yanacocha refused to talk with the leaders, stating that they did not legitimately 
represent any community or group of water users. The mining company even 
qualified a leader’s communications as hidden threats against the mine, and warned 
that they would report him to the Cajamarca court of justice in case he would 
undertake any further action. In 2008, the leaders organised a public protest, blocking 
the road that connects the mine site with the city. The intention of this protest was to 
demand a solution and to call the attention of the media and the authorities. Instead, 
they were accused of causing public disturbance and of aggression against the private 
property of Yanacocha and brought to court. See below an example (Figure 7) of the 
material prepared by the communities claiming their water back to their canal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
55 Judicial demand presented by the leaders of La Ramada to the Court of Justice from the Jequetepeque 
region.  
56 Res. N. 021-2008-GA-GRLL-ATDRJ., and Intendencia de Recursos Hídricos-IRH. Res. N. 769-2008-
INRENA-IRH. 
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Figure 7. The La Ramada case – farmers’ version. Note: Flyers by local organizations in support of the 
La Ramada farmers: “Yanacocha destroyed our canal and deprived 160 families from water for 
irrigation. Open La Ramada again, water for the farmers” 
 
The disputes and arguments continue until today, involving different factions in the 
involved communities and different government authorities. In 2006, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, commanded a study to determine the feasibility of the canal and the water 
availability in the area. Its objective would be to "give water rights – in priority – to 
those who were affected because of the expiration of such rights".57 With this 
document, the leaders approached again the two water authorities –Cajamarca and 
Jequetepeque- asking them to follow up. In 2009, and responding to the Ministry 
command, the National Water Authority -Autoridad Nacional del Agua ANA- hired an 
independent consultant to do those studies. The conclusions (in 2010) stated that water 
demands exceeded water availability from May until November, but that the surplus 
water of the other months could be made available to farmers. The consultant’s report 
                                                     
57 Res. Ministerial N. 0407-2006-AG. Lima. Ministerio de Agricultura. 
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also declared that La Ramada canal was not operational, and in urgent need of 
rehabilitation, reconstruction, and maintenance work. Among other suggestions, the 
report proposed the construction of a reservoir to store and supply water to the canal, 
and the installation of a sprinkler irrigation system. 
Yanacocha disputed the study’s results, and in particular questioned the calculated 
figures for water availability. It stated that "decisions that can be taken on the basis of 
[those studies] can have irreversible effects on the property rights of Yanacocha".58 In 
spite of this, the water authorities decided in favour of the famers, by approving a 
designated water flow for La Ramada of 1.37 L/s from May to September.59 The 
authorities also stated that the users needed to make some provisions to regulate and 
store water in the rainy season, from October to April, and ordered La Ramada water 
association to rehabilitate the canal within a year’s time. Although positive in principle 
for those who wanted to claim their water, the resolution by itself does not provide 
them with rights to water, nor does it allow them to construct new infrastructure. 
Rehabilitating the canal or constructing new reservoirs might turn out to be difficult, 
as some of those would have to be located on the property of Yanacocha. That the 
mining company will not be forthcoming shows in the fact that they already made a 
legal appeal against the ANA resolution (Defensoría del Pueblo 2011). 
3.3.2 Case 2: The San José Reservoir 
In this second case, we describe another series of encounters between Yanacocha and 
its neighboring communities about water. Like in the La Ramada case, here also the 
mining company resorted to negotiations and the payment of compensations to 
resolve the problems and secure its unlimited access to, and control over, the upstream 
water sources. 
The activities of the Yanacocha mine in 2000 and 2003 in one of its open pits led to 
severe changes in the soil cover (due to erosion and compaction), while also 
significantly altering downstream water flows by disrupting the existing drainage 
networks and lowering the water table. Because of percolations during the expansion 
                                                     
58 Letter issued by Yanacocha, Cajamarca 23.11.2010.  
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phase of the platforms at the Cerro Yanacocha and La Quinua areas, water quality was 
also compromised. In addition (at the end of 2006), there were some accidents with the 
spill over of acid water that reached the communities. The mining company qualified 
most of these environmental impacts of their operations as moderate (MWH Peru 
2006). 
However, for water users downstream, the impact was significant, as two of the creeks 
that experienced the reduction in water flows were feeding five irrigation canals. One 
of those canals was constructed in 1953 through the collective work of 30 farmers, who 
had also arranged for its registration with the water authority and who together looked 
after its operation, cleaning and maintenance. After Yanacocha started its open pits in 
the two mentioned areas, the five canals only received a fraction of the water flow that 
they used to have. For example, in one case the water flow dropped from 80 L/s to 56 
L/s and in another from 500 L/s to about 100 L/s. The affected communities 
complained against Yanacocha and demanded to have their water sources back. 
According to these communities, the impact on the two creeks and the reduction of 
water in their canals were not mentioned as the impacts of Yanacocha’s operations in 
the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) that was approved in 1998. 
In its annual reports, Yanacocha admitted that the initial operations in its pits could 
lead to a reduction of downstream water flows. As a solution, the company proposed 
getting water from another area – a complex of natural springs or lakes – by 
constructing a dam to store water, which could then be diverted to the affected 
communities. However, the communities surrounding those springs opposed these 
plans, as they feared the loss of their own waters. The mine then came up with a 
mitigation and compensation plan, in which it proposed to provide the affected 
communities with treated water from the mine. The proposal was that Yanacocha 
would collect the remaining or residual water it had used in its mining processes, next 
to harvesting or collecting rainwater. Before this water could be released to the affected 
communities, it had to be treated. As part of this plan, Yanacocha constructed the San 
José reservoir,60 in an old open pit, with a storage capacity of 6 MCM of water. This 
                                                     
60 An investment of US 25 million dollars.  
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water would be used by the mine itself, and could also be delivered to the 
communities. By thus releasing water, Yanacocha intended to replace the water lost 
because of its operations. 
The quality of the treated water was such that it could only be used for irrigation and 
not for consumption or other domestic uses. This was why many community members 
were not too happy about the mine’s proposal. Many people did not want treated 
water; they expected to receive what they called 'natural' water, as they always had. 
However, as one farmer leader indicated: "the only alternative was the one proposed 
by Yanacocha, so they gave us treated water".61 Affected users expressed 
dissatisfaction with the quality of the mine’s water: "[Our] water sources and flows 
were natural before [the mine arrived], and we were drinking that water and using it 
for irrigation, as well as for our animals. Water was consumed without any fear."62 
Some of the affected communities refused to use the treated water; they protested, and 
entered into a long judicial process against the mine, to demand a continued access to 
'natural' water. However, they were not successful63 and finally had to agree to receive 
treated water. 
During 2006 and 2007 and as a part of the mitigation and compensation plan, the 
communities and the mine signed extrajudicial agreements. The first condition for 
receiving treated water was that the communities had to give up their former water 
rights issued by the ATDRC, 64 over the sources and flows located in the area where 
Yanacocha is operating. They were requested to apply for new water rights. In their 
applications for new rights, the communities specifically had to indicate that they are 
aware of, and willing to receive, treated water from the San Jose Reservoir. Through 
this process, the former communities’ water rights were thus returned to the State 
administration, allowing Yanacocha to obtain them and proceed with its operations. 
The process itself was contentious and full of questionable incidences, like the 
reduction of water amounts in the new licences given to the communities. The ATDRC 
                                                     
61 Farmer 4, personal communication, February 2011. 
62 Farmers 3, written communication April 2011. 
63 Since there was the ongoing legal process, information about this case was restricted.  
64 Res. N. 008-2004-GR-CAJ/DRA-ATDRC. N. 009-2004-GR-CAJ/DRA-ATDRC. 
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issued new water rights with the quantities that users would be entitled to, even before 
the official agreement had been signed. For example, one of the canals that used to 
receive 120 L/s now only received a licence for 56 L/s.65 The presidents of these water 
user associations had diligently followed the requested procedure, thereby giving up 
their former water rights and applying for new ones from the San José reservoir.66 The 
new water rights indicating amounts and sources as issued by the water authority 
indicated: "this canal will conduct 56 L/s of treated water and 29 L/s from natural 
sources, rounding up to 85 L/s to benefit about 230 water users, mainly agricultural 
families".67 
What is also remarkable is the relative eagerness and ease with which the peasant 
leaders believed, and agreed to, the mine’s discourse about the viability and 
sustainability of the reservoir. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that they did 
not have any alternative means of getting water. Also – as rumours have it – some of 
them may have accepted small bribes and favours from the mine.68 A statement from 
one affected peasant water user association which signed an agreement with 
Yanacocha illustrates the ease with which they went along with the mine’s proposals: 
The water users agreed to renew our previous request about the nullity of our water 
rights issued by the water authority on 2004. The permit gave us the right to use 63.28 
L/s for agriculture and livestock production, benefiting 70 farmer families…  
“Currently our water user association does not use this given water flow. On the 
contrary, it is convenient for us to use water from the San José reservoir owned by the 
Yanacocha mining company, which is supplied by treated water from the mining 
operations. The agreement with this company is to receive 42 L/s from its reservoir into 
our canal and 21.28 L/s from the other natural springs… We also ask for the closing of 
the aqueduct of our canal and its right of way (700 m) and we give the permission to 
                                                     
65 Community advisor, personal communication, February 2011. 
66 The yearly maximum amount of water to be provided by Yanacocha to this canal was agreed on 1.357 
MCM.  
67 Res. N. 004-2009-ANA-ALA-C. 
68 Community advisor, personal and written communication, February 2011 and April 2012. 
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Yanacocha to use this part of the canal and land for the its own purposes with the 
condition of receiving water from San José”.69  
The net result was a relatively smooth handing over of water rights from peasant 
associations to the mine, with the former giving up their previous water rights licences 
and rights over infrastructure and accepting new rights from the reservoir. Also, 
through these agreements and with the full acknowledgment and authorisation of the 
state water authorities, Yanacocha became the de facto water provider for five peasant 
canals, supplying water to about 1000 users. The mine is responsible for releasing and 
allocating a total amount of about 3 MCM, especially during the irrigation period from 
April to September. To assume its new duties as a water manager for the region, the 
mine temporally hires some workers from the affected communities. These workers, 
however, just operate the installations following the technical and operational 
instructions from the mine and have nothing to say about how or when water is 
released or allocated. Formally, the water authority remains responsible for 
establishing how much water each of the canals should receive. However, from the 
time the mine has taken over water provision and distribution, there has been no 
involvement whatsoever from the water authorities in terms of instructions or 
inspections. 
The agreement between the mining company and the affected communities also 
stipulated that the company would compensate the communities in financial terms for 
giving up their water rights. Already, although not meant as direct compensation, the 
mine was financing various investment projects such as the construction of schools 
and roads to communities, the implementation of drinking water systems, 
reforestation, and employment. The more direct compensations make the transactions 
between the communities and the mine closely resemble a water market, in spite of 
the fact that the Water Resources Law 29338 expressly forbids water trading. 
Yanacocha paid about US 30,000 dollars to every user of a community of about 230 
users. Comparing the compensations given in 2006 with the income of peasant 
                                                     
69 Community Act – Cajamarca. (Acta de Asamblea comunal) November 2008 and Res. N. 008-2004-GR-
CAJ/DRA-ATDRC. 
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families, the amounts are equal to ten times the minimum income, about US 200 
dollars, of what an urban worker in Cajamarca (in 2008 and 2009) could earn (INEI 
2010). In addition, the mine established a trust fund aimed at guaranteeing the 
continued operation and maintenance of the San José reservoir once mining operations 
are finished, by 2018. This fund is about US 2.9 million dollars.70 However it is not 
clearly defined how and by whom this fund will be managed, and in particular 
whether actual water users will be involved or trained to do that. 
Not all affected communities entered into negotiations with the mine, or signed the 
agreement. Some communities that were affected as well did not receive any attention 
because they refused to receive treated water. Others who were also affected lacked 
the necessary documents to prove their water use, flows and official water rights, 
which is why their complaints were dismissed by the mine and the water authorities. 
The implementation of Yanacocha’s proposal to deliver treated water to the affected 
communities implied a shift in the responsibility for water allocation. Now, this 
responsibility came to lie with the mining company. To the people receiving water, it 
was unclear how allocation would happen and who would monitor and control this. 
They thus requested the water authority, ATDRC, to assume this task by checking how 
Yanacocha released water. ATDRC never did this; it just issued water rights or licences 
to the communities, allowing them to use water from the reservoir, and to the mine for 
providing water. De facto, the mine thus controls how water is used and allocated, and 
it does this without informing or being checked by the users of the water authority: 
"the only one which knows and controls is Yanacocha".71 That users do not know how 
and if they can hold the mine accountable for its water services is also shown in the 
fact that for about 2 years, (2010-2012) the reservoir has not been functioning. Against 
the agreement, Yanacocha is therefore releasing water directly from its La Quinua 
treatment plant. To date, the water authorities have not done anything to hold 
Yanacocha to its promises, and to have the reservoir repaired. Yet, the current local 
                                                     
70 Final agreement between Yanacocha S.R.L. and users. Cajamarca 2009. 
71 Former employee of Yanacocha responsible for releasing water, personal communication, February 
2010. 
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water authority of Cajamarca, is critical of how water management is changing in the 
region: 
“Water has become an element of pressure and negotiation,… in some places where 
mines impacted people, they paid to avoid more problems. It is a mistake [from the 
mines] to proceed like this,… because when negotiation take place, it is very difficult to 
approach [water related] problems from a different perspective… I criticised that both, 
the mine and the communities, negotiate with resources that are not theirs”.72  
In 2009, the ATDRC decided to enact a resolution acknowledging the negotiations 
between the communities and the mine: 
“Yanacocha, a private mining company that developed exploration and exploitation 
activities, between 2000 and 2002 and since that time there is not water flow of about 
56 L/s in an irrigation canal that used to come from two water creeks [nearby mining 
operations]. Because of the extraction of surface and groundwater in the open pit, the 
water level has reduced [and the canals cannot take it]… Now the water flows from 
these creeks are captured by Yanacocha and constitute part of its mining operations. 
[After a treatment process done by the mine, this water] and are finally stored on the 
San José reservoir. Because of the impacts on those [flows] and with the purpose to 
guarantee water provision to the canal, Yanacocha constructed the San José reservoir to 
store water and then provide it in a controlled basis during dry seasons”.73  
This statement was part of the new resolutions that the water authority enacted to the 
affected canals issuing their new water rights over water flows from the San José 
reservoir. 
Yanacocha proudly mentions this plan in its annual reports as reflecting its 
contributions to local water management (Yanacocha 2009, 2010). During the opening 
of the reservoir, in 2008, the former President Alan García also celebrated and 
congratulated the initiative from the mine. He emphasised that such private-sector 
                                                     
72 J. Puicán, personal communication, February 2010.  
73 Res. N. 004-2009-ANA-ALAC. 
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initiatives were crucial also for the further development of agriculture, and he 
mentioned the reservoir as an example. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Our analysis elicits three important conclusions. One, large-scale mining operations 
such as that of Yanacocha entail major shifts in how water is used, owned and 
managed. Perhaps different from how most land grabbing occurs, the shifts in these 
cases do not occur through the open and outright sale of water. Instead, they involve 
long-winding, fuzzy and opaque processes of negotiation and sometimes struggle on 
a playing field that is far from level, with the political and financial powers of mining 
companies far outweighing those of the local peasant and indigenous communities. 
The net effect nevertheless is a thorough reconfiguration of water governance, with 
the mining company controlling water in the region and local communities being 
effectively dispossessed by losing their water rights. 
Second, these shifts in water use and tenure relations imply an irreversible transfer 
over the control of water from local communities and government agencies to a large 
and wealthy private transnational corporation. This transfer not only occurs through 
the company’s acquisition of water rights but also through its de facto responsibility 
of releasing and allocating the upstream water sources to downstream users. The 
mining company partly 'earned' the power to do this by making huge investments in 
hydraulic infrastructure, such as the San José reservoir. As La Ramada case shows, this 
creation of hydraulic property may go accompanied with the material and discursive 
destruction of existing hydraulic properties. The damage to, and blocking of, a canal 
constructed by farmers, and the active denial of its very existence were clear strategies 
of the mine to assert its control over the waters in its area of operation. In this sense, 
what happens in Yanacocha resembles a form of primitive accumulation, with water 
that used to be publicly or collectively owned becoming enclosed into private 
ownership by expelling existing claimants (Hartsock 2008). However, and different 
from many other documented cases of primitive accumulation (for instance in reports 
of land grabbing), the appropriation of water in these cases is a subtle process, with its 
implicit privatisation serving the extraction of gold rather than water itself becoming 
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a commodity. In the Yanacocha case, this involves a partly implicit process as formal 
rights to transfer water continue to be vested in the regional water authorities. 
However, in actual fact and practice, these authorities leave all responsibilities and 
powers to the company who thus becomes the de facto water management authority. 
The troubling question of course is how this company, whose actions are guided by 
transnational trade relations and capital flows rather than by localised questions of 
environments and livelihoods, can and will be held accountable for its actions. 
And third, the impacts of these changes in water use and control are potentially 
devastating for local livelihoods and for future water availability. Water previously 
used for irrigating pastures and growing subsistence crops is now increasingly used 
for producing gold for export, an activity the local gains of which are likely to be short-
lived, in spite of the enormous contributions of the mining company to local 
development. The mining company indeed destroys an existing waterscape. The 
longer-term social and environmental impacts of this remain poorly understood as yet. 
What is generally clear, however, is that many people in the rural areas of Cajamarca 
are left in an even more persuasive condition of vulnerability than they were before 
the arrival of the mine. This may suggest that for mining companies, the place and the 
resources are useful, but the people are not – turning them into a surplus population 
(Li 2010). On the other hand, the entrance of Yanacocha has opened up new 
opportunities for civic action, protest and resistance and has triggered new ways for 
indigenous groups to assert their rights and claim environmental justice (e.g. Perreault 
2006). The La Ramada case is still unresolved. This shows the mining company does 
not automatically win and those farmers who are still struggling may yet succeed in 
re-claiming their water rights. 
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Chapter 4. Questioning the effectiveness of planned conflict resolution 
strategies in water disputes between rural communities and mining 
companies in Peru 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rondas meeting in Combayo, Cajamarca. Photo: M. Sosa.
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4.1 Introduction 
Since the 1990s mining activities have considerably intensified in the Andean regions 
of Peru, triggering a proliferation of socio-environmental conflicts (Bebbington et al. 
2008, Bebbington et al. 2010). Between 2009 and 2012, more than 250 mining conflicts 
have been reported. Many of these are about access to and control over land and water, 
and about the availability and sustainability of those resources for activities other than 
mining (Bebbington and Williams 2008). In many cases, paradoxically, the 
communities that are articulating these concerns are often the same as those who 
expect and demand to benefit from the social and economic development 
opportunities that mining activities generate in rural areas (Bebbington 2007). This 
paradox importantly co-shapes the nature and direction of conflict resolution 
scenarios: the fact that affected communities economically depend on mining 
companies limits their possibilities and willingness to express grievances and 
concerns. Often, conflicts happen within an institutional context that is not just 
characterized by large asymmetries in financial and political powers, but that also 
separates the governance of mineral expansion from that of water resources and local 
development. Coupled with the political prioritisation of mining development, this 
makes it difficult to effectively plan and regulate the interactions between mining 
operations and water. 
Against this context, this chapter critically interrogates the effectiveness of planned 
attempts to solve or intervene in mining conflicts, particularly looking at whether and 
how these help ensure the sustainability of water resources, water-based ecosystems 
and livelihoods. We use selected examples of an iconic conflict, the one between the 
Yanacocha mining company and the rural communities of Combayo (Cajamarca), to 
show how conflict resolution typically happens by invoking the “authority” of law 
and science. The legitimacy of both importantly relies on their association with 
objectivity and neutrality. In other words, their strengths stems from the fact that they 
are designed to be non-political. We argue that the deeply political nature of mining 
conflicts makes it intrinsically difficult, or perhaps even impossible, to institutionally 
or scientifically safeguard objectivity and neutrality. This subsequently calls into 
question the effectiveness of the proposed technical and legal solutions strategies. In 
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particular, there is a danger that rather than correcting unsustainable or unjust 
behaviours, those in power - mainly the mining companies - use supposedly objective 
solutions as a legitimizing device to continue with business as usual.  
We conclude that instead of trying to screen off socio-environmental mining conflicts 
from politics by resorting to science and law, it might be better to explicitly admit and 
subsequently deal with the fact that these conflicts are always inherently political and 
power-laden. That is to say, instead of basing solutions on forms of objective 
“rightness”, we suggest there is merit in acknowledging that they are always part of 
specific institutional contexts characterized by huge inequalities in voice and financial 
resources. This calls for much more emphasis on the process and power dimensions of 
environmental conflict resolution strategies.  
This chapter is based on fieldwork done in Cajamarca from 2009 to 2011, visiting 
communities in Combayo: El Triunfo, Bellavista Alta, Bellavista Baja, Porvenir and 
Pabellón de Combayo. Information collection consisted of some 40 semi-structured 
interviews in Cajamarca and Combayo with farmers, local and regional authorities, 
consultants, researchers, representatives of state agencies, the mining company and 
local NGOs. In addition, 6 in depth interviews were held with presidents of irrigation 
canals and local authorities. Community assemblies, communal work parties, herding 
activities, cattle markets and judicial hearings were used many as occasions for 
observations, more or less formal interviews, oral stories, surveys and discussions, 
thus combining multiple research methods (Burawoy 1998, Manson 2002, Ranjit 2011). 
Grey literature formed another important source of information.  
After this introduction, the chapter presents the theoretical inspirations that have 
informed our analysis. This is followed by background information of the case and a 
description of the conflict, and then an analysis of the legal and technical solutions that 
form important elements of strategies to deal with opposition to mining operations. 
As a conclusion, the chapter discusses the effects of such strategies on rural 
communities, disputes over water resources influenced by mining operations and the 
sustainability of water resources in general.  
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4.2 Water governance and socio environmental conflicts 
This analysis draws theoretical inspiration from an emerging literature about the 
contested nature of environmental problems on the one hand, and from scholarly 
attempts to come to grips with the many entanglements between science and society 
on the other. As for the first, scholarship that explicitly acknowledges the deeply 
contested character of environmental problems has a long history. Inspired by political 
ecology as a way to think about “conflicts and struggles engendered by the forms of 
access to and control over resources and the inherent power relations in defining, 
controlling and managing nature” (Peluso and Watts 2001: 25), this work assumes and 
posits linkages between the institutional regulation of property and the organisation 
of society. In contrast to much conventional water-focused scholarship, it explicitly 
sets out to unravel how environmental planning and governance processes help 
reproduce social hierarchies and power relations. Hence, in political ecology terms, 
water governance is not just about water but also about the distribution of incomes, 
wealth and authority in society (Bridge and Perreault 2009). This is one important 
reason why water is an intrinsically political and contested resource (Zwarteveen et al. 
2005, Boelens 2008, Mollinga 2008, Panfichi and Coronel 2010). 
In line with this body of scholarly work, water governance can be defined as “the 
practices of coordination and decision making between different actors around 
contested water distributions” (Zwarteveen 2015: 18). Such practices are thick with 
politics and culture, are linked to creative processes of imagining and producing 
collective environmental futures, and combine political problems of scale (spatial, 
ecological, administrative, temporal), with problems of coherence (the durable 
alignment of different people and different waters despite problems of 
incommensurability and political tensions) (Bridge and Perreault 2009). The 
implication of this perspective for water conflict resolution, the topic of this chapter, is 
that it can never be just a technocratic exercise, but should always engage with issues 
of (the organisation of) power and politics. 
Socio-environmental conflicts materialize when disagreements and contestations 
between different groups within society around natural resource (e.g. water) 
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distributions, or the allocation of risks and hazards (Muradian et al. 2003), cannot be 
solved in a manner that is agreeable to all parties involved (Edmunds and Wollenberg 
2001). Such conflicts are symptoms of inadequate or ineffective political processes, as 
much as they signal problems of a more technical nature. This brings us to the second 
source of theoretical inspiration for this chapter, the literature on the entanglements 
between science and society. Because water is always contested, water (management 
and governance) questions cannot be resolved by just referring to ‘objective’, scientific 
information or analyses, but also involve matters of opinion and choice (Zwarteveen 
and Boelens 2014) and have to do with interests and values (Muradian et al. 2003). 
Thus to intervene in water conflict situations, scientific accounts of reality cannot be 
dealt with as an objective ‘black box’ separated from the context and from the political 
and social issues they are immersed in. On the contrary, pretensions of scientific 
objectivity and neutrality risk being purposively used to screen contentious question 
off from explicit deliberation (Castro 2007). As Li (2007) argued, questions that are 
rendered technical, are simultaneously rendered non-political. 
This chapter combines these insights about the intrinsically contested nature of water 
and the impossibility of separating politics from scientific or technical forms of 
knowledge as a framework to assess the effectiveness of conflict resolution strategies 
in mining areas in Peru. To summarize, we consider these conflicts as more-than-
technical in that they are indicative of wider power imbalances. These conflicts emerge 
when two or more actors or organizations compete for control over or access to water, 
and may evolve around issues of quantity, quality or opportunity (Pereyra Matsumoto 
2008). Urteaga (2011) thus aptly refers to these conflicts as expressions of political 
processes, with prevailing power relations co-shaping relations between the actors 
involved and their relations with water.  
4.3 Background of the area and the conflict 
4.3.1 The highlands of Combayo  
Combayo, a rural town located in Cajamarca, has been the setting of a sequence of 
socio-environmental conflicts involving farmer communities and the gold mining 
company Yanacocha as main actors. During the period of the hacienda, this rural town 
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was known as the Hacienda Combayo. It formed one of the important estates in the 
northern region.74 Today, about 13 of the 21 caseríos or communities of Combayo are 
located within the area under direct influence of mining operations determined by 
Yanacocha. Between 1992 and 1996, the company acquired about 4069 ha from 41 
Combayo farmer families, land that it needed to start operations in Cajamarca (Pascó-
Font et al. 2003). The combined effect of these sales and population growth is that at 
the time of this study, most land holdings in Combayo were small individual 
minifundias, ranging in size from 0.5 to 2 ha (INRENA 2007). Here, like elsewhere in 
Cajamarca, the main economic activities are livestock and dairy production, together 
with some small scale agriculture. For instance, surveys conducted in El Triunfo, one 
of the communities of Combayo, revealed that livelihood activities consisted mainly 
(76%) of small-scale farming and dairy production, with temporal employment at the 
mining site complementing families’ incomes.75 Farming and dairy production in 
Combayo rely on irrigation water that comes from streams or creeks fed by water from 
the Azufre River, a tributary of the Chonta River which is part of a river basin of about 
34,531ha.76 Assessments conducted during 2006 and 2007 by MINAG and sponsored 
by Yanacocha, concluded that agricultural yields and dairy production in Combayo 
were lower than in other areas in Cajamarca province. The study attributed this to low 
quality seeds, lack of proper soil fertilization, and inadequate farming practices. 
However, it also mentioned the lack of water for irrigation, or the lack of water security 
in the area, as a reason for low productivity (INRENA 2007). A comparison of the 
water requirements of the existing farming systems in the watershed with water 
availability in the area reveals water shortages of about 38 MCM between May and 
                                                     
74 This hacienda was property of Eloy Santolalla, well-known in the area for his mining activities in 
other areas of Cajamarca (Santolalla 1906). The Land Reform of 1969 affected and dissolved this 
hacienda, like many others in the region. 
75 Because of the proximity to Yanacocha, many households in Combayo rely on employment with the 
company. Usually farmers are hired for short periods of time (3 to 6 months) as unskilled workers. 
During the development of the mining operations in the region, and encouraged by the company, 
farmers also created small community or communal companies to provide services to Yanacocha.  
76 Together with other rivers -Grande, Quinuario and Paccha- the Azufre River forms the Chonta 
watershed. The Chonta River is about 39.8km long and together with the Mashcon River feeds into the 
Cajamarquino River, one of the most important rivers in the region (Nippon Koei 2010). 
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October. Availability of water for irrigation is lowest and most critical in August 
(CEDEPAS 2009), but water shortages can last for about 8 months of the year.  
Water is conveyed into to the fields through a network of rudimentary canals. Some 
of these were constructed during the hacienda period, while others were dug more 
recently by farmers. Of the 8 farmer canals in Combayo, about 3 were directly affected 
by the mining operations of Yanacocha at the Carachugo site: Azufre Ahijadero 
(conveying about 100 L/s), Azufre Atunconga (150 L/s) and Azufre Ventanillas de 
Combayo (160 L/s), with a total of approximately 357 users and 885 ha of irrigated 
areas impacted (Mendoza Moreno 2008). To manage the irrigation canals, farmers 
have organized themselves in water users associations, one comité for each canal. Some 
of them, like El Triunfo, hold official water rights given by the state. The associations 
are registered with the local water authority in Cajamarca77 and led by a canal-
president, who is responsible for distributing the available water supply, establishing 
the rotation schedule for the delivery turns and organizing maintenance work. These 
canal-presidents also play a key role in mobilizing farmers in times of water disputes. 
They are the ones who speak for and represent the irrigators in the outside world. 
Their powers, means and resources to protect their canal's water rights are 
nevertheless limited (Sosa and Zwarteveen 2012).  
Before going into a more detailed description of the conflict, we briefly introduce the 
main features of the mining company. Yanacocha is a joint venture of the Newmont 
Mining company (USA), the Buenaventura mining company (Peru) and the 
International Finance Corporation a member of the World Bank group. It started 
operations in the region of Cajamarca in the 1990s. The mining concession of 
Yanacocha in Cajamarca consists of about 25,000ha. The company operates a complex 
of open pit mines, consisting among others of four leach pads and in situ processing 
facilities. Yanacocha's gold production for 2012 was 1.35 million ounces (Newmont 
2012). Of all the mines operated by Newmont, Yanacocha is considered the most 
                                                     
24 The irrigation canals of this river basin belong to the Chonta Water Users Association (Junta de 
Usuarios del Río Chonta - JURCH). The users associations from Combayo, however, are not formally 
part of the JURCH, because the fees asked by the JURCH (between 30 to 40 soles) are too high for them 
and farmers do not feel that the JURCH works for their benefit (Mendoza Moreno 2008, CEDEPAS 2009). 
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profitable (Bury 2004). During the years of mining operations and because of its 
performance and expansion plans, Yanacocha faced countless cases of socio-
environmental conflicts (see Bury 2002, Deza 2008, Lingán 2008, Arana Zegarra 2009, 
Guardia Nogales 2011, Sosa Landeo 2012, Zavaleta 2014) with several of the about 100 
communities neighboring its area of operations (Yanacocha 2008).  
4.3.2 Socio environmental conflicts in Combayo  
In 2005, farmers and authorities from Combayo started opposing the expansion of 
Yanacocha mining operations. They were particularly against the Carachugo II 
expansion project: an open pit about 150m in diameter and 180m deep, in the high 
areas of Combayo. Yanacocha had obtained the authorization from the Regional 
Agricultural Authority (which also was responsible for water at that time) to use 
sources that were also used to supply water to Combayo. The mine had also obtained 
authorization to construct a dam in the Azufre river. Comuneros were concerned that 
the mine's uses and manipulations of water flows would negatively impact the quality 
and quantity of water available in the sources that fed this river, which in turn would 
have implications for their irrigation water.78 In particular, 3 lakes were going to be 
compromised: Corazón, Patos and Estación 1. 
The farmers and communal authorities mobilized to launch a collective complaint to 
the Agriculture Authority in Cajamarca against the authorization given to Yanacocha. 
In support of the claims of the population, the Agriculture Authority agreed to revisit 
its authorization. Yanacocha, fearing an obstruction of its plans, reacted by engaging 
in conversations and negotiations with some Combayo representatives. The mining 
company succeeded in reaching an agreement with these representatives, in which it 
promised to protect the water sources of Combayo.  
In spite of this agreement, however, communities of Combayo in the Azufre 
watershed, and particularly in the area of direct influence of Yanacocha, began 
noticing changes in the water flows in their canals after Yanacocha had started its 
                                                     
78 Interview by Alicia Abanto Cabanillas (commissioner from the Cajamarca Ombudsman office), with 
Luciano Llanos (mayor of Combayo at that time), and the main leaders of Combayo, 02.08.2005. 
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operations: “the water was different”.79 After they irrigated their grass it changed colour: 
“it got yellowish” and the animals which drunk this water got sick. They also noted a 
reduction of water flows. As Yanacocha's operations happen in the upstream areas of 
the Azufre river, nearby the three lakes, comuneros did not hesitate to attribute the 
reported changes to the mining operations. Farmers' discontent and anger with the 
company were also fed by the collapse of the dam that Yanacocha was building on the 
Azufre River this damaged farmers’ plots and crops. 80  
Led by the presidents of the water users associations, irrigators decided to stage an 
organized campaign to demand Yanacocha’s compliance with the promises it had 
made in 2005. The first days of August 2006, around 600 people from the affected areas 
(Bellavista Baja, Bellavista Alta, El Triunfo, Porvenir and Pabellón de Combayo) 
headed for two of the Yanacocha mining sites - the Chaquicocha open pit and the 
Carachugo mountain - to protest (see Figure 8). They were repulsed by the security 
company of Yanacocha and the police officers the company had hired to protect the 
mining site, who used tear gas and guns to stop the protesters. 81 In the confrontation, 
Isidro Llanos, a farmer from the community of El Triunfo, was hit by one of the bullets 
and died. During the ensuing turmoil, two workers of Yanacocha were taken by the 
farmers. Yanacocha interpreted this as a kidnapping, and held two farmer leaders 
responsible.82  
 
                                                     
79 Group discussion farmers, Bellavista Baja, April 2009. 
80 This dam was constructed to prevent the mine sediments from obstructing the canals and water flows, 
but the people thought it was going to be for securing and increasing water quantity in the area. Personal 
communication farmer leader April 2009. 
81 For a discussion about Peruvian national police being hired by private mining companies, see 
Kamphuis (2012). 
82 The Peruvian legislation considers kidnapping as a complex crime, with a punishment of 
imprisonment between 20 and 30 years (Sala Penal Cajamarca 2010). 
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Figure 8. The conflict area and the impacted creeks in Combayo, Cajamarca.Designed by C. Cerdán (based on 
Gobierno Regional de Cajamarca (2011) and La República (2006)). Note: The figure shows the location of the 
conflict area within the borders of the Yanacocha mine site, the creeks impacted by mining operations (in bold 
dots) and the location of the Azufre river and the dam. It includes the town centre of Combayo as well as the the 
other urban centres like the city of Cajamarca scaled to the Chonta watershed and to the total area of the mining 
company. 
Right after the protest, the mayor of Combayo joined with some other authorities in 
attempts to arrange meetings between the farmers and Yanacocha to discuss about the 
impacts of its operations on water. According to them, however, all their initiatives 
were unsuccessful. This is why they decided to revert to less peaceful means. For about 
20 days, they blocked the main access road to the mining site, preventing Yanacocha 
from operation as usual. In the media, representatives of the company stated: Because 
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of this conflict, Yanacocha has decided to stop operations at the expansion project”.83 The vice 
President of Newmont in Latin America, Carlos Santa Cruz, announced that this 
would represent a loss of about US 700,000 dollars for the Peruvian state and about US 
2 million dollars for the company.  
The continuous tensions in Combayo, the blocking of the road and the company’s 
announcement that it would stop its mining operations in the region, aroused the 
attention of the central government. Even the Prime Minister, Jorge Del Castillo, 
intervened. He decided to personally help solve the conflicts by mediating between 
the farmers and the company (Villar et al. 2006). His intervention resulted in a public 
meeting in September 2006, one month after the conflict, in which the Peruvian 
government, the company and the authorities of Combayo signed an agreement, the 
so-called Acta de Combayo.84 This agreement consisted of a whole menu of solutions to 
the water problems in the area, ranging from assessments and management plans to 
promises of work and investment projects. In addition to those agreements, the 
meeting was also used to explicitly and formally obtain Combayo's promise that it 
would stop opposing oppose the development of mining operations in the area. 
Satisfied by this outcome, Yanacocha stated that dialogue is the only way to 
understanding and development “What started as a conflict ended in an agreement 
for mutual support, inclusive dialogue and long-term development plans.”85 The 
farmers, however, were less satisfied. Especially those from the affected communities 
were suspicious about the outcomes of the negotiations.  
 
                                                     
83 Different representatives from communities, civil society organizations, the private sector as well as 
the government argued that the Combayo conflict was more about communities' attempts to get more 
economic benefits from the mining company, than about water and the environment. Years after the 
conflict, a representative of Yanacocha commented: “The conflict in Combayo was an extortion, the 
trigger was not water but employment”. Personal communication, December 2010. 
84 This meeting brought together high level authorities, such as the ministers of Agriculture, Energy and 
Mining, Health, Economy and Finances; five representatives of the parliament; the president of the 
regional government; the mayor of Cajamarca; the mayor of the Encañada district; about fifty 
representatives or leaders of the caseríos of Combayo and four representatives of Yanacocha (Málaga 
Málaga 2006, Villar et al. 2006). 
85 Yanacocha’s communication (http://www.yanacocha.com/, accessed 2009). 
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Figure 9. Reaching agreements: Company – state - community. Drawing by Erwin Dijkhoff 
 
The following sections present a more detailed analysis of these negotiations. The 
analysis shows that the conflict resolution strategies favoured by the mining company 
and state officers importantly rely on legal and technical (or scientific) forms of 
authority. As noted, the conflicts took place in a context of large financial and political 
power asymmetries. Indicative of this is that Yanacocha had agreed to make 'social' 
investments of about US 1 million dollars in 2007 and 2008 in Combayo. The 
communities that (hoped to) benefit from this support (with sprinkler irrigation 
systems) were also the ones that complained that their water sources were 
deteriorating because of the mining operations.86 The economic dependence of the 
communities on the company obviously weakened their bargaining power, and 
negatively affected their ability to hold the company accountable for its water actions. 
4.4 Invoking legality: Operating according to law 
For the mining company (often in combination with some government actors), a first 
important and powerful strategy to deal with communities' complaints and reduce 
tensions is to convince all involved that everything they do is within the law. The 
reasoning is that if something is legal, it must be right, even if it is clear that this legal 
rightness says little to nothing about its social or environmental integrity. 
                                                     
86 Personal communication Yanacocha’s former worker, March 2012. 
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Mineral expansion projects like Yanacocha's Carachugo project have to comply with 
more than a dozen of regulations and norms to get a license to operate from the state 
(Torres 2007). A large number of government authorities such as the ministries of 
energy and mining (MEM), agriculture (MINAG), environment (MINAM), as well as 
the local and the national water authorities have thus been involved in granting 
Yanacocha the permissions to operate. Such permissions were given, among others, 
for accessing and collecting water, as well as for its extraction, management, treatment 
and disposal (MWH 2012). Also, and as part of the requirements established by the 
Peruvian environmental legislation, environmental impact assessments (EIAs) have to 
be publicly presented and discussed.87 For the Carachugo expansion project, this took 
place in meetings organized by the MEM in Cajamarca in 2003 and 2004. These 
meetings happened with the help of private consultancy companies, who informed the 
general audience of the actions that Yanacocha would be developing in the area. After 
these public hearings in Combayo (December 2003) and in Cajamarca (January 2004), 
the EIA was approved. The MEM considers these public hearings to be processes of 
consultation and public participation. The mere fact of having organized them is 
enough to comply with the law. However, it is debatable whether these meetings are 
effective in terms of communication.88 As is also shown below, many people from 
Combayo -authorities as well as farmers- were not properly informed regarding how 
mining operations would affect their water resources.  
In 2008, Yanacocha wanted to develop mining operations at the Carachugo Mountain, 
compromising the areas of the Ocucha Machay and Chaquicocha Creeks, tributaries 
of the Azufre River. These operations, as well as previous hydrological and 
                                                     
87 The EIAs are prepared for the mining companies by consultant companies visiting the areas to be 
mined. During the presentations of the EIAs, these consultants inform the population about the 
activities to be developed by the companies during operations. 
88 During fieldwork and together with representatives of the Ombudsman office, M. Sosa attended a 
public hearing of an EIA for large mining exploration activities in Cajamarca. The representatives 
commented that perhaps the technical language used to explain environmental and water issues during 
the hearing made it difficult for many of those present to understand what was explained. Because 
income issues were more tangible and easier to grasp, some of them seemed less interested in 
environmental and water issues and instead started talking about issues of employment generation. 
From the questions posed by the public, nine were about water issues and more than 20 related to 
employment. For a discussion of the limitations of these public hearings as participatory events, see: Li 
(2009) and de Echave et al. (2009a). 
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hydrogeological studies done by Yanacocha, were authorized by the water authority 
and the MINAG through the following administrative resolutions: 051-2008-INRENA-
IRH and 367-2008-INRENA-IRH. These stated that “[Yanacocha was authorized to 
execute] surface draining works at the influenced area of the Los Patos, Corazón and Estación 
1 Lakes at the Ocucha Machay Creek to facilitate the expansion of the ... leaching pad at the 
Carachugo Project”89. Having all the authorizations made it seem as if everything was 
agreed for the company to proceed. Yet, not all were in favour of the mining company's 
plans. The deputy governor of Combayo, for one, complained against Yanacocha, 
arguing that the people of Combayo had not been informed about these works. They 
were particularly upset about the fact that they had not given any authorization to the 
company to proceed with drying out Combayo’s water sources.  
According to deputy governor, the EIA did not contain any clear reference to or 
information about the removal of lakes. The only answer from the representatives of 
Yanacocha to the complaints was that they had duly complied with all the legal 
requirements, met all the regulations and had obtained all the permissions needed to 
proceed since the approval of the EIA in 2004, a process that was validated by the local 
authorities of that time. They also referred to the authorization given by the National 
Water Authority resolution approving hydrological and hydrogeological studies and 
drainage plans in the area of the lakes. 
Besides letters to the local representatives of Yanacocha, the deputy governor issued a 
letter to the highest representative of Newmont in Latin America.90 In the letters, he 
expressed his discomfort regarding the lack of communication from the company 
about the drying out of the lakes. He mentioned that those actions were not 
communicated to the population and that when he had asked for explanations, the 
response was merely that they “are not doing any work that does not have all the permissions 
of pertinent authorities and with the full acknowledgment of the population”. Arrogantly, the 
company added that they could do as they pleased within their concession. According 
to the deputy governor, if there was an authorization given by the population, this 
                                                     
89 Res. N 051-2008-INRENA-IRH and Res. N. 367-2008-INRENA-IRH. 
90 Deputy governor of Combayo letter N.009 and N.010, CPM-Combayo, May 2008. 
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must have been given in a dubious way, without those granting the authorization 
realizing what they were doing.91 
In addition to permissions or authorizations given by the state, the law also requires 
that companies get permission to operate from the communities and their authorities. 
How this community approval should be obtained, however, remains vague and 
questionable (Li 2009). Commenting on communities approving documents and 
actions, a Cajamarca regional officer told the story of the leaders of Combayo signing 
a document thinking that it was a simple request for a regular inspection of the 
headwater areas to be done by the Cajamarca Water Authority (ATDRC). They did not 
realise that the document would to be used as an authorization to dry out the lakes: 
“The signatures (of the authorities) were for the inspection of the lake area, not for making them 
disappear!.”92 
As part of the agreement signed by the state, Yanacocha and Combayo, the company 
promised not to make any more legal accusations against the farmers. The farmers and 
communities in turn had to state that they would not oppose mining operations in the 
area. However, the farmers from the affected communities that organized the protest 
commented that little was achieved for their areas in terms of environmental 
conservation, water protection and socio-economic improvements. According to them, 
they came out of the conflict worse off than they had entered it: with the death of Isidro 
Llanos, and the anxiety provoked by the judicial case that followed the conflict. “The 
people fear that they will be judicially denounced by the [company], the judicial processes have 
restricted people.”93 
                                                     
91 He commented that “precisely the days that the personnel of Yanacocha was drying up the lakes in 
the headwaters area ... the mine organized together with our mayor ... a music parade which included 
folkloric artists”. Presumably his intention with this comment is to notice that water issues were blurred 
by other activities that were organized in Combayo at the same time. 
92 Personal communication, April 2009. 
93 Personal communication with one of the judicially denounced farmers, March 2009. 
Questioning the effectiveness of planned conflict resolution strategies 
110 
 
4.5 Invoking science: Technical knowledge supporting operations 
A second important strategy of Yanacocha in alliance with the Peruvian state to solve 
conflicts is to rely on scientific expertise to produce supposedly objective assessments 
of how mining will affect the quantity and quality of water flows.  
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, small-scale agriculture, livestock and dairy 
production constitute the permanent livelihood activities of rural households in 
Combayo. Those activities crucially depend on the availability of water in the canal 
networks that are fed by water from creeks and the Azufre River. That MINAG and 
Yanacocha are well aware of the criticality of local water resources for sustaining rural 
livelihoods shows in the assessments conducted (by MINAG) during 2006 and 2007 
(and sponsored by Yanacocha), which both refer to the lack of water security to explain 
low agricultural productivities (INRENA 2007).  
When the first incidents of conflict happened in 2005, with Combayo opposing the 
expansion plans of the company, Yanacocha was prompt to initiate negotiations. 
Yanacocha's quick success in reaching an agreement with the mayor of Combayo “for 
joint work towards development and the protection of water quality and quantity in Combayo” 
largely happened because many in Combayo hoped the agreement would lead to 
improvements in water availability and security.94 The agreement consisted of 
promises to: (1) support the implementation of a drinking water supply system for 
Combayo; (2) preserve the water sources of Combayo; and (3) develop social 
investment projects in the town.95 This was the first agreement signed by the company. 
As noted, many comuneros were of the opinion that it was not respected, and this is 
what prompted the conflict of 2006. 
The mediation process that followed the conflictive events of 2006 again ended with 
an agreement in which the state, in coordination with Yanacocha, promised to 
implement drinking water systems for the town of Combayo and its communities. In 
                                                     
94 Letter N. 009 CPM-Combayo, May 2008. 
95 Yanacocha offered US$ 1.500,000 to invest in Combayo, and the municipality arranged lists of people 
and companies from Combayo to work for Yanacocha. Agreement documents from 15 and 20 
September 2005.  
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addition, the agreement stipulated that the Prime Minister would commission a water 
management study to be implemented at the river basin level. The idea was to assess 
and determine the water quality and quantity in the area and propose the best and 
most efficient ways to protect water resources and ensure water supply for Combayo 
for drinking and irrigation purposes. To develop these studies, the government 
engaged funds from the Inter-American Development Bank. The international 
consulting company Nippon Koei was hired to carry out these water studies in the 
Chonta and Mashcon watersheds within 10 months. The consultants proposed several 
actions to manage water at the watershed level. These included the construction of a 
main reservoir (42.5 MCM) on the Chonta river to secure water for Cajamarca and 
irrigation for downstream areas of the watershed. They also proposed the construction 
of two minor reservoirs (about 1.5 MCM) at the upper side of Combayo to secure water 
for the Azufre watershed.96 Other proposed interventions in this regulated system 
included maintenance work of the irrigation canals and installation of water 
measurement devices (Nippon Koei 2010). 
The study was finished in 2010. It is now available online on the national water 
authority's website. Although they reduced the tensions, neither the agreement nor the 
post conflict water study proposed interventions that would guarantee or improve the 
longer-term sustainability of water resources. They also had little resonance in the 
conflict area, as the agreement did little to influence what happened with the 3 lakes, 
nor did it propose solutions to the problems of water depletion in Combayo. Instead, 
improvements seemed to depend on each community’s political agency, its networks 
and its lobbying skills, as well as their success in mobilizing external funding from the 
company or other sources.  
After the signing of the agreement, and during the preparations for the studies, 
Yanacocha proceeded with their actions in the Carachugo site. This entailed the 
                                                     
96 In other part of the study, however, the proposal of constructing up streams reservoirs was 
problematic because this would affect water availability for downstream areas. The proposal of 
developing minor reservoirs is not new. Previous studies developed by the Water Authority in 
Combayo already proposed that alternative, but with differences concerning the selection of water 
sources. 
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draining of areas at the Ocucha Machay and Chaquicocha creeks of about 412 ha and 
685 ha respectively. In May 2008, and in spite of the ongoing studies, the company also 
communicated to the water authority ATDRC that it would begin with the removal of 
the 3 lakes. The ATDRC approved those actions and specified that the company would 
have to mitigate the reductions in water availability by releasing treated water, 
suitable for irrigation and animal consumption, to the creeks. To mitigate impacts at 
the Ocucha Machay creek, the company would have to release water permanently 
(minimum discharges of 5 L/s in 2007, 15 L/s in 2009 and 35 L/s from 2011 onwards). 
Compliance with these agreements was to be controlled by the ATDRC.  
On paper, these agreements sounded reasonable, even though they do not include any 
concern about the longer-term sustainability of the water-based ecosystems. Yet, the 
capacity of the ATDRC to actually monitor and enforce them is highly doubtful. In 
fact, its little involvement during the Combayo conflict, its poor track record in 
managing water resources in the area (Caballero Martin 2012) and its lack of credibility 
and legitimacy among affected communities (Sosa and Zwarteveen 2012) seriously call 
into question whether the ATDRC will be able to make Yanacocha keep its part of the 
agreement or hold the company accountable for the impacts of its operations (Sosa and 
Zwarteveen 2014). Some have suggested that the monitoring could also have been 
done by the technical committees established in 2000 by the ATDRC and appointed to 
assess and monitor water in areas where Yanacocha operates. However, because the 
technical committees are financially sponsored by the company, they have little 
credibility in the eyes of the rural population (Orian 2008). 
The quality of the water assessment studies themselves is likewise the subject of 
serious doubts and questions (Orian 2008). As part of the Yanacocha’ expansion plans 
for the Carachugo site, the company carried out a water assessment study. This study 
characterized the 3 lakes that would be affected as intermittent (or non-permanent), 
reducing their significance. The study indicated that the Patos lake had a water volume 
that varied from 5135m3 during the rainy season to 2868m3 during the dry season, and 
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that the other two lakes were basically empty during the dry season.97 The deputy 
governor of Combayo considered these findings as a strategic way to dismiss the 
relevance of the 3 lakes; it allowed the mining company to convince some leaders of 
Combayo that there was no water in the lakes. He stated apprehensively, “The 
authorities supported the mine’s version in exchange of money, and there is going to be a leach 
pad in place of the lakes!”. The deputy governor was also disappointed and suspicious 
about the role of the ATDRC, because the water inventories elaborated and updated 
by this authority in 2007 did not mention that the 3 lakes were not registered. This 
omission, according to him, made it easier to forget about these waters.98  
The representatives of the mining company countered the worries of the deputy 
governor about water availability in Combayo and the performance of Yanacocha by 
emphasizing the fact that there are water studies being carried out in the area by a 
renowned international consultanting company and financed by the Inter-American 
Development Bank.  
4.6 Conclusions 
Although some Combayinos received benefits from the company, like temporary work 
or assignments for their communal companies, many things regarding local 
development in Combayo remained as they had been before the conflicts. In particular, 
nothing happened to better protect the water resources of Combayo: in spite of the 
promises and agreements, the mining company's operations depleted the three lakes 
that were at the centre of the conflict.99 In the process, the communities lost faith in 
their collective ability to alter the course of mining events. Instead of the risky strategy 
to collectively mobilize to protect their water resources, they had come to appreciate 
that directly and individually dealing with the mining company to secure funding for 
their water projects would be more effective, at least on the short-term. Conflicts 
                                                     
97 Communication from Yanacocha to the ATDRC requesting the approval for hydrological and 
hydrogeological studies of the Patos and Estación 1 lakes and approval for a draining plan, 11.03.2008.  
98 Personal communication, 22.03.2009. 
99 Yanacocha releases treated water to the creeks and the Azufre river as it is stated in the permissions 
given by the state. 
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indeed seemed resolved, but the underlying problems of environmental integrity and 
livelihood security are not.  
To deal with the conflicts surrounding the activities in the highlands of Combayo, the 
government of Peru and Yanacocha importantly relied on two strategies. First, they 
made sure that what the company proposed to do was legally right, or just by 
obtaining all required permissions. This allowed the company to respond to 
complaints by simply stating that it was operating within the law. Second, Yanacocha 
made sure that what it did was scientifically sound, by conducting scientific impact 
assessments and proposing technical strategies to mitigate the impacts on the 
environment, particularly water. Yanacocha proposed for instance to compensate for 
depleted water sources by installing water treatment plants and by releasing treated 
water to communities suffering from the depletion. Together, these two strategies lent 
legitimacy to the company's operations by making them seem morally and 
scientifically sound. Indeed, the discussed examples show that legal compliance 
(justice) and technical (or scientific) accuracy function to legitimize mining operations, 
allowing the company to proceed with business-as-usual without having to take 
seriously the demands of ecosystems or communities. Rendering water problems legal 
and technical thus conveniently transforms them into problems that can be solved. It 
simultaneously renders them non-political (Li 2007). 
How this is problematic can perhaps best be illustrated with the example of the water 
assessment study that was proposed by the state as part of its conflict resolution 
strategy. Interestingly, the final report explicitly mentioned that its outcomes were 
dependent on how the problems were framed and by whom. According to the report, 
the fact that there were different parties involved with diverging views and opinions 
made it difficult if not impossible for the report to meet everyone's expectations:  
“since the launch meeting in June 2008, it became apparent that there were                 –
different– and conflicting expectations among the actors [and] about the importance 
and the value of the study. As stated in public meetings, the city of Cajamarca and the 
water users [of the Chonta watershed] expect the report to justify the need for a large 
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dam in the Chonta watershed to provide water not only for the city of Cajamarca, but 
also to extend the irrigated areas close to the city. Exactly the opposite idea was echoed 
by the highland water users [Combayo and those nearby the mining operations], 
who hope that the study will emphasize the need for numerous reservoirs in the 
upstream areas of the watershed [to secure water for them]. [This action, however] 
would have a direct negative effect on the amount of water that reaches the downstream 
areas" (Nippon Koei 2010: 142).  
The consultants thus acknowledged that, although they had made efforts to make the 
study as participatory as possible,100 the fact that different parties had widely 
diverging and sometimes opposing views made it difficult to fully involve them and 
their interests: “although an important mobilization of public opinion and information have 
been generated, a [comprehensive] response of actors’ proposals has not been achieved, [nor 
have there been] organizational actions that could allow to work with a [legitimate] 
representative in the study area...” (ibid: 142).  
The report clearly showed how problems were articulated differently by different 
actors. Its interviews revealed that many comuneros and the authorities representing 
them wondered whether "the study would produce more water for the users, particularly 
from the upstream areas” or be “just another study” done in the area (Nippon Koei 2010: 
134).101 Hence, while the mining company could use the study as an objective 
statement of fact, the very consultants conducting it were aware of its partiality. They 
were worried about the effectiveness and value of their own report, because they were 
conscious of the impossibility of screening off their analysis from the political context 
in which it was conducted.  
This example serves to underscore the more fundamental point about the success of 
water conflict resolution strategies that we want to make. We have argued that the 
                                                     
100 The document states that several information meetings and water quality monitoring were done with 
participation of Combayo’s population as well as with public and private organizations of Cajamarca.  
101 Since the 2000s, there were several water assessments done in Cajamarca (and in Combayo) by 
national authorities (see INRENA, 2007) as well as by international bodies. For example, the Office of 
the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman CAO of the IFC (CAO 2007) commissioned a water study in the 
area to the company Stratus Consulting in 2003. 
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complex and deeply political nature of mining conflicts makes it difficult or perhaps 
even impossible to institutionally or scientifically safeguard objectivity and neutrality. 
Our analysis shows that there is a danger that rather than correcting unsustainable or 
unjust behaviours, supposedly neutral or objective solutions work and are used as a 
legitimizing device for those in power (in this case the mining company), to continue 
their business as usual.  
Hence, rather than relying on forms of 'objectification' (law, science, technical 
solutions) that deny (eliminate, erase or render invisible, see Edmunds and 
Wollenberg (2001)) the intrinsically political nature of conflicts, water conflict 
resolution strategies should be much more explicitly concerned with the question of 
how to democratically organize political decision making processes, including the 
question of how to organize possibilities of objecting. This goes much further than 
public hearings and stakeholder engagement. It also requires thinking beyond quick 
solutions (Himley 2014) or reaching short-lived forms of consensus, both of which tend 
to blur the diversity of positions and mask abuses of power (Edmunds and Wollenberg 
2001, Moreyra and Wegerich 2006, Castro 2007). Rather than seeking to neutralize 
differences in position and power, our analysis suggest that the longer term 
sustainability of livelihoods and ecosystems may be better served by openly accepting 
and dealing with such differences, and by learning to acknowledge that experiences 
and knowledge (including science) are always contextually embedded and plural. 
One implication is that effective environmental conflict resolution and water 
governance strategies should pay more attention to processes and power dimensions 
in conscious attempts to create a more or less level playing field. As Budds (2014) 
suggests, communities' abilities to engage and object not just require their improved 
access to information, but also improvements in their skills to critically analyse and 
understand this information, as well as with the capacity and the influence to use it 
and make it count. Another implication of our analysis is that creative ways need to 
be identified to give voice to the environment (the ecosystem) beyond the one singular 
voice of science, allowing it to speak in multiple ways (as articulated by the different 
parties involved). And a third important implication is that it becomes essential to find 
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innovative ways of accounting for water uses beyond mere economic or market 
benefits, challenging dominant approaches of dealing with water (Trottier and Brooks 
2013) to include longer-term and often harder to measure values and functions.
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Chapter 5. The institutional regulation of the sustainability of water 
resources within mining contexts: Accountability and plurality
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guided tour – Yanacocha’s mining site, Cajamarca. Photo: M. Sosa. 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter has been published as: Sosa, M. and M. Zwarteveen (2014). "The institutional regulation of 
the sustainability of water resources within mining contexts: accountability and plurality." Current 
Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 11(0): 19-25. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Since 1990, mineral extraction frontiers have rapidly expanded in the developing 
world. Transnational companies have started exploiting mineral deposits in rural 
mountainous areas, like the Andes (Bebbington 2007, Bebbington 2013, ECLAC 2013) 
often through the development of large scale open pit mines, a form of mining known 
for “its high productivity and its low production costs” (Dammert and Molinelli 
2007:60). Peru is one of the countries that have been particularly active in attracting 
mining investors, to become one of the major mining hotspots in the region (Bury 2002, 
Torres 2007, de Echave et al. 2009a). 
This chapter explores the sustainability challenges that this mining boom creates in the 
regions where extraction occurs, discussing in particular the effectiveness of existing 
institutional arrangements for safeguarding the long-term integrity of water resources 
and water-based ecosystems. Rather than nurturing beliefs that mining operations can 
ever be sustainable, our exploration is informed by deep awareness that mining is 
intrinsically exploitative. Accepting that mining operations take place, the intention in 
the chapter is to seek for institutional ways or mechanisms to combine mineral 
extraction with the protection of water resources or water-based ecosystems. Mining 
operations alter not just the quantity and quality of water flows, but also entail an often 
irreversible transformation of existing institutional forms of regulating and governing 
water (Budds and Hinojosa 2012, Sosa and Zwarteveen 2012, Bebbington 2013). 
Focusing on the developments of the rapidly growing mining sector and their pioneer 
players in the Latin American context, we use the conceptual lens of legal pluralism 
(Benda-Beckmann et al. 1998, Roth et al. 2005, Boelens 2008) to show that those current 
forms for regulating water resources in mining areas risk being ineffective. Although 
mining companies are accountable to organizations outside of their area of operation, 
through compliance with several national and international agreements and codes of 
conduct, the people that directly witness and experience the impacts of mining 
operations have few formal options to share their knowledge or voice their concerns. 
In terms of legal pluralism, this problem stems from the fact that existing regulatory 
mechanisms rely too much on external sources of (scientific) expertise, authority and 
  Chapter 5 
121 
 
norms, to the neglect of local and existing (or traditional) sources of knowledge and 
regulation (Bavinck and Gupta 2014) 
The chapter is based on a literature review of water and mining, surface or open pit 
large scale operations. It presents this review against the exemplar, based on empirical 
findings, of the Yanacocha gold mine, located in Peru. Following the introduction, we 
present the institutional panorama for regulating water use within mining contexts. 
Then we engage with insights about regulating the impacts of mining on water 
resources and finally we present an assessment of the regulations of sustainable water 
within mining contexts. We conclude that to enhance the sustainability of water 
resources used by companies and by communities surrounding them, it is necessary 
to make companies accountable for their actions not only to international and national 
regulations, but also to those directly affected by mining operations. 
5.2 Water and mines: Institutional pluralisation 
Open pit gold mining requires large amounts of water (Budds 2010) to leach the gold-
containing soil. In heap-leaching platforms, the soil is washed with water containing 
specific chemicals, such as cyanide, to separate out the mineral. Most developing 
countries actively welcome foreign investments in mining operations through a 
combination of favourable tax conditions and institutional and legal reforms that make 
it relatively easy for new companies to obtain land and water (Budds and Hinojosa 
2012). In Peru, mining companies were given concessions that allowed them to make 
use of the land that was used by smallholder farmer communities. In line with stories 
on land (Borras Jr and Franco 2012) and water grabbing elsewhere, these communities 
only realized that their lands had been given out to concession when the investors 
arrived to the area to negotiate access to the land. Some of the communities that were 
happy at first to engage in land negotiations, later doubted the fairness of the 
compensation they had received (Deza 2008, Lingán 2008, Arana Zegarra 2009). Land 
negotiations sometimes happened under the threat of forcefully dispossessing 
communities of their lands (Pascó-Font et al. 2003).  
In many instances, the acquisition of land served as an indirect way of also obtaining 
access to water, making it physically possible for mining companies to access and 
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control water sources. How this is legally justified varies per country. Chile for 
example introduced a Water Code which allowed the trading of water rights, making 
it possible for companies to purchase water rights (Budds 2010). Likewise in Peru, a 
new Water Resources Law 29338 was enacted102, and new state water authorities were 
created that were accountable to the newly created National Water Authority. The new 
law instituted a central water rights' registry, administrated by regional water 
authorities, thus making it possible to free and re-distribute ‘unused’ water rights. This 
is the way the pioneer large gold mining company Yanacocha legally obtained its 
water rights. When no such rights were available, the company went through great 
efforts to convince communities to give up their rights, offering them sums of money 
and other benefits in return, together with investments in communities' development. 
These deals were often agreed upon in long-winding extra-judicial agreements. In this 
sense, the company made use of both formal laws as well as of extra-legal or informal 
ways to get water rights.  
Changes in the water law in combination with the active purchasing of land, and water 
rights by mining companies drastically alter the institutional regulation of water, often 
culminating in the concentration of rights and powers in the companies (Budds and 
Hinojosa 2012). Perreault, in an analysis of the impacts of mining on water in the 
Bolivian Altiplano, thus concludes that “mining activity has usurped much of the 
water and water rights formerly enjoyed by downstream indigenous campesino 
communities” (Perreault 2013: 1062). On paper, the newly created legal water situation 
appears neat, smooth and uniform. Yet, this chapter uniformity hides the fact that 
existing water user communities often continue to rely on and refer to traditional 
arrangements and institutions for accessing and managing water. These are anchored 
in their territories, knowledge, and belief systems that have evolved over generations 
of living in co-dependence with water-based ecosystems (Gelles 2000, Boelens 2008, 
Vera Delgado 2011).  
                                                     
102 According to Del Castillo, (in Budds and Hinojosa 2012), the modifications of the legal apparatus 
respond -among others- to the need to better accommodate the water use requirements and challenges 
of an emerging industrial sector e.g. extractive industries, agro-export, etc. 
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It is telling in this respect that in Cajamarca, Peru –one of the most popular regions for 
transnational mining investors-, many water users were not particularly interested in 
registering their historical uses of water so as to formally acquire legal rights to water. 
Farmers did not see any use or benefit in doing this, neither did they see the existing 
basin-level water user association as their representative or as a supportive 
organizations in case of water problems. Interviews with members of affected 
communities revealed that many based their sense of water ownership on prior 
histories of land, and water use and investment in infrastructure, rather than on formal 
registration. Yet, by not registering, their waters got marked as ‘unused’ and could be 
acquired by others. Although many communities thus lost their formal powers of 
access to mining companies in this way, communities often continued to consider 
themselves as the custodians of water territories: rather than ‘owning’ the water, they 
feel responsible for caring for the waters and lands that they depend upon. In return 
for this care, they feel entitled to use it. Water is thus conceived by the communities 
within a distinct legal field (Roth et al. , Boelens and Seemann 2014) which is based on 
an entirely different ontological conception of ‘rights’ than the one of the Water 
Resources Law 29338. This Law declares that water belongs to the state, with the 
licence to use it being regulated via water permits that are given by the respective 
water authority (República del Perú).  
5.3 Regulating the water impacts of mining  
As mining often happens in the headwater regions of river basins, the use and 
diversion of water by mining companies considerably affects downstream water 
flows. Studies analysing the impacts of extractive industries in Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Peru,103 show how leaching operations entail both changes in water quality, polluting 
rivers with mining waste, as well as changes in water quantities, altering and reducing 
downstream water availabilities (Bury 2004, Younger et al. 2004, Bury 2005, 
Bebbington 2007, Bebbington and Bury 2009, Yacoub 2013). Because of the location of 
the Yanacocha mine on the catchment areas of four watersheds: Grande, Quebrada 
                                                     
103 Research carried out by the Concertacion Programme, an interdisciplinary research and capacity 
building programme on local water management and water policies in the Andean Region. Programme 
coordinated by Wageningen University, The Netherlands.  
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Honda, Mashcón and Chonta (see Figure 10), there are reports providing testimonies 
or measurements of how Yanacocha’s water uses have impacted the availability and 
quality of water for human consumption, irrigation and livestock production (Bury 
2004, Yacoub 2013).  
  
 
Figure 10. Mining operations of Yanacocha in main watersheds – Cajamarca.Modified from Yanacocha 
2008 by C. Cerdán and the author 
 
 
On the basis of the European Water Framework Directive, Yacoub assessed the water 
quality of Andean watersheds in Cajamarca, particularly in rivers that are in contact 
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with effluents from mining operations such as the Jequetepeque river in the vicinity of 
Yanacocha. This river was diagnosed as polluted because of the accumulation of heavy 
metals and sediments (Yacoub 2013). Also, because of the water diverted and used in 
heap-leaching platforms, the catchments areas of the Crisnejas, Rejo and Grande rivers 
have stopped functioning as water collecting areas (Preciado Jerónimo 2011). The 
dewatering or removal of water sources needed for the work in open pits, has also 
caused depletion of groundwater (Sosa and Zwarteveen 2011). The company itself 
reported (Yanacocha 2011) how it caused a reduction or even disappearance of surface 
water flows because it's operations affected creeks that used to feed farmers’ irrigation 
canals. Communities (or organizations representing them) likewise reported how their 
canals have run dry since the mine started operations (Arana Zegarra 2012). Hence, 
there is no question that open pit mining operations rely on, and drastically alter, 
existing water flows and water-based ecosystems. However, the precise measurement 
of these impacts is difficult and often itself the source of contestation and sometimes 
conflict.  
Concerns about such impacts form the background to ever more sophisticated global 
regulations devised to make sure that mining operations do not provoke irreversible 
damage to longer-term water sustainability. These include the ILO 169 International 
Agreement (of which Peru is a signatory country), the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI)104 and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).105 
Companies working in countries that have signed these initiatives agree to report on 
their environmental performance, providing evidence of compliance with the 
regulations (Fonseca et al. 2013). In sustainability reports, mining companies 
meticulously document the various actions they undertake to comply with different 
social, environmental, labour and economic laws and mandates. Although often based 
on their internal company rules, these reports largely follow the international 
                                                     
104 EITI consists on reporting and implementing standards with full disclosure of taxes and other 
payments made by companies to governments. It aims to improve openness and accountable 
management of revenues from extractive activities and better information sharing. http://eiti.org/eiti 
(Accessed 23.04.2014). 
105 GRI is the most used sustainability reporting framework within the mining sector (Fonseca et al. 
2013) 
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standards and guidelines to which the companies have committed such as: Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights, GRI, International Cyanide Management 
Code, the ICMM 10 Principles of Sustainable Development from the International 
Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), etc.  
At national levels, Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) provide an important 
institutional mechanism for safeguarding the sustainability of mining operations. 
According to the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) in (Li 2009: 
219) “the EIA is a process of ‘identifying, predicting, evaluating and mitigating the 
biophysical, social, and other effects of development proposals” (also see Lawrence 
2003: 7). Yanacocha diligently executes EIAs, using this to safeguard its reputation as 
a company. Its 2011 sustainability report documents that Yanacocha invested106 almost 
4 million of soles on water management issues and about 1.5 million of soles on social 
responsibility. Through these investments, the company supported the construction of 
drinking water systems, the implementation of sprinkler irrigation systems, the 
rehabilitation of irrigation canals and the construction of reservoirs benefiting more 
than 300 families (Yanacocha 2011, Yanacocha 2012). Such investments and actions 
constitute the concrete measures the company engaged in to assume its social and 
environmental responsibility (Yanacocha 2009). In addition, and just like most other 
mining companies in the region, see for example the case of Pierina gold mine (Himley 
2010), Yanacocha also engaged in a number of additional activities aimed at making 
mining operations (seem) as beneficial as possible to society and nature, and more 
broadly, trying to picture companies as a drivers of development (Himley 2010). One 
such programme was the Voluntary Support Programme or Mining Programme of 
Solidarity with the Community, launched in Peru in 2007 by the government of Alan 
García. 
 The existence of international and national regulations is testimony of the seriousness 
with which sustainability is addressed at policy levels. Yet, many have raised concerns 
about their effectiveness (Gupta and Pahl-Wostl 2013). Some critics question the 
                                                     
106 Amounts in Peruvian currency –Nuevos soles or soles - with an average exchange rate of US 2.7 
dollars the investments are: US 1.447.041 million dollars and US 580972.1 dollars respectively.  
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usefulness of the information collected for environmental assessments, as much of it 
relies on technical data that measure direct particular impacts in specific localities 
rather than providing ecological analyses of life production cycles and system 
dynamics that would be needed for understanding how mining operations impact 
longer-term water-based ecosystems and biodiversity (Fonseca et al. 2013). The 
different projects companies engage in to address social and environmental concerns 
likewise are not aimed at regenerating or restoring damaged ecosystems or water 
flows, but instead merely mitigate identified impacts, sometimes in ways that may 
even cause further damage. On the basis of an analysis of mining reports from different 
companies, Mudd (2008) more specifically argues that the reports poorly address 
water sustainability issues. They often do not include the impacts on water use or the 
total amount of water needed for mineral production. In-depth studies examining the 
functioning of EIAs in practice likewise raise a number of important questions about 
their effectiveness. Li (2009) documents how an EIA107 rather than a mechanism to 
hold the mining company accountable to the impacts of its operations on 
environmental and water sustainability, instead worked to further legitimize and 
prioritize resource extraction. As there is a lot of room for mining companies 
themselves to define what is and what is not considered in the EIA, there is 
considerable risk that they just include the issues they can address and find solutions 
for, to the neglect of others. Hence, also “people’s needs are defined by what the 
mining company can offer” (Li 2009:231).  
The many protests and disagreements that surround mining operations are caused by 
concerns of a very similar nature. Yanacocha serves as a good illustration of how these 
conflicts play out. The Peruvian government considers Yanacocha as a 'model 
company' in terms of its environmental behaviour. In 2008, Yanacocha even received 
an environmental protection prize from the Peruvian government. This prize was a 
reward and public recognition for the company's efforts to construct a water reservoir 
in a former open pit, to provide water to communities whose canals had run dry 
because of the mining operations. Yet, there are many in and outside Peru who do not 
                                                     
107 Research based on the Yanacocha West Supplementary Project –PSYO- for the expansion of the 
Yanacocha mining operations located in Cajamarca, Peru. 
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share this admiration for Yanacocha's environmental behaviour. During interviews 
with farmers and communities’ advisors, it was stated that communities in Cajamarca 
were not at all happy with how the company dealt with their reduced access to water. 
The construction of the reservoir implied that instead of what they considered 'natural' 
water, they would now receive treated water. This water was much less appreciated: 
it tasted and smelled differently; made grass that is irrigated with it turn yellow and 
caused cattle drinking it to become ill. Although the treated water was not intended 
for human consumption, some comuneros did drink it and experienced stomach 
problems as a result. Communities also protested against the company's plans to 
mitigate its use of four lakes for another project of Yanacocha in Cajamarca: the Conga 
mining project. To compensate for the loss of these lakes, Yanacocha proposed the 
construction of four new reservoirs that would assure effective water storage for the 
area (Preciado Jerónimo 2012) Together with environmental NGOs, local communities 
led by the regional water authority questioned this solution, arguing that the 
destruction of the lakes would not only affect downstream water uses and users, but 
also irrevocably alter the water-based ecosystem in the region. Most of these and other 
protests did not significantly change the plans of the company. A notable exception is 
the Mount Quilish: here the energetic attempts of large sections of the urban and rural 
residents to protect their sacred mountain made the company change its plans 
(Preciado Jerónimo 2012) 
Fed by larger and more fundamental controversies about whether mining can ever be 
sustainable (Amezaga et al. 2010, Mudd 2009), such disagreements happen within a 
broader institutional context that separates the governance of mineral expansion from 
that of water resources and local development, and that is characterised by large 
asymmetries of power favouring large scale investment over local livelihoods and 
environment (Bebbington and Bury 2009: 1, Himley 2010). They also reveal a 
fundamental flaw in the effectiveness of existing institutional forms of holding mining 
companies accountable to the impacts of their operations on the environment and 
water. We further explain this in the next section. 
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5.4 Accountability and institutional pluralism: The regulation of water 
sustainability in mining contexts  
Existing forms of regulating and controlling the water impacts of mining companies 
rely, almost entirely, on what we call 'upward accountability': companies' social and 
environmental behaviour is assessed against general indicators, based on technical 
assessments, by parties that are far removed geographically from the areas where 
extraction occurs. As we have shown, the norms and rules that guide the 
environmental behaviour of mining companies are set by international and national 
standards and protocols, often informed by scientific and supposedly objective 
methods. This has a clear positive side: it makes it possible to compare the conduct of 
mining companies within and across countries, and provides them with a clear 
incentive to behave 'properly' as not doing so would damage their reputation. Yet, 
being upwardly accountable and complying with national and international 
regulations creates an undesirable separation between authorized assessments of the 
effects the mining operations and how these effects are experienced. This separation is 
the root cause of the many controversies, disputes and conflicts that mining operations 
provoke. According to the Defensoría del Pueblo (Peruvian Ombudsman) from 221 
social conflicts nationwide reported during the last months of 2013, 143 were about 
socio environmental cases with 48.4% related to mining activities (Defensoria del 
Pueblo 2013). According to the same report, Cajamarca, where Yanacocha is located, 
is among the five most conflicting regions in the country. These conflicts are directly 
"linked to the mining-sustainability relationship and are motivated by concerns about 
livelihood security, environmental degradation and by the perception that wellbeing 
has not increased in proportion to the profits of mining companies” (Bebbington and 
Bury 2009: 17296). 
That a mining company can comply with all environmental regulations (and even 
receive national awards for its environmental behaviour), while at the same time 
provoking many disagreements, protests and conflicts is indicative of weaknesses in 
the current institutional regulation of sustainability. Next to well documented 
problems of reporting and enforcement (Li 2009), these have to do with a lack of 
downward accountability: the existing norms and standards (or the procedures for 
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enforcing them) lack legitimacy in the eyes of many, most notably of those who 
directly experience the impacts of mining operations. Members of local communities, 
even when they have transferred their land- and water rights to the mining company, 
continue to consider themselves if not the owners than certainly the custodians of their 
territories, including the water sources located on those. Their intimate knowledge of 
the water sources and flows, and the fact that their livelihoods depend on these, turn 
them into articulate spokespersons for the ecological integrity of their living 
environments.  
Yet the formal institutional regulation of sustainability gives very few formal 
possibilities to local communities and their representatives to voice their concerns, 
share their knowledge, or influence courses of action. Existing EIA procedures do 
include public hearings, allowing community members to voice their concerns and 
articulate their opinions. Yet, these public hearings seldom prevent an EIA from 
getting approved, but instead tend to be used by companies to obtain public and 
formal endorsement of the EIA process, and to limit and disqualify oppositional voices 
(Li 2009: 220). As Partidario and Sheate (2013) suggest, Impact Assessment (IA) 
processes are based on a restricted number of consultations that may just be organized 
to formally comply with legal requirements. Sometimes community members can also 
participate in regional policy planning processes (in Peru this is the Ecological and 
Economic Zoning process), or make use of the Ombudsman Office to influence the 
environmental conduct of mining companies. However, to what extent communities 
have the courage to actually make use of such possibilities, or to engage in more 
informal ways to question mining companies, strongly depends on how much they 
stand to lose. In the case of Yanacocha, the company has gone through a lot of effort, 
and spent much money, on various development projects. For instance, it supported 
the construction of the community meeting room and the implementation of stoves in 
every household. Importantly, the company or its sub-contractors also often hire 
community members to work on those development projects. Several local people 
even initiated community companies, as a way to get included in the list of local 
contractors that provide services to Yanacocha. Many comuneros thus directly depend 
for their livelihoods on the mining company, a dependence that may make them 
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reluctant to formally or informally question its environmental conduct, even when 
they are deeply concerned about it. In addition, and as we showed, in the process of 
installing itself and starting operations, mining companies often effectively 
accumulate many land- and water rights, thereby also accumulating powers to decide 
what happens with land and water. This power further increases when companies, 
like Yanacocha did, themselves invest in water treatment plants or new conveyance 
infrastructure which they also operate. Through such investments, mining companies 
not just legally but also physically control water.  
Further complicating effective downward relations of accountability is the fact that 
much of the knowledge of communities is based on experiential data. This knowledge 
is therefore not accepted as authoritative or considered legitimate enough to inform 
policy or enforce regulation. The more technical and scientifically endorsed 
information produced by formal procedures (Li 2009) is often challenged by local 
residents (Horowitz 2010). In fact, differences between indicators used by local 
residents which are often considered as “vernacular and based on everyday 
monitoring of the landscape” (Bebbington and Bury: 3) and those used by mining 
representatives which are based on quantitative technical assessments and structured 
monitoring programmes, frequently lie at the basis of conflicting views about changes 
in water quality and quantity. Such differences often also inform local protest, as 
affected communities have few other means to voice their concerns and dissatisfaction. 
We would agree with Partidario and Sheate (2013) who suggest that it may be essential 
to “to receive, accept and make use of other forms of knowledge and values” from 
different stakeholders. This is important also because (access to and production of) 
scientific information is itself often concentrated in those with most political power, 
including the mining company, leading to a situation in which only the company is 
perceived to have the right credentials and measuring devices to collect the 
information used to assess its own environmental behaviour.  
5.5 Conclusions  
The regulation of the sustainability of water resources in mining areas can be 
characterised as institutionally plural, with fundamental differences and 
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disagreements about definitions, principles, procedures and the essence of law 
(Bavinck and Gupta 2014). Our analysis shows that institutional mechanisms to hold 
mining companies accountable are mainly directed ‘upward’ - meeting national and 
international standards through reports compiled by companies themselves - rather 
than ‘downward’ - based on the knowledge of those who directly experience the effects 
of mining operations on their everyday lives. National and international regulations 
to monitor and control the impacts of mining operations on the quality and quantity 
of water flows do not prevent mining companies from irretrievably damaging water-
based ecosystems, thereby endangering both biodiversity and the livelihoods of local 
communities. An important institutional reason for this is that these regulations and 
procedures separate assessments of changes in water resources from communities’ 
experiences of degradation, experiences that are informed by the intimate knowledge 
communities have gained through generations of living in the area. They often 
continue considering themselves as the rightful custodians of their territories and 
waters, even when they have formally lost their rights. Existing institutional 
frameworks discredit traditional legal and normative orders and knowledge systems, 
making it near to impossible for members of affected communities to legitimately 
articulate concerns, share their knowledge or question the behaviour of mining 
companies. In line with findings from sustainability science and governance studies 
the chapter concludes that mechanisms for regulating the sustainability of water 
resources in mining contexts will only be effective when accompanied with the sharing 
of knowledge (information) and power, needed to forge downward accountability 
relations (Partidario and Sheate 2013: 27). This requires finding creative ways of 
endorsing the knowledge and customary rights of local communities, to foster 
processes of 'good enough governance' and 'institutional bricolage' (Bavinck and 
Gupta 2014) that are based on the acknowledgment and acceptance of the plurality of 
institutions and knowledges that co-constitute water resources in mining contexts. 
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Trueque in Challhuahuacho, Apurímac. Photo: M. Sosa. 
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the major findings of the research, organized and articulated to 
respond to the main question that was elaborated in the introduction: How does water 
governance evolve in contexts of large mining operations in the Peruvian Andes? This is 
linked to a more theoretical discussion about water governance, focusing on how the 
conceptualization of water governance in terms of process and relations yields useful 
and very different insights as compared to conceptualizations that see water 
governance as systems. As this research was conducted in particularly contentious and 
uneven waterscapes, its findings clearly illuminate how power hierarchies shape 
governance processes, often blocking the achievement of goals of sustainability and 
equity.  
6.2 Major findings and research question 
This thesis, based on the grounded qualitative unraveling of conflicts over water in 
mining contexts, has set out to conceptually and empirically explore the influence of 
large mining operations on water governance norms and arrangements in two Andean 
regions in Peru. It has brought together information about specific incidences of 
conflicts over water between mining companies and communities gathered through 
ethnographic fieldwork methods and the analysis of reports and (legal) documents, 
discussing this information against a range of theoretical ideas to explain the politics 
of accessing, using, managing and controlling water in contexts of extractive 
operations. 
First: Mining formalizes local water governance arrangements 
The main findings presented in chapter 2, around the activities of the mining project 
and operations of the Las Bambas mine in Apurímac, show that even before the actual 
operational phase of the mining endeavour, local water governance arrangements 
become restructured. This happens most forcefully through the formalization of local 
water rights, something that produces complexities and contradictions. The chapter 
shows how some rural communities approach and understand the formalization of 
rights as a legal-instrumental opportunity to improve (or sometimes even newly 
obtain) water security. They hope and expect that the formalization of their water 
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rights systems will protect their water uses from the actual or potential demands and 
threats by the mines, other communities and third parties. Similarly, some 
communities use ‘formalization’ as a strategic, empowering mechanism to enhance 
their negotiation position about the access and use of the water sources that are located 
in their territories. This strategy was evident in those communities that engaged in 
negotiations over land titles and territorial access rights with the mining company. The 
possibility to use (rights to) resources as a resource in negotiations with powerful 
others is quite tempting for certain communities, particularly when they are located in 
socially marginalized and economically poor zones and do not have many other 
sources of bargaining power. Yet, the fact that some communities use natural resources 
to make (business) deals has profound implications for those existing (vernacular) 
water control arrangements that did not depend on economic or monetary 
transactions, but on ideas that link the distribution and sharing of water to family and 
community labor contributions (see below). There are also communities that choose 
not to resort to formalization because it is a very costly and cumbersome process, one 
that is impossible to afford without some source of extra income or help from the 
mining company. Ironically, it is if often the mining company that constitutes the 
source (and promoter) of the funding and technical advice needed to materialize the 
formalization process.  
The chapter’s findings thus illustrate the tensions that are generated because one 
community (Fuerabamba) was assigned formal water rights. This was a community 
that had to be relocated by the mining company to allow for open pit operations on 
the community’s land. Fuerabamba got the support of the company to formalize its 
water rights, rights that supersedes existing local ways to deal with water in and 
among the communities. Through the formalization process, Fuerabamba’s rights got 
prioritized over those of other communities. Voluntary, age-old agreements 
concerning the sharing of water flows and springs among communities, based on their 
own experiential assessments and historically anchored in wider relations of sharing 
and mutual help, were replaced by a nation-wide formal system in which rights can 
be compared and transferred across places and thus becomes dis-embedded from local 
history, place, and cultural dynamics. 
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The chapter thus highlights that the formalization propelled by mining imposes a new 
normative hierarchy that privileges the rights of those aligned with the mining 
company over those that oppose it. This not just disrupts relatively well-functioning 
and sustainable ways of dealing with, sharing and caring for water. It also exacerbates 
old inequalities and creates new ones, when, in a context of competing claims, some 
enjoy the support of a mining company and the formal legal system and not others. 
My research findings of the Apurímac case thus lead me to make a plea for critically 
analyzing the impacts of water policies that mechanically advocate for ‘water rights 
formalization’ as a way to improve poor communities’ water security. Formalization 
always happens as part of the dynamic power-laden interactions between 
communities and between communities and mining companies. It is part of wider 
struggles over access to and control over water and land that characterize these 
interactions.  
Second: The mines control water in areas where they operate  
Large-scale mining operations entail major shifts in how water is used, owned and 
managed in the Peruvian Andes. Mining needs relatively large quantities of water in 
mostly arid or semi-arid zones. For accessing these water sources and flows, mining 
companies display a range of strategies. With a particular focus on the large mining 
operations of the Yanacocha gold mine, Chapter 3 shows that these strategies are not 
clear-cut, but entail long-winding, fuzzy and opaque processes of negotiation between 
communities and mines taking place in a highly unequal playing field. It is also a 
process in which all parties gradually develop more political astuteness: they learn 
which bargaining strategies are most effective, and become ever more smart in 
negotiating compromises. I show how water and rights figure prominently in 
negotiations about the compensation for mining impacts, with the mining company 
indirectly offering money or other kinds of benefits in return for communities’ water 
rights. Another strategy of the mining company to obtain water was to systematically 
deny existing rights. By damaging and blocking a canal constructed by farmers, the 
mining company could assert that it was in disuse, eventually even denying its 
existence altogether. In addition to thus intervening in the allocation of water rights to 
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obtain control over water, mining operations also more directly altered water flows 
through dewatering processes in the catchment areas, causing farmers downstream of 
the mine to lose their water sources. Because the mining company offered to provide 
them with treated water instead, the company de facto took over the authority of 
managing the upstream water sources. The net effect of all these strategies and actions 
combined is a thorough reconfiguration of water governance in the area: an 
irreversible transfer of water control powers from communities or state agencies to the 
wealthy transnational mining company. This de facto take-over raises serious concerns 
about questions of sustainability and equity, linked to the difficulty to hold the mining 
company accountably for the social and environmental impacts of its actions. 
Third: ‘Objective’ solutions do not help to deal with conflicts but legitimize the mining 
company’s water use  
To deal with the conflicts surrounding mining activities in the Peruvian highlands, 
state agents and the mining company Yanacocha make use of a number of strategies, 
including violence and informal bribes. The more formal strategies that mining 
companies deploy to deal with their contentious water-interventions are based on and 
make use of the objective and neutral image of law and science (or technology). First, 
by making sure that everything the company proposed to do was legally right by 
obtaining all required permissions, the company could dismiss many complaints by 
simply stating that it operates within the law. Second, the Yanacocha mining company 
made sure that what it did was backed up by scientific arguments and approval. It did 
this by commissioning scientifically approved impact assessments, as well as by 
proposing technologically advanced strategies to mitigate the impacts of mining on 
the environment, particularly on water. For instance, when – as was the case in 
Cajamarca – the process of mining risked draining and drying out entire lakes, 
Yanacocha proposed to compensate or replace the depleted water sources. One way 
of doing this was by building sophisticated treatment plants, which allowed cleaning 
and re-cycling the water it had used in its operations, water that could then be released 
to communities suffering from the depletion. These two strategies – based on law and 
science (and the use of sophisticated technology) - help give legitimacy to the 
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company's operations by associating it both with moral rightness and truth or 
modernity. Indeed, the discussed examples of chapter 4 show that legal compliance 
(formal justice) and technical (or scientific) accuracy function to legitimize mining 
operations, while the company’s use of sophisticated water treatment technologies 
also provides it with an aura of modern optimism.  
Law and technology (science) are thus strategically used as ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ 
solutions to dilute and resolve tensions. Yet, the chapter, and the entire thesis, has 
shown that these solutions are and can never be objective and neutral: any legal 
measure or scientific assessment is always coloured by prior assumptions about what 
is right and what is true. The fact that the mining company has much better access to 
these solutions produces a situation in which legality, scientific truth and technological 
superiority become the exclusive privilege of the mining company. The effect is that 
arguments brought forward by communities against mining operations, including 
those based on their knowledges and experiences, are quickly and easily dismissed as 
non-legal and non-rational. 
The chapter concludes that rather than correcting unsustainable or unjust behaviours, 
there is a real danger that these supposedly neutral or objective solutions work and 
are deployed as legitimizing devices for those in power, allowing them to continue 
with their work. In that regard, this thesis urges to understand that the complex and 
deeply political nature of mining conflicts makes it difficult or perhaps even 
impossible to institutionally or scientifically safeguard objectivity and neutrality. 
Instead of relying on forms of 'objectification' (law, science, technical solutions) that 
deny the intrinsically political nature of conflicts, water conflict resolution strategies 
need to recognize power differences and openly deal with them. Supporting 
communities (financially, technically and scientifically) to develop and mobilize their 
own legal and scientific contra-expertise could be one an important and meaningful 
step. 
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Fourth: Downward accountability is needed in contexts of extraction 
This thesis shows that the institutional mechanisms to hold mining companies 
accountable are mainly directed upward: companies need to meet national and 
international standards through reports that they themselves have compiled. The 
effect of this is that it is relatively easy for companies to make it seem as if their 
behaviours are within set limitations: it is not very difficult to do the required 
measurements and assessments in such a way that outcomes look reasonable. This 
creates the faulty impression that the impacts of their mining operations are minimal 
or reparable. The irretrievable damage of extractive operations on water-based 
ecosystems, endangering both biodiversity and rural communities’ livelihoods, 
thereby risk going unaccounted for. 
The chapter in particular draws attention to how existing institutional frameworks 
discredit or dismiss locally prevailing customary legal frames and knowledge systems, 
making it near to impossible for members of affected communities to legitimately 
articulate concerns, share their knowledge or question the behaviour of mining 
companies. Against this scenario, this thesis proposes that, for effectively and 
meaningfully regulating the sustainability of water resources and protecting water-
based ecosystems and livelihoods in mining contexts, upward forms of accountability 
need to be complemented by downward forms of accountability. The latter require 
ways to recognize, acknowledge and appreciate the intimate knowledge and 
experiences of those who are directly affected by mining operations in their everyday 
lives.  
6.3 Theoretical discussion: Contributions to water governance debates 
As elaborated in the section 1.3 of the introduction, this thesis engages with scholarly 
work documenting and discussing the implications of an aggressively expanding 
mining industry on local livelihoods and the environment, focusing especially on 
water. What lessons about water governance does the thesis generate? 
Aligning with approaches to water governance as deeply political, based on the 
acknowledgment that water is an always contested resource, the thesis distances itself 
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from more normative approaches to governance. In these approaches, the term ‘good 
governance’ – associated with the promotion of transparency, accountability and 
integrity – has become the seemingly neutral title for a distinct political reform agenda 
(Colebatch 2014: 308). This agenda marries ‘New Public Management’ to the advocacy 
of liberal democracy (Rhodes 1996: 656) through the encouragement of competition 
and markets; the privatization of public enterprises; reforms of the civil service by 
reducing alleged over-staffing; the decentralization of administration and the greater 
reliance on non-governmental organisations. One notorious operationalization of this 
reform agenda consists of the creation of markets for water or water rights, something 
that is expected to both improve the productivity of water uses and address concerns 
about environmental degradation (Bakker 2007). This particular political-ideological 
use of the term water governance that has most fiercely marked discussions and 
debates, as the reliance on markets or quasi-market mechanisms for regulating 
resources is deeply contested on many accounts (Boelens and Zwarteveen 2005, Ahlers 
and Zwarteveen 2009, Arsel and Büscher 2012, Büscher 2015). 
Indeed, in water the term governance is mostly used to normatively prescribe or help 
design particular institutional, organizational and financial arrangements for making 
water decisions and regulating water (Castro 2007, 2008, Meissner 2014, Zwarteveen 
2015, Woodhouse and Muller 2017). The thesis instead has attempted to make sense of 
and help understand actual processes of governing water. I have posited in the 
introduction that this requires, first of all, to make the question of what governance 
means for whom itself the object of critical investigation: how and by whom is the term 
water governance used, and for what political or analytical goals? To do this, 
Colebatch’ observation that some people have an interest in referring to (often simple 
and straightforward) definitions of governance to denote or indeed justify what they 
do (Colebatch 2014) is useful. The mobilisation of particular accounts of governing is 
thus itself part of the practice of governing, with that what constitutes a ‘good account’ 
depending on context (Colebatch 2014: 312).  
A second element of my analytical approach to describe and analyse water governance 
in mining contexts thus consists of acknowledging the many recursive linkages 
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between knowing water governance and governing water by accepting that any account 
of water governance is always deeply concept-dependent. The terms, categories and 
measurements used to describe and assess water governance are themselves, at least 
partially, informed by particular views of which form of governing (or governance 
structure) – be it the government, the market or networks – is best. 
A third element of my approach to the analysis of water governance is the focus on the 
detailed documentation of everyday dealings with water, anchoring reflections about 
water governance in everyday water practices. How do farmers, water operators, 
mining company employees, government officials, researchers, educators and others 
engage, deal and live with water in their daily routines and interventions?  
The thesis thus is an attempt to bring empirical depth to discussion on water 
governance through offering detailed accounts of governance practices, struggles and 
the interactive dealings and navigation strategies of communities and mines. By 
analysing several cases of interactions and conflicts between communities, mines and 
state water authorities in Apurímac and Cajamarca, this thesis adds to the debate of 
how politics are always inherent to and embedded in water control (e.g., Budds 2010, 
Perreault 2013, 2014a, Yacoub et al. 2015). These politics are often messy, consisting of 
long-winded processes of bargaining and negotiation in which all actors gradually get 
to know each other. Water governance in contentious contexts such as those of mining 
operations is necessarily a process full with contradictions, uncertainties and conflicts 
among actors –who have different political powers and interests in how water is to be 
governed and distributed (e.g., Roth et al. 2005, Swyngedouw 2005, Bridge and 
Perreault 2009, Zwarteveen and Boelens 2014, Perreault 2014b, Boelens 2015, 
Rasmussen 2015). 
Compiling the cases, and aligning with studies that look at the challenges,  
opportunities and threats for sustainably governing water when mining happens 
(Bebbington and Bury 2009), a main and overarching conclusion of the thesis is that in 
mineral extraction contexts, the preservation of water and ecosystems requires strong 
institutions to endorse the experiences, rights and knowledge of those affected by 
operations. Active support to the development of expertise to contest and challenge 
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the expertise mobilized by mining companies, as well as the development of 
mechanisms for downward forms accountability that go beyond cosmetic hearings 
and forms of participation (Sosa and Zwarteveen 2014) are needed here – in addition 
to other measures and actions directed at somehow creating a more even playing field, 
empowering and supporting communities to continue to protect what they care for 
without risking to be accused of criminal behaviour and without being lured into 
silence by huge sums of mining money.  
By showing the diverse gamut of practices and strategies deployed by different actors 
when seeking to access and control water, and when dealing with mining conflicts, 
this thesis also sheds light on the realpolitik nature of water governance in mining 
contexts. I have shown that actual water decisions and agreements often come about 
on the basis of often short-term practical or pragmatic considerations, rather than 
being based on moral or ideological principles. This is why a dichotomous co-option- 
accommodation versus resistance-revolt type of analysis of the interactions between 
mining companies and communities fails to shed light on the sometimes rather banal 
motivations of those engaging in them. Without denying the deeply unequal power 
relations that mark the interactions, nor the larger structural forces of capitalist 
development that they form part of, the thesis thus shows the importance of linking 
more structural analyses to an understanding of everyday strategies, governance 
processes, and livelihoods and water control arrangements.  
In sum, this thesis highlights the value of analyses that go beyond what prescriptive 
or formal frameworks mandate about using and distributing water. In its attempt to 
recognize how water governance is always political, the thesis has among other things 
shown that relying on or adhering to technical and legal frameworks makes deeply 
political questions disappear – a process that Li has famously called “rendering 
technical” (Li 2007). Thus, this thesis highlights that for interventions in mining 
conflict situations to be meaningful, they need to openly recognize and deal with the 
inherent and embedded political nature of conflicts (Sosa and Zwarteveen 2016). 
The thesis also makes a plea to go beyond the mere exposure of the politics and power 
behind or hidden in formal laws, technologies or science. Zooming in and engaging 
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with the messy everyday practices of accessing, using, managing and struggling for 
water at extraction sites, the thesis argues for taking individual and collective 
experiences, histories and meanings seriously in accounts of water governance. Here, 
it becomes important to acknowledge that outcomes of water governance practices, 
decisions and arrangements are not always easy to predict (Sosa et al. 2017).  
This thesis also adds to and usefully complements an emerging water grabbing 
debates (Franco et al. 2013, de Bont et al. 2016) by showing how beyond the direct 
appropriation of water, water grabbing may also happen in more indirect ways as a 
collateral by-effect of extractive industries that are not interested in the water per se, 
but just need it for their operations. Here, I show how the construction of advanced 
hydraulic infrastructure and treatments plants by mining companies serves as a 
legitimizer of the use of water by mining companies, who emphasize their financial 
investments in such technologies as evidence of their active contributions to 
environmental conservation. This is disingenuous, and I also show how these 
technologies dangerously work to shift the de facto powers of appropriating and 
controlling water to the company (Sosa and Zwarteveen 2012). 
6.4 Implications for governance practices 
Water governance in mining impacted regions in the Peruvian Andes faces huge 
sustainability challenges. These tend to get glossed over in official accounts, as 
extractive practices receive full support by the central government. The latter gives 
concessions without serious consideration for local natural resources strategies and 
rural livelihoods development (Bebbington and Bury 2010), as the national economy 
has become so dependent on the incomes of mining. Mining and other extractivist 
interventions usually take place in remote rural areas where formalized state rules 
have low legitimacy, application, or even seem to be absent. While this may make it 
relatively easy for mining companies to negotiate land- and water rights, it is 
important to realize that mining operations never happen in “legally and 
institutionally empty spaces”. Even in the absence of formal rights, mining operations 
happen in societal contexts characterized by existing governance arrangements, 
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natural resources management histories, vernacular water control institutions, farmer 
and indigenous knowledges, and local livelihood and community dynamics.  
Acknowledging the existence of current governance arrangements and the wisdom 
that they embody entails a fundamental re-consideration of existing procedures and 
institutions. This research stresses the need to understand and consider the already 
existing local water rights arrangements among rural communities, which determine 
the actual practices of water usage and governance at intra- and inter-communal levels 
(see e.g. Boelens 2015, Hoogesteger and Verzijl 2015, Rasmussen 2015). As Bebbington 
and Bury (2010) conclude, far from imposing mining, planning this activity requires 
careful consultation and interactive planning processes; collectively and publicly 
defining areas that could be considered appropriate for extraction, to better align 
mining to existing rural livelihoods and their vernacular modes of water governance 
and usage. This way also, by considering locally grounded questions and 
particularities of rural community environments and livelihoods, the extractive-
mining industry may be held accountable for its actions and impacts (cf. Sosa and 
Zwarteveen 2014).  
An important implication of my research for policy makers and practitioners thus 
refers to the need of fostering democratic governance processes. This requires openly 
acknowledging and addressing power differences in conscious attempts to create a 
more horizontal interaction where different water views interact with one another. 
Looking for example at how decisions for water allocation are made in contexts of 
competing claims, how decisions affect users, and in turn, how users can influence 
such allocations. Thus, materializing practices and strategies of social and 
environmental justice (e.g. Schlosberg 2004) asks for building countervailing forms of 
power and deliberation; multiscale interactions and platform collaborations that 
engage in resisting pervasive forms of accumulation of water and its control in the 
hands of the few, at the expenses of many (e.g., Bebbington et al. 2010, Hoogesteger 
2013, Hoogesteger and Urteaga 2013).  
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6.5 Reflection: Re-thinking water governance in community -- mine relations  
In this thesis I have shown the disputes and tensions between mines and communities, 
fighting for water (Chapter 2, 3, 4), for respect and for recognition (particularly in 
Chapter 3 and 4), but also struggling to get labour and material compensations 
through meaningful negotiations. As I observed in the introduction, this thesis 
navigates between disputes, resistance, opposition and negotiations for water and 
jobs, among other benefits. Grasping the intricacies between communities and mines 
in Andean extraction contexts, and the political complexities in permanently changing 
scenarios, asks for a subtle and refined focus. As I have observed above I suggest that, 
to understand how communities living next to large mining operations manoeuvre to 
continue with their lives and livelihoods, we should depart from black/white 
“resistance versus cooperation” arguments. 
To this respect, my research aligns with Bebbington and Bury (2013), Hogenboom 
(2015), and Li (2015), who warn against considering stakeholders as fixed categories. 
Instead, they are to be understood as undergoing and reflecting ambiguous 
relationships, different interests, views and purposes; their actions result from blurred 
scenarios whereby actors interact, negotiate and collaborate in unexpected ways. 
Coinciding with open conflicts and struggles, I found communities and mines 
gathering and bargaining around land and water rights, engaging in compensations, 
and working together in benefit sharing projects like sprinkler irrigation introduction. 
Every interaction interrelates with the other, sometimes overlapping each other, which 
results in different types of relations that range from forging community-mine 
alliances when convenient for both parties or opposing the mine when disagreements 
prevail. Most theoretical frameworks that try to reason only from resistance versus 
accommodation perspectives are ill equipped to grasp the fluidity and complexity of 
minescape realities. Essentializaling these positions and relations tends to bring 
disappointment and frustration to those who support or promote one particular 
community attitude or identity towards mining. 
Community – mine relationships evolve and change over time, depending on 
contingencies. Resistance and cooperation with mining companies, including multiple 
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shades and colours of negotiation, tend to coexist in one community and may alternate 
frequently. I engaged with farmers and their stories and, while being empathetic with 
them more than with the mines, instead of romanticizing their actions or struggles, I 
started to realize that their decisions and strategies have multiple layers and 
motivations that entwine in complex, non-congruent ways.  
Framings that portray communities’ wishes as “People do not want water, they want 
money” are too simplistic to understand conflicts within mining scenarios. Many are 
the possible consequences for communities when they engage in relations of protest, 
negotiation or collaboration with the mining company; these involve diverse and often 
difficult choices. Communities engaging in negotiations risk to be considered, by 
companies or the state, as only interested in benefits from the mines, dismissing their 
concerns regarding environments or rural livelihoods. At the same time, these 
communities risk being considered, by their own peers, as selling out, losing 
credibility, trust and any future support in case of unexpected consequences.  
6.6 Final remark 
Considering the evidences and analysis presented in this thesis, a fundamental water 
governance question that this thesis has brought to the surface is the question of the 
longer-term sustainability of water resources. In governance terms, this is a question 
of scientific and political representation: what is the truth about water, and who has 
the authority or legitimacy to speak that truth?  
I have shown that the triangular image of main actors -- communities, state and mines 
(Revesz and Diez 2006) -- cannot fully respond to the challenge of securing or 
protecting water and equitably sharing it. By law, the state assumes the responsibility 
of managing and caring for water, yet as this research has shown, in practice it is not 
able of doing this. Here, its dual role is particularly problematic: on one hand, the state 
acts as a regulator of natural resources use such as water, and on the other it acts as an 
active promotor of extractive industries. These two roles are often contradicting each 
other, with the enormous short-term economic benefits of mining often taking 
precedence over the less obvious longer term value of healthy rivers and water 
sources. The capacity of the state to effectively regulate water in Peru is further 
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compromised by the scattered and bureaucratic, centralistic functioning of its water 
authorities which, in addition to the in situ limitations of state agents who must adhere 
to technical-legal frameworks, prevents them from effectively dealing with water 
disputes. In the case of the mining companies, despite particular efforts to shift 
operations towards cleaner and more sustainable production or better community 
relations (Elizalde et al. 2009, Kemp 2010), the inherent, permanent need to extract 
water makes it difficult if not impossible to protect the water security of existing water 
users. Just like objectives of sustainability, objectives of fairness and justice thus 
become de facto sacrificed in favour of profits and so-called development. I do not join 
those who rely on rural communities as the only ones to turn to for helping safeguard 
and protect water resources, based on their inherent closeness to nature. The thesis 
shows that it is naïve to charge them with this task, as they – at least in the current set-
up – not just lack the financial resources, but also the legal and political powers, as well 
as the (access to) science and technology. They, in sum, can never by themselves 
challenge the enormous powers of mining companies-state alliances in their greed for 
profits. In addition, placing communities in the role of the saviours of water leaves 
little (analytical and political) room for community members to articulate and develop 
their own livelihood projects.  
Accepting that water mediates relations and it is in turn also shaped by relations, the 
thesis has shown that the way water is governed also determines how people relate to 
one another and vice-versa. In contexts of extraction, strategies to somehow re-
negotiate and challenge the extreme historical political and economic power 
differences are needed. These necessarily rely on networks and alliances that 
supersede local contexts - including NGOs, federations, Defensorías del Pueblo and other 
actors. Without romanticizing communities, neither easily giving away waters nor 
adhering with mines, these networks will pursue multiple agendas that have in 
common the active re-politicization of extraction – continuously and actively 
questioning the kind of development it forms part of and helps promote. These 
networks need to contribute to creating mechanisms to re-organize power and 
decision making, helping make these meaningful to the ones that face the 
consequences of extraction.
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Appendix 1. List of Interviews and key informants 
 
Number of interviews per category 
Category Number 
Farmers and communities’ leaders 50 
Local, regional and national state representatives  37 
Mining companies representatives 13 
NGOs, consultants and local researchers 26 
TOTAL 126 
 
 
Key informants  
 Informants Date Location 
1 Representative Ombudsman Office 2009-2015 Cajamarca 
2 Representative Regional Government  2009-2010 Cajamarca 
3 Representative ALA Cusco 2010-2012 Cusco 
4 Former leader Combayo 2009-2010 Combayo-Cajamarca 
5 Leader farmer irrigation canal  2009-2011 Combayo-Cajamarca 
6 Local authority 2009-2010 Combayo-Cajamarca 
7 Leader farmer irrigation canal  2009-2010 La Ramada-Cajamarca 
8 Farmer leader  2010 Fuerabamba-Apurímac 
9 Representative of local environmental NGO 2009-2015 Cajamarca 
10 Representative Yanacocha mining company  2009-2010 Cajamarca 
11 Employee Las Bambas mining company 2010 Apurímac-Cusco 
12 Leader farmer irrigation canal  2010 La Ramada-Cajamarca 
13 Representative of local NGO 2009 - 2015 Cajamarca 
14 Former local NGO employee 2010-2015 Apurímac-Cusco 
15 Community advisor 2011-2016 Cajamarca-Lima 
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Appendix 2. Mining concessions in Challhuahuacho – Apurímac 
  
 
 
Note: From 60.93% of the territory of Challhuahuacho given for mining concessions in 2005, to 
109.32% in 2014. Source: www.cooperaccion.com.pe (accessed Sept. 2014). 
60.93% 
109.32% 
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Appendix 3. Mining concessions in Cajamarca 
 
 
Note: From 2% of the territory of Cajamarca given for mining concessions in 1985, to 41% in 2014 
(Cerdán 2014) 
1985 -  2% 
2014 – 41% 
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Gold: production process 
Waste 
deposits 
1 . 
Exploration 
Drilling : 
to see 
mineral 
features 
2. Mining: extraction 
of soil & minerals 
from pits to leaching 
pads 
3. Transport: 
extracted mineral 
to leaching pads 
4. Leaching: cyanide 
solution washes 
extracted mineral. 
Pipes conduct ‘Au & 
Ag rich solution‘ to 
leaching ponds   
Leaching pad: 
platform 
irrigated with 
cyanide solution 
Impermeable 
membrane at the 
bottom of the pad 
Most used water 
recirculates in 
closed cycle & 
cyanide is 
 
Cyanide drip 
irrigation 
system (50g 
per 1000 L 
 
Water 
treatment 
plant applying 
reverted 
osmosis 
5. Merril Crowe 
Process: Au & 
Ag rich solution 
treated with Zn 
to get solid 
mineral 
6.  
Refinery &  
Smelting:  
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Gold production at 
Yanacocha 
Appendix 4. Gold production in Yanacocha mining company – Cajamarca 
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Appendix 5. Research fieldwork guide: Water notions in Las Bambas –
Apurímac 
Lineamientos para trabajo de campo: Gestión del agua en contextos mineros, Caso Las Bambas – Apurímac 
– Perú 
Lugar:    Provincia de Cotabambas, distrito Challhuahuacho 
Actores:  Comunidades vecinas al proyecto minero Las Bambas Compañía X-strata, estado.   
Responsable:  Milagros Sosa /Grupo IWE - Univ. Wageningen 
Contacto – Sur :  Centro Bartolomé de las Casas CBC – Cusco (Facilidades y apoyo).  
____________________________________________________________________ 
1. Situación de las aguas comunales  
Detalle: 
Explorar el estatus de las aguas de las comunidades. Observar la forma de obtener acceso al agua, control y 
distribución (en actividades agrícolas). Analizar las prácticas locales, asignación de derechos y 
responsabilidades y de autoridad. Si es que han pasado por un proceso de reconocimiento o formalización 
por el estado. De ser así si cuentan con permisos de uso y/o licencias a títulos personales o comunales y los 
usos a los que se destinaron las aguas. Así también –si aplica- seguir el accionar de las organizaciones de 
regantes en la zona. De encontrarse permisos para uso agrícola, si se cuentan con las autorizaciones de uso 
sobre infraestructura (canales de riego). 
2. Esfuerzos de las comunidades por asegurar sus fuentes de aguas  
Detalle: 
Seguir, reportar y analizar los mecanismos o estrategias que tienen las comunidades que conviven o que están 
en contacto con actividades mineras para defender/asegurar o garantizar su acceso al agua así como el 
control/uso de fuentes. 
Nota: Se asume que la minería principalmente en su fase de operaciones puede competir por el agua con 
otras actividades comunales como agricultura y/o ganadería. En el caso dee Las Bambas que se encuentra 
en exploración, observar si las comunidades están tomando algunas acciones para asegurar sus recursos 
ante inminente explotación minera. 
3. Situación de las aguas minero  
Detalle: 
Actividades mineras actuales y/o potenciales requieren asegurar agua y tierras. En el caso de aguas, 
observar la situación de concesiones o licencias/permisos gestionados o en gestión por la empresa. 
Cntidades, fuentes, fines y posible construcción de infraestructura. Esto también podría dar una idea de 
actuales y posibles conflictos socio-ambientales con comunidades asentadas en la zona que pueden estar 
haciendo uso de las mismas fuentes o caudal.  
4. Primeros impactos o impactos esperados de las actividades mineras  
Detalle: 
En los recursos hídricos: practicas, usos & actividades, fuentes, infraestructura 
En las comunidades: procesos de polarización, desplazamiento, priorización de otras actividades 
productivas, migración  
5. Situación de conflictos agua, comunidad, minería  
Detalle: 
Analizar las estrategias empleadas por actores involucrados en conflictos (Negociación, compensación, 
expropiación, protestas, etc.). Identificar-analizar actores, sus intereses, posiciones, características y contextos 
–sociales, económicos, políticos y culturales (para entender reclamos y/o demandas). Analizaran 
interacciones o relaciones entre dichos actores. 
6. Implicancias de la ley de recursos hídricos (29338) en contextos mineros (si aplica?)  
Detalle: 
Integrando la problemática de la zona con el contexto nacional y los cambios en la legislación, analizar por 
ejemplo influencia de la ley, presencia del estado, (consejos de cuenca) –definición de prioridades o 
actividades a desarrollar en la zona, uso del territorio y recursos (agua, suelo, etc.).  
 
Resumen:  
A. Temas potenciales preguntas: Usos del agua (comunidades, empresa), impactos mineros (agua/ 
comunidades)  
B. Niveles de contestación: Recursos / Reglas y derechos/ Autoridad /Discursos 
C. Estrategias  
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Summary 
This thesis documents as well as questions how the presence of large mining 
operations in Andean regions of Peru alters waterscapes and hydro territories. Taking 
conflicts over water as a useful entry-point for the analysis, it explores and unravels 
the dilemmas and challenges that the main actors involved have to deal with: rural 
communities and (representatives of) mining companies, in addition to the state in its 
various manifestations. Through an in-depth portrayal and analysis of how 
communities and mining companies navigate these challenges, focusing on those 
related to water, the thesis sets out to understand what happens with water in contexts 
of mineral extraction. It traces changes in how water is accessed, controlled and 
governed, and by whom. By thus making the inherently situated, complex and power-
laden character of water politics in mining contexts explicit, the thesis sheds light on 
how mining reconfigures water governance arrangements, while also contributing to 
wider debates about water governance in contexts characterized by huge disparities 
of power. 
The thesis is structured in six chapters, with chapters 2 – 5 being previously published 
separately as peer reviewed articles in scientific journals. Chapters 1 and 6 provide the 
overall coherence to the thesis by presenting the introduction and the conclusions. 
Chapter 1 starts by explaining how it is useful to define and analyze water governance 
(in contexts of extraction) as consisting of everyday politics, with rural communities 
and mining companies struggling for water and, at the same time, engaging in messy 
and contradictory relations of collaboration, cooptation, contestation and conflict. 
Using this everyday politics lens, the thesis sets out to answer the following research 
question: “how does water governance evolve in contexts of large mining operations in the 
Peruvian Andes?”. As field work sites the Las Bambas and Yanacocha mining 
companies in Apurímac and Cajamarca, respectively were selected, as these are the 
places where highest levels of discontent and conflict associated with mining 
investments are recorded. Doing fieldwork in such contentious and politically charged 
environments is challenging, demanding that the researcher – just like the other actors 
– cautiously navigates positions and interests in attempts to establish relations of trust 
with all actors, without taking the easy stance of claiming to be neutral or objective. 
Summary 
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Chapter 2 shows that the impacts of mining interventions profoundly reconfigure 
customary and formal water control arrangements around, among, and within rural 
communities. Zooming in on processes of formalizing water tenure relations in 
communities neighboring the Las Bambas mining company, it demonstrates the 
inherent contradictions that accompany these reconfigurations. Although 
formalization, as a state-endorsed legal instrument, may provide security to some 
users by officially recognizing their water uses, it also inevitably introduces new 
political-normative hierarchies between communities and erodes existing local water 
sharing and management arrangements. The chapter thus highlights that new claims 
to water provoked by the mining company generate tensions with these communities’ 
arrangements, actually threatening their very existence.  
Chapter 3 shows that the operations of the Yanacocha mining company in Cajamarca 
provoke a fundamental reshuffling of how rights to water are allocated in the area, 
profoundly changing water access and distribution. The chapter argues that these 
changes can be understood as a form of water grabbing, since they result in a de 
facto transfer of water control from communities or the state to the mining company, 
which thus comes to assume responsibility over water allocation. By meticulously 
describing two contentious cases: La Ramada canal and the San José reservoir, the 
chapter sheds light on the company’s overt and covert strategies to  obtain water. 
These include negotiation with communities; the offering of compensations in return 
for water rights; as well as replacing ‘natural’ water with treated water to mitigate for 
community’s loss of access to water.  
Chapter 4 illustrates how to solve conflicts and deal with opposition to mining 
operations, the state and the mining companies make use of a combination of legal and 
technical strategies. The chapter questions the effectiveness of these strategies, 
focusing on the sustainability of water resources and rural livelihoods. Using the case 
of conflicts in Combayo around the Yanacocha mining operations, the chapter shows 
that although legal and technical conflict resolution strategies effectively diffuse 
tensions and legitimize mining operations, they do not address the underlying 
inherently political causes of such conflicts. These conflicts thus continue to simmer in 
the background, threatening to erupt every time matters of contention surface. The 
chapter states that instead of those ‘objective’ quick solutions, solving conflicts around 
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mining operations requires explicitly admitting and dealing with the fact that they are 
inherently political, situated, and power-laden. 
Chapter 5 uses illustrations from the large gold mine, Yanacocha, to assess the 
effectiveness of institutional mechanisms for safeguarding the sustainability of water 
resources, and water-based ecosystems, in mining regions. The chapter shows that in 
these regions, the sustainability of water is mainly regulated through upward forms 
of accountability, those that depend on the mining company's compliance with 
national and international regulations. These forms of accountability dismiss and 
ignore existing ‘local’ knowledge (and associated ways of living with and caring for 
water) of communities affected by mining. The chapter concludes that the preservation 
of water and ecosystems requires enabling institutions that combine existing upward 
forms of accountability with more downward ones that endorse the experiences, rights 
and knowledge of those affected by mining.  
Chapter 6 summarizes and discusses the major findings of the research and shows 
how these contribute to larger theoretical and policy debates on water governance. 
Considering water governance as everyday practices, this thesis highlights that in 
contexts of mineral extraction (a) Mining developments reconfigure local water 
governance arrangements with contradictory consequences for affected communities; 
(b) Mining companies become the de facto water managers responsible for water 
access and distribution in areas they operate (c) Compliance to the law and the use of 
technology are used as strategies by the mining companies to legitimize their actions 
and impacts, allowing them to continue with business as usual; (d) The preservation 
of water based ecosystems requires downward forms of accountability, that is to say 
institutions that endorse experiences, rights and knowledges of those affected by 
extraction. The chapter discusses the implications of the research for water governance 
practices, and presents reflections about ways to understand water governance 
arrangements as everyday politics.  
In sum, the thesis is a contribution to practice-based theorizations of water governance. 
Its main practical conclusion is its emphasis on the need to create countervailing 
powers and expertise to those of mining companies – state alliances through 
mechanisms and networks that empower local communities, helping them to 
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effectively contest, engage in discussion and debate with and deal on more equal terms 
with their nasty neighbours. 
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